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Abstract
NGOs have been consistently excluded from multilateral proceedings in the security and
disarmament sector where states are concerned about their national security interests.
And yet, they have found avenues to participate in the multilateral process through the
negotiation of treaties, provision of expert research and testimony, systematic monitoring
of state compliance, documentation of UN proceedings, and even as members of
government delegations. This paper explores the conditions that enable NGOs to engage
directly in the state-centric system of the United Nations, addressing political
opportunity, enabling resources, and institutional support. I explore how NGOs
contribute to international politics, using a constructivist approach, to consider the
important role NGOs play in the security and disarmament sector.
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Chapter 1 - NGOs and the UN System

In various fora at different times in the history of the UN, NGOs have been at the
centre of proceedings, or at the distant periphery, barred from substantive discussions. In
the security and disarmament sector, however, NGOs have been consistently excluded
from proceedings with a national security and disarmament theme. Peter Willetts
(1996:1), an expert on the place of NGOs in the UN system, in differentiating between
'high' and 'low' politics on the international agenda observed: "Governments expect to
dominate disarmament negotiations, military alliances, armed conflicts and the
international arms trade. On the other hand, they will usually be cautious about claiming
any authority at all in sport and religious affairs". NGOs have a long history of activism
on the 'peace' agenda around specific conflicts and particularly on nuclear disarmament,
but until recently, the security and disarmament field has not seen NGOs in a prominent
role. Directly engaged in the negotiation of treaties, the provision of expert research and
testimony, systematic monitoring of state compliance, the documentation of formal UN
proceedings, and as members of government delegations, NGOs have found recently
found avenues to participate in UN activities in various security and disarmament areas.
What conditions have enabled NGOs to engage directly in the state-centric system
of the United Nations? Specifically, why has the security and disarmament sector seen
the proliferation of highly specialized NGOs and individuals functioning in roles that
complement official processes? Openness to NGOs, access to new operational tools, and
an increasingly supportive institutional environment all contributed to the emergence of
1

such actors. With the end of the Cold War, the explosion of internet-based
communications, and the emergence of new non-state actors engaging in the political
process across national lines, the environment for NGO engagement in the UN system
changed dramatically in the 1990's and set the stage for these initiatives. NGOs have
found new ways to employ their skills in what has historically been a closed area of
multilateral diplomacy, partnering with states and UN agencies in the provision of
services. These NGO initiatives contrast to the image of global civil society that emerged
in the 1990's, but I would argue are indicative of democratization in international politics
and the blurring of the line of state sovereignty in the UN arena.
Non-governmental activity in the security and disarmament sector has generally
fallen into two categories: activism, typified by mass rallies, protests and publicity stunts;
and advocacy, including letter-writing, lobbying and information dissemination for public
awareness. Service NGOs have always existed in the humanitarian aid and development
fields, working in close cooperation with governments in the delivery of aid programs.
The record of NGO activity in the multilateral realm grew extraordinarily in the 1990's
with activity around the major UN summits, as well as meetings of the international
economic institutions, and smaller international meetings like the G8, APEC and World
Economic Forum that drew organizations from around the world. The protests of the new
'anti-globalization' movement were first seen in 1999 at World Trade Organization
Ministerial meeting in Seattle and subsequent G8 and World Economic Forum meetings.
Terms such as 'global civil society' and 'transnational civil society' emerged in the
policy literature in an extensive debate around a new 'third force' in international
politics.1
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At the same time, however, non-govemmental organizations working in the
multilateral context began to employ tactics that mirrored the corporate world.
Employment of specialized experts; the production of highly refined marketing materials;
targeted fundraising and publicity strategies; as well as new information dissemination
tools, became increasingly common across various NGO sectors. This
'professionalization' of NGO activity borrowed tools and strategies from business, think
tanks and government agencies to implement new operational projects. Among
international and specialized NGOs, the UN system was the locus for this activity. These
borrowed skills laid the foundation for NGOs to fulfill roles perceived to be in the
domain of states. Through the provision of services such as treaty monitoring, document
collection and as expert advisors to governments, NGOs assumed central roles in the
multilateral system. The pre-eminent case of an NGO in this capacity is the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines
Among the most important multilateral accomplishments of the 1990's was the
negotiation of the 1997 "Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction", familiarly
called the Landmines Ban or Mine Ban Treaty. The NGO community - led by the ICBL
as an umbrella network of over 1200 partner organizations - was instrumental in calling
for the ban on antipersonnel mines.2 Upon the ICBLs inception in 1992, the founding
organizations issued a "Joint Call to Ban Antipersonnel Mines" and brought together a
network of like-minded NGOs from the humanitarian, development, human rights, arms
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control and faith sector.3 Together, the NGOs and national campaigns that made up ICBL
worked with a group of sympathetic governments that ultimately became the drivers
behind the so-called 'Ottawa Process'.4 The ICBL's strategy to achieve a landmine ban
focused on providing evidence-based research on the effects of antipersonnel (AP) mines
on civilians; lobbying sympathetic governments to address the problem internationally;
and levying public awareness of the issue. Critical research by Human Rights Watch and
the International Committee on the Red Cross (ICRC) established the baseline research
about the humanitarian effects of anti-personnel mines. Subsequently, NGOs in mine
affected regions provided victim testimony and field research, while the ICBL engaged
high profile public figures to garner media support for the issue. The network structure of
the ICBL broadened the activism and advocacy around the issue and later in the process,
information technology enabled the participation of groups from developing and mineaffected regions.5
The ICBL broke new ground in the disarmament sector through its close
collaboration with governments to realize the goal of a Mine Ban Treaty. The landmines
campaign itself is widely regarded in the NGO community as a model of a successful
campaign strategy: the groundwork was laid with strong research; the network featured
affected people, public figures and nationally-based campaigns; and NGOs worked with
governments throughout the - admittedly unusual - negotiations.6 But IBCL's leadership
did not stop with the achievement of the Treaty; attention shifted to monitoring the
Treaty's implementation through the Landmine Monitor project. In its preface to the first
Landmine Monitor annual report in 1999, the ICBL noted that this was "the first time that
non-governmental organizations are coming together in a coordinated, systematic and
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sustained way to monitor a humanitarian law or disarmament treaty, and to regularly
document progress and problems."
Although the ICBL case is exceptional, it is a useful example of NGOs
performing tasks and fulfilling roles typically belonging to state parties and UN agencies
in the security and disarmament sector. Following the successes of the ICBL and the
emergence of Landmine Monitor, there has been a profusion of efforts by NGOs in other
security areas to perform treaty verification or document treaty implementation using
similar methods. NGOs are also performing documentation services, providing the
primary repositories of statements and official documents pertaining to a certain treaty or
UN body ensuring public access to the record of proceedings. Others are engaged in
treaty negotiations or implementation as consultants, NGO representatives and official
delegates in areas where previously NGOs were kept at the sidelines. Chayes and Handler
Chayes (1995: 252) describe the variety of parallel and supplementary roles played by
NGOs in regime management:
They are independent sources of information and data that can be used by the
regime. They help to check and verify party reporting. In many cases, they
provide the basic evaluation and assessment of party performance that is the
fulcrum of the compliance process. They have provided technical assistance to
enable developing-country parties to participate in treaty negotiation and
administration and to comply with the reporting and sometimes the substantive
requirements of the treaty. They perform mediating and facilitating services.
Where there is noncompliance, they are key to public exposure, shaming, and
popular political response. In a real sense, they supply the personnel and resources
for managing compliance that states have become increasingly reluctant to
provide to international organizations.
This paper will explore the evolution of NGO activity in the security sector to
consider why NGOs are increasingly assuming essential roles and responsibilities. At a
general level, there is both an opening for NGOs to fulfill these roles and some level of
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support for them to become involved in this way. On one hand, NGOs appear to be
meeting needs not otherwise met in the various treaty regimes, by incapacity or
negligence. On the other, there appears to be increased acceptance to the participation of
NGOs in the international, multilateral system. New tools are enabling the NGOs to
provide such complimentary services, supported by professional tactics to project
implementation.
In the security and disarmament context, where NGOs have historically focused
on advocacy and activism, new activities are observed demonstrating a high degree of
professionalization and integration. The cases to be examined in depth are the ICBL's
Landmine Monitor system; the documentation and archival services provided by the
Reaching Critical Will project in the nuclear disarmament field; and contributions by
individual experts on official government delegations in the small arms, biological
weapons and nuclear regimes. The intention is to gain insight on the variety of NGOs that
are engaged in the provision of key services in the security and disarmament,
acknowledging that some are very small projects with narrow functions, or relatively
new, but others are large, well-funded research groups. The examples cover a wide range
of activities, including official UN bodies, formal treaties with broad adherence, and
instruments of a more informal character.
The conditions that have enabled NGOs to contribute to the security and
disarmament field will be discussed in terms of opportunity, means and institutional
support. Changing state relations, and therefore multilateral dynamics, in the post-Cold
War will be explored to consider how, in a system defined by sovereign state
membership generally closed to direct NGO engagement, opportunities emerged for
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NGOs to assume these roles. The case studies demonstrate incidents where a lack of
capacity among states has enabled NGOs to supplement official efforts, and others where
NGOs fill a gap in the institutional framework of the regime. There is evidence that some
state parties were open to NGOs expertise, advocating their engagement, and this
leadership will be considered.
The political opportunity to take on such roles is important because in most cases
a new initiative was designed, expanding the NGOs mandate to engage in this activity.
But NGOs also require the means to implement these programs. In this light, I will
consider how organizational developments have facilitated the move from traditional
NGO activism and advocacy to professionalized service provision. This will require an
exploration of new tools, namely information technology, human resources, and
strategies including outreach and research programs that have become essential features
of many NGOs' work. States' openness to NGO contributions is in part a result of the
perception that NGOs have specialized skills and expertise that generalist government
officials do not share. I will explore the notion of an increasingly 'professionalized' NGO
sector.
The initial entry into these NGO activities required opportunity and means, but
the growth in this area stems from external and relationships with key institutional actors.
There was a climate of openness to engagement with NGOs in the multilateral
environment, fueled by donor support for such initiatives, and the leadership of key
states. A shift within the UN agencies themselves to promote increased cooperation with
NGOs will also be considered, including recent panel studies on UN-NGO interaction.
Each of these conditions - the opportunity, means and assistance for NGO participation in
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the security and disarmament sector - will be explored against the case study evidence in
an analysis of NGO engagement in what was previously a sector with limited direct NGO
participation.
The research for this paper has relied on a combination of secondary sources and
factual interviews with individuals involved directly in each of the three cases. These
interviews included email and telephone communication as well as face-to-face meetings
and were non-standardized. A complete list of interviewees is attached as Appendix 1. As
a former project associate with a Canadian peace and disarmament NGO, I have firsthand experience working with Reaching Critical Will and with some of the individual
NGO experts, and personally served as an NGO Representative on the Canadian
delegation to the 2003 NPT PrepCom in Geneva, Switzerland. To minimize personal bias
I have endeavoured to examine other projects with which I am familiar only by
reputation.7

Defining Concepts
There are three primary elements to be examined in this study, NGOs, states, and
the security and disarmament sector, each of which requires some discussion to clarify
terminology. This discussion will probe further into the historical relationship with NGOs
in the UN system; the sovereign state and its roles and responsibilities; and the nature of
the security and disarmament sector within which this NGO behaviour is observed.
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Sovereignty and Multilateralism
The study of international politics, particularly according to the neo-realist and
neo-liberal paradigms, is fundamentally state-centric, and examines the balance of power
between sovereign states. The principle of sovereignty - defined by Christian Reus-Smith
as "the notion that the state should hold absolute authority within its territory and
recognize no higher authority outside" (1998:7) - is the qualifier of statehood. The Peace
of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years War in 1648 established this principle and a
system of territorially bound sovereign states in Europe. While sovereignty has evolved
from absolutist monarchical regimes, to the current dominant political system of
democratic states operating within the multilateral system, statehood still prioritizes
territorial sovereignty.8 A discussion of sovereignty and state in the multilateral system is
a useful starting point for this analysis of NGO engagement in that system.
The United Nations Charter identifies sovereign states as its Members, as per
Article 2, which outlines the organization as being "based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members" (Article II, Paragraph 1). Attributes of the
sovereign state as identified in the Charter include: territorial integrity, political
independence and jurisdiction over domestic affairs. Membership is obtained therefore by
virtue of holding status as a sovereign state and signing the Charter, which thus entitles
the state to a vote in the General Assembly, representation on the Security Council and
Economic and Social Council on a rotating basis, and participation in all other UN bodies
and treaties according to their specific membership rules and procedures. Chapter VII of
the Charter provides additional insight on the concept of state sovereignty, with respect to
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. The enforcement

9

measures defined in Chapter VII, determined by decision of the Security Council and
with mutual cooperation of the Membership, must be consistent with Paragraph 7 of
Article II. The intervention clause respects state sovereignty, ensuring that the Members
of the UN do not "intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of any state" (Chapter I, Article 2, Paragraph 7). Ongoing debates about
military intervention in cases of humanitarian crisis are focused on the principle of state
sovereignty and the limitations outlined in the Charter.
The primary unit of analysis in the study of multilateralism is the sovereign state.
Multilateralism is articulated through the various organs of the United Nations, including
its formal committees, subsidiary and partner bodies, and the framework of treaties and
agreements that together constitute our system of global governance. John Gerard Ruggie
(1992: 571) provides a definition of 'multilateralism' that engages its qualitative
attributes, as:
"an institutional form which coordinates relations among three or more states in
accordance with generalized principles of conduct - that is, principles which
specify appropriate conduct for a class of actions, without regard to the
particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in
any specific occurrence."
While often 'multilateral' is used in reference to a global or universal body, this is not
always true; indeed the term 'plurilateral' is often used instead of multilateral to describe
an institution made up of a small group of states. However, multilateralism assumes that
states engage in a relationship with an agreed framework for cooperation.
A discussion of statehood and what this means in the multilateral system is
instructive with regard to the engagement of NGOs in the security and disarmament field.
It is sovereign states, as UN Members, that have specific rights, so defined in the Charter,
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of participation in UN bodies. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines the
parameters of Treaty law, outlining the terms and conditions of states' adherence to a
treaty. These rights as UN members or states party to a treaty also entail certain
responsibilities. The relationship between rights and responsibilities of UN Members is
described in Article 2 of the Charter, which states: "All members, in order to ensure to all
of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfill in good faith the
obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter" (Charter I, Article
2, Paragraph 2). These responsibilities vary according to the body or document, but can
be summed up as cooperation with other Member states, contribution to the operation of
the UN system, and compliance with the requirements of its constituent bodies and
agreements.

Non-State Actors
The non-state actor or group is simply defined as any entity made up of private
actors without legal status as a sovereign state. The term is used to describe a range of
groups, in contrast to the legal state, and by definition NGOs are non-state actors together
with intergovernmental organizations, commercial actors, criminal cartels, and rebel
groups. In the introduction to their analysis of non-state actors in international relations,
Reinalda, Arts and Noortmann (1998) identify three categories of non-state actors:
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Figure 1: Non-State Actors

Transnational
actors

International
Actors

Non-governmental
public-interest-oriented
(non-profit)

Non-governmental
profit-oriented

Public-Interest NGOs

Business INGOs

NGOs, private
organizations or social
movements:
• Proper NGOs
• Governmentally
organized NGOs
• Quasi-NGOs
• Donor organized
NGOs
• Grassroots
Organisations
• Citizen networks
•
•

International
NGOs
Internationally
active national
NGOs

•

•

Transnational
corporations
(TNCs)
Criminal
organizations

Governmental publicinterest-oriented

Transgovernmental
actors*

*refers to cross-border
relations between
representatives of
(semi-)governmental
institutions below
government level
Multinational
corporations (MNCs)

•

Nation-states or
governments
representing
them
• InterGovernmental
Organisations
Reproduced from Reinalda, 1998:13

While useful particularly for classifying the range of public-interest non-governmental
organizations, Reinalda's table demonstrates the limitations of the term 'non-state actor'.
It has some utility to compare entities against sovereign states, but its generality requires
further precision for clarity, as is evident in light of the range of NGOs alone, and
therefore it will be avoided.
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Non-Governmental Organizations
A variety of other terms are often used interchangeably with 'NGO', complicating
the question of its definition. Gordenker and Weiss list alternative usages for the NGO
sector including: "...independent sector, volunteer sector, civic society, grassroots
organizations, private voluntary organizations, transnational social movement
organizations, grassroots social change organizations and non-state actors" (1996: 18).
The commonly used term 'civil society' is the subject of intense debate, complicated in
that NGOs are made up of members of civil society, and alternatively form part of civil
society with a wide range of additional groups. Further, there is wide discussion of the
emergence of a global or transnational civil society and the place of NGOs in that
phenomenon.10 Other terms, including grassroots organizations (GROs) and communitybased organizations (CBOs), are used to describe local NGOs, but will not be used
because these are less useful in the multilateral context.11
In order to minimize definitional pitfalls, the term non-governmental
organization, or NGO, will be used exclusively in this paper because it is the most widely
accepted term for those organizations that are engaged in political activity in the
multilateral process as private organizations without the authority and rights of states.
The principles outlined in Resolution 1996/31 of the Economic and Social Council of the
UN, the current version of the NGO Statute, provide a useful framework within which to
define the term NGO. Although these principles apply specifically to the designation of
an NGO in consultative status with ECOSOC, they provide accepted standards within the
multilateral context. The second principle holds that an organization "shall be in
conformity with the spirit, purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations"
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and the third that an NGO "support the work of the United Nations and to promote
knowledge of its principles and activities." Principles 10-12 speak to the established
nature of an NGO, in terms of its constitution and governance structures, underlining that
organizations established by a government do not qualify. A final general principle notes
that NGOs are non-profit organizations. These broad principles thus disqualify entities
such as guerilla groups, criminal groups or organizations that espouse violence, political
parties, and corporate or profit-driven entities.13 The line between NGOs and academic
institutes can also be unclear, so for the purpose of this study organizations affiliated with
an academic institution will be included, when they have a separate governance structure
and act as a non-profit.14
The ECOSOC principles speak to the attributes of NGOs, but are less illustrative
of intention or objective. In general terms, NGOs advance principled positions on
relevant international issues in order to bring their moral authority to bear in the influence
of policy change. Khagram, Riker and Sikkink (2002:4) define NGOs as "private,
voluntary, nonprofit groups whose primary aim is to influence publicly some form of
social change." There is an implicit assumption that organizations driven to influence
social change make an inherently positive contribution to civil society and are likeminded in their principles. Normative claims about the intentions of NGOs are
problematic, as is evident in the small arms and light weapons context, where gun control
coalitions that advocate strong gun control legislation and affiliates of the National Rifle
Association, proponents of the right to bear arms, participate together in the UN process.
In her review of the literature on NGOs in the development field, Claire Mercer (2002:9)
observes a pre-dominant "allegiance to the normative ideal that civil society and NGOs
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are inherently 'good things'; microcosms of the (liberal) democratic process, comprised
of the grassroots, both separate and autonomous from the state, while acting as a
'bulwark' against it."
Gordenker and Weiss (1997:20) propose a definition which holds that NGOs are
"private citizens' organizations, separate from government but active on social issues, not
profit making, and with transnational scope." They add the useful caveat to their
definition regarding transnational scope, or organizations "having transnational goals,
operations or connections, and active contacts with the UN system" (1997: 20).
Technically grassroots or community-based organizations may share the same
characteristics of internationally focused NGOs, and may even be larger or more active,
but it is the domestic focus of their work that differs. To that end, it is organizations with
a transnational scope that are of interest in my research, regardless of size. Gordenker and
Weiss further distinguish between NGOs and Intergovernmental Organizations or IGOs,
which have unique membership structures, usually made up of national affiliates.
International NGOs or INGOs are described as organizations with an international
framework or federative, multi-state membership, however this term will be avoided
here. While some of the case studies are very small and localized groups, all have a
distinctly international focus, though only the ICBL would technically constitute an
INGO. This distinction is useful in considering not the essential characteristics of the
organization, but the focus of its work. Mary Kaldor (2003: 82) in her work on Global
Civil Society also suggests 'international NGO' is a misleading term that assumes
organizations without an international structure do not have an international interest:
"Indeed almost all social movements and NGOs, including parochially minded
nationalist and religious groups, have some kind of transnational relations.
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Precisely because these groups inhabit a political space outside formal national
politics (parties and elections), they address a range of institutions (local, global
and national), they operate through links with a range of international institutions
(NGOs, inter-governmental organizations, foreign states, Diaspora groups) and
they often receive funding from abroad."

NGOs as 'Quasi-State' Actors?
The term 'quasi-state' was first used by Robert H. Jackson in his book, QuasiStates: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World to describe the weak
states that emerged in the collapse of colonialism. Defined by their legal status as
sovereign entities, Jackson depicts quasi-states as those states that possess negative
sovereignty, or freedom from external intervention (by virtue of their sovereignty), as
opposed to positive sovereignty, or the freedom to act and deter (because of their limited
military power).15 This application has been used further to examine the roles of African
states and micro-states in the UN context.16 The term 'quasi-state' has some utility in
discussing NGOs, used not as a noun to describe a category of state, but as an adjective to
describe the kind of activity in which that non-state actor is engaged. This usage suggests
that the actor has assumed a state-like quality because of the official nature of its
involvement in the specific multilateral context. 'Quasi-state' could describe those
functions that are expected of the membership of a Treaty by the relevant security and
disarmament organ, or its support system within the UN, which for whatever reason are
not being implemented so NGOs have unilaterally taken on that responsibility.
There are, however problems with the use of the term 'quasi-state' to describe
non-state actors that have assumed responsibilities that would typically fall to states or
agencies in the UN system. It suggests that such NGOs have a state-like level of agency
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and self-determination, implying that they have equivalent rights in the UN system,
including a right to vote, which is not the case. Further, the term infers that NGOs seek a
state-like status in these roles, which is misrepresentative of NGOs that value highly their
independence in the UN system. For these reasons, 'quasi-state' will not be used. The
term 'de facto' is appropriate to some degree in describing activities that have assumed a
quasi-official place within the regime. But I will avoid categorizing the ways in which
NGOs are partnering in the implementation of the specific Treaty or operation of the UN
body, except to describe how these tasks are complimentary to state and UN mechanisms.
While on one hand serving the health of the regimes, NGOs gain unique access to
governments not previously seen in the security and disarmament field through these
functions. The place of NGOs within the broader international system has a long history,
and the limited role for NGOs in the security and disarmament sector must be understood
within this context.

The Historical Interplay between NGOs and the UN
The history of NGO-UN relations is older than the current UN system itself: a
wide range of grassroots, community and even international NGOs pre-date the
establishment of the League of Nations. A substantial community of NGOs including the
World Alliance of YMCAs, International Committee of the Red Cross, Fellowship of
Reconciliation, Woman's International League for Peace and Freedom and the Save the
Children International Union, among others, was established by the end of World War I.
Through the 1920's the NGO community, led by the Union of International Associations,
promoted the League of Nations and participated in the early proceedings of League
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meetings and committees. Bill Seary observes that this relationship ultimately changed:
"In general, the interaction between the League and international NGOs changed from
one of NGOs supporting and contributing to the policy work of the League to one where
the League was less interested in the opinions of NGOs but more willing to provide
information for and about them" (1996:26).
The NGO community was active in the negotiations that led to the agreement of
the United Nations Charter at the United Nations Conference on International
Organization held in San Francisco in 1945. Education, health and human rights themes
were undoubtedly elevated in the final draft text because of the lobbying of NGOs,
particularly the representatives of major US organizations. But the greatest success at
the conference was the inclusion of Article 71 in reference to the Economic and Social
Council, which states:
"The Economic and Social Council may make suitable arrangements for
consultation with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with
matters within its competence. Such arrangements may be made with
international organizations and, where appropriate, with national organizations
after consultation with the Member of the United Nations concerned."
It was recognized that NGOs had competencies in social and economic themes, and their
input on these issues could have value to states. Notably, from the outset, issues of
national security were considered outside the realm of NGO expertise. In 1946, a
committee was established under ECOSOC to define the nature of the ECOSOC
consultative relationship, made a Standing Committee of ECOSOC in 1947. Through the
Standing Committee discussions NGOs were defined as international, regional and
national organizations, though with limited roles for nationally-based NGOs. The
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evolution of these categories over the successive iterations of the NGO statute is outlined
below:
Figure 2: Levels of ECOSOC Consultative Status for NGOs
1946-50
Resolution 3
(II)

1950-68
Resolution 288
B(X)

1968-96
Resolution
1296 (XLIV)

1996-Y
Resolution
1996/31

Category A

Category A

Category I

General Status

Category B

Category B

Category II

Special Status

Category C

Register

Roster

Roster

Type of NGO
in each
category, since
1996
Global, large
membership
and work on
many issues
Regional and
general or
specialized and
high status
Small or highly
specialized or
work with UN
agencies

Reproduced from Foster and Anand, 1999: 250

Throughout the Cold War, NGO engagement in the UN system grew, with the
greatest increase among those organizations included on the Roster, the small or
specialized organizations. During this period, Cold War politics came to bear on
ECOSOC consultative status negotiations. In 1968, Resolution 1296 was adopted by
ECOSOC, requiring that NGOs report to the Council on their activities, allowing for
suspension of consultative status if it was determined that the NGO received government
financial influence, engaged in politically motivated acts against States Members of the
UN, or "had not made any positive or effective contribution to the work of the Council or
its commissions or other subsidiary organs" in the preceding three years (Section 36, Part
VIII). Although this change resulted in intense debate and states instigated votes on the
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status of several organizations, Willetts observes that the NGO community emerged from
this period "virtually unscathed" (1996:33).
Another avenue for NGO engagement with the UN was created in 1968, when
ECOSOC adopted Resolution 1297 regarding the partnership between the UN
Department of Public Information and NGOs. The outcome was the establishment of the
DPI/NGO Section and an associational relationship with NGOs for the purpose of
information dissemination and exchange. Based on criteria, consistent with the ECOSOC
Statute, an NGO with "the commitment and the means to conduct effective information
programmes with its constituents about UN activities" can acquire associated status, upon
approval by the DPI review committee.18 At a working level, the UN Non-Governmental
Liaison Service provides services both to the UN system and to NGOs to enhance their
cooperation. A major component of this work is a range of news and information
products and orientation materials for NGOs seeking to participate in UN activities.19
ECOSOC accreditation remains the primary, though not sole means of NGO cooperation
with UN member states; however, this was challenged by developments at the World
Summits of the 1990s.
The 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development,
commonly known as the Earth Summit, was an important event in the history of UNNGO relations for a number of reasons. The representation of civil society at the
conference was unprecedented, with some 2,400 non-governmental actors attending the
Summit while an additional 17,000 representatives participated in a parallel nongovernmental forum,20 many of which were not from NGOs with consultative status. But
more importantly, the Earth Summit was the first major UN conference to adopt rules of
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procedure that expanded the participation of NGOs beyond ECOSOC parameters to
include 'relevant non-governmental organisations'. The rules of procedure adopted in the
preparatory process defined NGO participation as including the right to submit written
presentations as official UN documents and make oral interventions at the discretion of
the Chair. Notably, the rules of procedure did not require that these NGOs have ECOSOC
status per Decision 1/1 of the Preparatory Committee, noted in UN document A/45/46
(1991: 22-3). As a consequence, the Earth Summit had a lasting impact on the
relationship of NGOs with the UN in that its concluding document, Agenda 21, explicitly
called for "Procedures [to] be established for an expanded role for non-governmental
organizations, including those related to major groups, with accreditation based on the
procedures used in the Conference" (Paragraph 44, Chapter 38, UN Document
A/Conf.151/26). Having opened the accreditation process to 'relevant NGOs', the
Summit set a standard that broadened the potential community of NGOs involved in the
multilateral process beyond the limitations in the ECOSOC Statute.
The explosion of NGO activity in conjunction with the World Summits saw the
multilateral system impacted by the activity of non-governmental actors operating within
grassroots networks, virtual communities (for the first time) and international campaigns.
Much of this organized activity was enabled by the nascent internet boom. Even with the
end of the world summits, the tide had shifted and NGO activity around UN proceedings,
major conferences and treaty negotiations was changed dramatically. Fundamentally this
was the result of sheer growth. Estimations of the number of active NGOs are just that,
estimations: they vary greatly depending on the definition of 'NGO' employed. As of
October 2007, there were 3051 organizations in consultative status with ECOSOC.21 The
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most widely used figure for NGOs engaged in the UN system is that of the Union of
International Organizations which in its 2007/8 edition, tallies some 52,000 international
non-governmental organizations. Approximations of the number of global grassroots,
non-profit and community-based organizations range widely, to the millions.

The Security and Disarmament Sector
This study focuses on the security and disarmament sector, a term used as
shorthand for what is actually a comprehensive regime of treaties, multilateral sub-treaty
level agreements and UN-affiliated bodies that deal with security themes. Two arms of
the UN have responsibilities for security and disarmament: the UN General Assembly
through its First Committee, within which the total membership of the UN debates, and
votes by majority on, a wide range of security questions in consideration of thematic
resolutions; and the UN Security Council (UNSC), which is mandated by the Charter to
undertake enforcement actions under the parameters of Chapter VII and is made up of a
rolling membership with five permanent members who have a right of veto. The
Conference on Disarmament (CD) is the cornerstone of this regime, because it maintains
sole responsibility for formal negotiation of disarmament treaties. A unique institution,
the CD does not have universal state membership; rather, it is made up of the five nuclear
weapon states and sixty others and periodically considers entrance of new members.
Under these official bodies comes a range of multilateral treaty-level agreements, which
address specific disarmament programs. Among these are the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), the Biological and Toxin
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Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction. A range of agreements that are at the subtreaty level also fall into this category, with the Kimberley Process for the Certification of
Rough Diamonds and the UN Program of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons
among these.
By its nature, the security and disarmament sector deals with issues that are
perceived to be sensitive because of their implications for national security. Debates over
potential enforcement actions against a state of concern, or negotiations that require frank
discussion of domestic military assets or policies, are approached with caution and
restraint by most states. Consistent with the state-centric view of international affairs,
security themes have typically been viewed as 'hard politics' in the domain of
governments. Although at its creation UN member states recognized the possible value of
NGO input on economic and social themes in Article 71, no such provision was made for
consultation with NGOs on security issues. Neither the Security Council nor the General
Assembly had any allowance for NGO participation or formal avenues for consultation
however NGOs have long pursued informal means to engage with states around these
themes. Without any direct channels for participation, an NGO Working Group on the
Security Council was established for informally coordinated exchange with UNSC
member states.24 Most major NGOs maintain offices in New York to monitor
proceedings and lobby states. The CD is interesting in this regard as all negotiations
occur in closed session with no direct participation by NGOs and plenary meetings have
only limited opportunity for observation by members of the public. There is however
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extensive informal exchange with CD members, fostered by a strong Geneva-based
disarmament community including the UN Institute for Disarmament Research. Annually
on International Woman's Day, a statement is read to the CD membership by the highestranking UN official in Geneva on behalf of the NGO community.25
The security and disarmament treaties have a range of arrangements governing
NGO access that differ significantly from the rules of procedure for standing UN bodies.
While for example, general debates and opening speeches in most conferences of states
parties are open to NGO observers, substantive discussions are typically held in closed
session. NGO participation in annual meetings of states parties, preparatory committees
and review conferences is for the most part limited to the hallways of the UN where
distribution of materials and organization of seminars and briefings takes place outside
the official conference hall. In some instances, for example meetings of the NPT Review
Cycle and the Biennial Meetings of States on the illicit trade in small arms and light
weapons, NGOs are granted a limited time to make presentations to the plenary. Unlike
the human rights sector, which is centered on the UN High Commission on Human
Rights with its annual Human Rights Council meeting where accredited NGOs can make
interventions, the security and disarmament sector has no single dedicated UN body.
Multiple processes, some centered in Geneva and others in New York or Vienna, deal
with a range of technically disparate and sensitive themes with different rules for NGO
participation, and thus dilute NGO engagement on the wider agenda.
In the development and humanitarian sectors, NGOs have long been seen as
partners of states and UN agencies, acting as service providers and sub-contractors in the
delivery of food aid, medical services, emergency relief and implementation of broader
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development initiatives. Multi-million dollar international relief organizations, or national
grassroots operations, such service NGOs regularly operate as field agents for UN and
state aid agencies. Particularly useful in times of conflict, this relationship enables donors
to channel funds to local service providers, reducing overhead, engaging domestic actors
without costly external involvement, and alleviating concerns about allegiances. While
NGOs are major voices in the human rights and environmental fields, the relationship
between states and NGOs is generally more antagonistic. Security-based UN organs,
including the multilateral disarmament treaties, the CD, First Committee and Security
Council have typically featured limited direct NGO participation and regularly operate in
closed sessions. Yet, it is in these areas where there are several significant cases of NGOs
performing important functions, including treaty monitoring and verification,
documenting official proceedings of UN bodies, acting as an informal treaty secretariat,
and even participating directly in treaty negotiations and reviews.
In a multilateral system where membership is dependent on statehood, and
particularly in the politically sensitive security and disarmament sector, how have NGOs
come to play such roles in the proceedings of UN bodies and treaties? It is in the balance
of rights and responsibilities where NGOs have found a niche within which to perform
functions that are within the purview of states, but which are not otherwise being done.
An opportunity to engage with states in this way has fueled the emergence of highly
professionalized NGO behaviour. In some cases, states are negligent in maintaining
certain tasks or functions of a regime, whether by unwillingness or lack of capacity. In
other cases, states openly welcome NGO engagement, providing support for activities by
way of financial aid, access to official proceedings or policy statements. Before
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examining particular cases in detail, it will be useful to consider international relations
theory, primarily constructivism, with regard to NGO roles in world politics. A
theoretical model will be introduced in a discussion of how NGOs engage in the
multilateral system. Finally, a theoretical development that was seen in the security and
disarmament sector in the immediate Post-Cold War years, the discourse around 'human
security', will be examined because it challenged the pre-eminence of state sovereignty
and provided an opening for greater NGO engagement in the multilateral arena.
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Chapter 2: A Constructivist Framework for NGO
Engagement in Multilateralism
Tremendous growth in the NGO sector in the last 20 years has inspired a
profusion of research on the relationship between NGOs and the United Nations and the
impact of NGOs on international politics. William DeMars (2005: 36) in his critical
analysis of NGO theory observed that NGOs received little serious attention during the
Cold War, but they ".. .continued to burrow into the nooks and crannies of world politics
whether or not scholars paid any attention. Finally, in the early 1990s, NGOs became
impossible to ignore, and the decline of security threats made it possible for scholars to
see them." The evolution of the literature has traced developments in international
relations theory more broadly. I will consider elements of the three major theoretical
approaches with regard to NGO contributions to world politics. Then, a model will be
introduced that considers how NGOs adapt their approaches to engage with states in the
multilateral system.
Realism is a political theory based on an understanding of the nation state as the
primary unit of politics, which functions in the national interest so as to retain and
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increase political power. John J. Mearsheimer (1994: 10) provides a useful summary of
realism, describing it as being predicated on five assumptions about the state system: the
international system is anarchic; states inherently possess some offensive military
capability; there is always uncertainty about the intentions of other states; the motive of
states is survival; and states always think strategically to maintain their sovereignty.
Realist approaches have largely ignored non-governmental actors as having no real
power in international politics, or as Peter Willetts summarized: "If international relations
27

in the traditional view concerns the interactions between 'states', which seek to mobilize
'power' to promote their respective 'national interests', then pressure groups [NGOs] are
not relevant to international relations" (1982: 1). Realism provides useful perspective
about the state decision-making calculus, but as NGOs become increasingly active in the
multilateral context, realism has not grown to account for the NGO role in the
international system, thus inspiring a variety of theoretical responses.
Early interpretations of non-state actors' engagement in international politics
sought to account for the impacts of the range of political actors on the international
system, while retaining the central tenets of realism.27 In the 1970's, neo-liberal
transnationalists first addressed non-state actors' contributions to international politics.
Keohane and Nye (1970: 380) proposed a new 'world politics' paradigm to "broaden the
conception of actors to include transnational actors and conceptually break down the
'hard shell' of the nation-state." But their analysis gave limited attention to broader civil
society including NGOs; rather it focused on the economic realm. Peter Willetts (1982)
responded to their work with his analysis of'pressure groups', defined as transnational
political actors that 'mobilize legitimacy' separate from the exercise of military power
and disposal of economic resources. Grounded in liberalism, these approaches maintained
a state-centred approach but accounted for other influences on state decision making.
The third dominant international relations theory adopts the view that politics has
a social base, that governments are 'social organs' made up of people whose complex
relationships affect the decisions made by governments. Critical theory includes a cluster
of approaches but the one of particular interest here is Constructivism. The primary
concern of the Constructivist approach is structure; however, this is viewed as a multi-
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faceted social construction including both tangible and intangible components. Wendt, a
leading proponent of Constructivism, describes a rational approach, whereby state
interests are "in important part constructed by systemic structures, not exogenous to
them" (Wendt, 1995:75). Arguing that these social structures are not merely concepts,
Wendt describes them as having three elements: shared knowledge, material resources,
and practices, which act as "collective phenomena that confront individuals as externally
existing social fact" (Op cit: 75).
Constructivism has spawned a variety of theories that have explanative power
with regard to NGO roles in international relations which will be considered more fully.
The 'global norm' is one social structure that is widely debated in international relations,
and is of particular interest in terms of NGO impacts on the multilateral system. Martha
Finnemore cites an accepted definition of a norm as "a standard of appropriate behavior
for actors with a given identity" which "embodies a quality of 'oughtness' and shared
moral assessment" (Finnemore/Sikkink, 1998:891-2). Jeffrey Checkel explains how
Constructivists modified the neo-liberal view of norms as a creation of states serving a
regulatory function, without causal force: "For constructivists, by contrast, norms are
collective understandings that make behavioral claims on actors. Their effects reach
deeper: they constitute actor identities and interests and do not simply regulate behavior"
(1998: 327-328). Scholars developed a norm 'life cycle' (See Figure 3) to describe the
institutionalization of norms.29

29

Figure 3: Stages of Norms
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Reproduced: Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:898

NGOs contribute to the development of a global norm at various points in its
lifecycle, particularly through the emergence and cascade stages as promoters of the
norm. Sometimes founded specifically for the purpose of promoting an emerging norm,
NGOs can provide the organizational structure within which norm entrepreneurs operate
in persuading states to adopt the norm, as was seen in the landmine case by the ICBL. In
the early stages of norm growth, NGOs socialize a norm by drawing attention to it,
engaging the public in the 'cascade' process. The cases to be explored in this paper show
another aspect of norm development as the various NGOs are engaged in
institutionalizing the respective norms, working with states in increasing the legitimacy
of what is either a new, or not fully developed norm. These NGOs are acting as norm
promoters.
The literature on the role of non-state actors, including NGOs, in norm
development has been expanded to consider the specific attributes that these actors offer
to the norm life cycle. Primarily, NGOs are seen to hold unique moral authority within
the realm of international politics, where they are considered a 'third sector' or 'third
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force' distinct from government and commerce. Khagram et al (2002: 11) describe the
function of this third sector:
If the business sector has been characterized by the drive for profit and the
government sector by the use of authority, the third sector, or nongovernmental
sector, could be characterized by the search for meaning. The individuals and
groups in this sector are primarily motivated to shape the world according to their
principled beliefs.
In his review of the burgeoning normative literature on transnational activism in the late
1990's, Richard Price argues that "transnational activists [a term inclusive of NGOs]
derive their authority from three principal sources: expertise, moral influence, and a claim
to political legitimacy" (2003: 587). It is the perception of both a principled position and
expertise that generates the notion of NGOs having authority on an issue, and thus
holding political legitimacy in international relations.
Expertise is the underlying concept in Peter Haas' notion of an 'epistemic
community' defined as a "network of professionals30 with recognized expertise and
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue-area" (Haas, 1992: 3). Epistemic communities,
drawing on their independent expertise on a specific issue, affect the policy making
process by informing decision-makers and influencing social institutions. This approach
does not assume correctness or truth in the information, but describes the manner in
which experts as part of an epistemic community facilitate consensus on a policy
question (Op cit: 23). While the literature on epistemic communities has generally
focused on natural or social scientists, the term can be applied to other areas, and is
applicable to the security and disarmament sector where technical expertise and valuebased policy approaches are prevalent.31 That is not to say that the entire disarmament
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community of NGOs is a unified epistemic community, as clearly there is not a
universally agreed rationale, policy approach or specific outcome among all actors.
Martha Finnemore, in her work, National Interests in International Society,
observes the role of persuasion in norm development, noting: "Normative claims become
powerful and prevail by being persuasive; being persuasive means grounding claims in
existing norms in ways that emphasize normative congruence and coherence" (1996:
141). While her focus is the legal sector, she argues that states are made up of people
whose preferences are malleable and can be affected by persuasive arguments. The
element of persuasion is an important consideration with regard to NGOs, as deemed
experts or moral authorities on an issue. NGOs that have political access through the
multilateral system increase their ability to influence and persuade states of policy
positions. Therefore, the influence of NGOs on norm growth is enhanced when they are
directly engaged in international politics with the ability to employ persuasion.
The theoretical framework for this study must take into account on one hand, the
ways in which NGOs contribute to world politics as non-state actors, and on the other
hand the ways in which NGOs adapt to engage with states to affect politics. Early
pluralist ideas recognized the contributions of non-state actors in international relations
and neo-Liberal Institutionalists further clarified how non-state actors contribute to
politics in a state-centric world. But Constructivists expanded international relations with
a sociological interpretation, identifying the range of social structures impacting the
policy-making process and the different actors engaged in politics. They accept that states
make policy decisions by interpreting a range of social elements, allowing for non-state
actors to impact the policy process. This theoretical perspective is useful in defining some
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of the ways in which NGOs acquire 'political legitimacy' in the international arena as
norm promoters, moral authorities and epistemic communities. All of these attributes can
be observed in the case studies of NGOs in the security and disarmament sector. While
constructivism provides broad-brush categorization of NGO roles, useful in a discussion
of what impacts NGOs have on world politics, its focus still rests with the state. Kerstin
Martens calls the work to date on NGOs one-sided, identifying motives for their
cooperation with IGOs and their influence on the international process, but failing to
explain impacts of international engagement on the NGOs themselves (2005: 16). In light
of my interest in the emergence of professionalized NGOs engaged in the security and
disarmament field, this challenge is a relevant one.

A Model of NGO Institutionalization and the International System
The "new transnationalists" of the 1990's revisited the concept of'transnational
relations' first debated in the 1970's. Defined as "regular interactions across national
boundaries when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a
national government or an intergovernmental organization" (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 3), the
focus of 'transnationalism' was narrowed. It was focused on identifiable actors linked
across at least two societies, including those promoting principled positions, namely nongovernmental organizations, coalitions and transgovernmental networks; and those
motivated by economic gain, namely multinational corporations. The previous
transnationalist debate stalled on arguments over the state-centric view of international
relations, toward which the new transnationalism adopts a broad view:
One can subscribe to the proposition that national governments are extremely
significant in international relations and still claim that transnational actors
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crucially affect state interests, policies and inter-state relations. Confusing the
impact of transnational relations on world politics with a "society-dominated"
view of international relations leads one to overlook the more interesting question
of how inter-state and transnational relations interact. One does not have to do
away with the "state" to establish the influence of transnational relations in world
politics. (Risse-Kappen, 1995: 15)
Responding to developments in institutional theory the transnationalist approach
examines two variables: domestic structures - the political institutions, societal structure
and policy networks of the state - and international institutions. Domestic structures are a
determinant of the degree to which non-state actors impact policy development in
different states, while international institutions facilitate transnational relations and act as
channels whereby transnational actors access governments. The approach posits that the
interaction between domestic structures and international institutions determines impact
on the policy process. This theory is adopted and slightly expanded by Kerstin Martens as
the basis for her model of NGO institutionalization.32
Martens' research assesses NGO activities in the humanitarian and human rights
sectors by employing a theoretical model to assess adaptation through interaction with the
UN and provides some useful guidance for this study. She describes three broad
categories of activities engaged in by NGOs and how patterns of NGO activity change
with respect to IGOs. Her research assumes the transnational approach to describe
internal and external variables that affect NGO relationships with IGOs (Martens, 2005:
13-14). Her explanatory model considers the internal characteristics of the NGOs, or their
composition, and their external function, how they institutionalize relations with the UN,
as variables affecting the kind of activities in which they engage (See Figure 4).
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Figure 4: NGO Institutionalization in the UN System - expanded model
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The basic model is useful with regard to NGO activity in the security and
disarmament sector, but it has some limitations and requires broadening. The model
proposed by Martens is designed for international NGOs, made clear by her description
of NGO composition as 'transboundary' and the more precise qualifiers of'centralist' or
'federative'. Although Martens seeks to describe 'Characteristics of Internationally
Operating NGOs' (emphasis added, 2005: 25), she assumes that there are only two types:
international federations of loosely connected, independent NGOs, or strongly linked
national organizations with a central head representative. Having based her model partly
on what she calls the trans-social approach, this is perhaps not surprising, but it begs the
question as to whether small, specialized NGOs operating at the UN level but without
international affiliates or a network structure would fit the model. She hypothesizes that
the loose structure of federative organizations increases their willingness to adapt in order
to be recognized by the UN, while centralist organizations operate through many
channels and are less dependent on UN relations (2005: 29-30). It can be correlated that,
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like a federative network, a small, specialized NGO also would be dependent on its
relationship with the UN as its primary vehicle to operate internationally.
The second NGO characteristic she describes is function, of which she identifies
two: advocacy, described as agenda setting and policy input, and service, which she
limits to humanitarian assistance and development aid. The case studies selected by
Martens apply with regard to both composition - all are international NGOs with either a
centralist or federative framework - and also function; they are limited to the human
rights (advocacy) and development (service) sectors. Her narrow model of NGO
function, with case studies chosen to fit it perfectly, is not sufficiently flexible to include
the kind of activities seen in the security and disarmament sector. These cases show
attributes of more traditional advocacy work requiring the policy expertise she
recognizes, but provide services to states not unlike sub-contracted aid delivery. This
problem is also evident in her description of NGO activities, which include policy
initiating activities (agenda setting, information provision and lobbying); policy
developing processes (policy advice and formulation); and policy implementing practices
(cooperation and sub-contracting in completing specific tasks) (2005:18). This final
category is limited it to delivery of services related to humanitarian aid and "support to
people in need" (2005:31). Specialized NGOs with a high level of expertise and
professionalization act in many ways more like a service NGO.
Of greater value in Marten's model is its recognition that the element of
institutionalization of NGO relations with the UN system is a factor that affects changes
in NGO activities. She describes two types of institutionalization: internal organizational
modifications and external demands on organizations that regulate behaviour. To assess

36

the optimization of organizational structures to facilitate interaction with other social
groups and mobilize necessary resources, Martens includes indicators such as
representation in New York or Geneva, division of labour with respect to UN activities,
and issue specialization. External institutionalization is explicitly a constraint of the UN,
assessed through formal association with the UN as dictated by consultative
arrangements. Unfortunately, her parameters are narrow and only include the official
ECOSOC, Department of Public Information, and Non-Governmental Liaison Service
channels of UN affiliation, not rules of procedure that govern individual Treaties,
conferences or UN organs and which vary widely.
There are some areas in this model that would be better viewed with a wide lens,
but I would also argue that there are fundamental gaps in Martens' model. First, her
analysis of external institutionalization does not sufficiently account for the political
context of UN institutions. Assuming a monolithic UN, or IGO as she regularly calls it,
does not take into account the dramatically different political contexts across UN bodies
and issue areas, which are always in flux depending on political circumstances. The
championing of NGO participation by a state, or complete obstruction of NGOs by
others, reflects particular state interests, linked with the specific issue under examination.
Accounting for NGO participation in a specific UN body or forum cannot be limited to
the consultative arrangements defined under ECOSOC; rules of procedure in some cases
are re-negotiated regularly and the role of a meeting or committee Chairperson - who
always represents a state, with its domestic interests - can be very important in how
NGOs are accommodated.33 Second, she limits her analysis to change within existing
organizations. Cases in the security and disarmament sector show several instances where

37

new NGOs were created to fill a given function. The element of opportunity, or the
political context, is therefore a key factor affecting why NGOs pursue a particular project
or strategy. This could be interpreted negatively - whereby the need is not otherwise
being met and thus NGOs assume responsibility for it - or positively - whereby NGOs
are invited or welcomed to take the subject role.
Elements of Martens' model provide useful guidance for the examination of
behaviour among NGOs in the security and disarmament sector, but it will not be applied
dogmatically to the case studies. Rather, my analysis will begin with a consideration of
the political climate within which the cases have emerged in the security and
disarmament field, to assess the element of 'opportunity', the opening by which each
project was created. Secondly, consistent with Martens' model and the analysis of NGO
characteristics, I will examine the composition and function of the various NGOs, or
what I see as the 'means' with which they are enabled to pursue this kind of activity,
including specific resources at their disposal and organizational structure. Finally, taking
into account 'institutionalization', I will consider interaction with the UN and other
governments, or what may be regarded as institutional support to implement the projects.
Martens' model acts as a framework for this analysis and Constructivism lends
further insights into the roles NGOs play in international relations. But to further frame
this analysis, a major policy development that coincided with the growth of direct NGO
engagement in the security and disarmament sector will be examined in depth. The
Human Security debate was important with regard to NGO participation in the
proceedings of the UN and as an umbrella concept it impacted all three elements of this
study: opportunity, means, and assistance.
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The Human Security Paradigm
The release of the UN Development Programme's Human Development Report in
1994 spawned an academic debate, new security paradigm and NGO advocacy tool that
made humans the referent subject of security. Adopting an individualistic approach to
security reminiscent of early liberal philosophy, the human security discourse presented a
challenge to traditional state-centered security.34 The greatest challenge with regard to
this concept of human security is consensus on a definition, with a fundamental debate
over scope. The UNDP report proposed a seven part 'agenda' of human security
addressing economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political
security with the individual as the central reference point. The report rejected the
traditional focus on state security ensured by armaments, to describe human security in
terms of freedom from fear and freedom from want (UNDP, 1994: 24). The 2003 report
of the independent Commission on Human Security adopted a broad perspective defining
human security as the means "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that
enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment.. .from critical (severe) and pervasive
(widespread) threats and situations" (Chapter 2, p 4). Taylor Owen asserts that this
approach differentiates human security from human development in that it denotes
urgency, where dire emergencies risk the vital core of the individual, rather than a
'laundry list of threats' (2004: 19).
A much narrower approach espoused by a Canadian school of theorists focuses on
violent threats to the individual, consistent with a more traditional security perspective
but viewed from a different point of reference and thus embracing a wider range of
threats.35 Andrew Mack has criticized that the broad agenda mixes independent and
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dependent variables by assuming that interconnected factors like war, hunger and poverty
all threaten human security, thus minimizing its explanatory value. Similarly, Keith
Krause argues that the broad definition "does not allow us to see what is distinctive about
the idea of 'security', and how it is inextricably tied up with the threat and use of
violence" (2004: 368). The 'freedom from fear' approach, with its focus on violent
threats to individuals, is attributed with having expanded the multilateral security agenda
by elevating issues affecting woman, children and civilians through debates over
landmines, small arms and light weapons, conflict resources, and child soldiers.
Human security has received wide attention in the multilateral security and
disarmament sector among 'middle power' states.36 Canada championed the notion,
notably under Minister of Foreign Affairs Lloyd Axworthy, and its leadership on
landmines was framed in terms of human security. The Commission on Human Security
was established in 2001 by Japan to promote public understanding; develop the concept
of human security as a policy tool; and propose a program of action to address critical
and pervasive threats to human security. Several states that embraced the concept as a
framework for their multilateral policy joined to form the Human Security Network in
1999 at a Ministerial Meeting in Norway, adopting a list of common principles. Member
states38 cooperate to develop common positions from a human security perspective and
have worked on landmines, the International Criminal Court, children in armed conflict,
small arms and light weapons, trans-national organized crime, and human rights. A
fundamental objective of the Network is to "energize political processes aimed at
preventing or solving conflicts and promoting peace and development", and this goal is
pursued in part through cooperation with NGOs. At its second Ministerial Meeting in
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Lucerne, Switzerland (2000), the Network recognized the role of NGOs in "developing,
advocating, building and implementing human security" and "undertook to work
nationally and in international fora to promote greater engagement, inclusivity and
transparency between governments and civil society on human security issues."
More than a decade after the 1994 UNDP report launched the debate about human
security, the human security concept remains somewhat ambiguous, however the
fundamental elements are agreed: individuals are the focus of a human security paradigm,
not states; threats to individuals' security extend beyond traditional, militaristic threats
and are linked with human development; and human rights and humanitarian law have a
central role in the paradigm, thus challenging the immutability of state sovereignty.
Advocates of human security question absolute state sovereignty and have inspired an
intense debate around its limitations in cases of dire humanitarian crisis. The issue of
humanitarian intervention and the parameters of Chapter VII of the UN charter were the
subject of a dedicated International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
which in 2001 issued its final report, entitled "A Responsibility to Protect". The events
that led up to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 saw adaptation of this discussion, notably
by Anne-Marie Slaughter and Lee Feinstein (2004), to justify intervention in sovereign
states to respond to threats from weapons of mass destruction. They proposed "a
collective 'duty to prevent' nations run by rulers without internal checks on their power
from acquiring or using WMD" (Feinstein and Slaughter, 2004: 136).
The human security debate also drew attention to the role of NGOs in the security
sector, particularly in light of NGO leadership in the landmines case. From the
conceptual shift to make individuals the referent subject of security, a logical conclusion
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holds that citizen's organizations and NGOs could have useful insights and potentially
important contributions to build up that security. Several states that have championed a
human security agenda are also proponents of NGO access to multilateral proceedings
and major funders of NGO activities. Canada created a Human Security Program,
renamed the Glyn Berry Program for Peace and Security in 2006, with funds to support
projects by NGOs, academic institutions, and even foreign governments or international
organizations working in relevant areas.39 The Swiss government funds a range of human
security-related research institutes, notably the Geneva Centre for Humanitarian
Demining and the Small Arms Survey. And governments including Canada, Sweden,
New Zealand and Mexico speak regularly in the NPT context on NGO access rights.
The human security debate challenged immutable state sovereignty and as a
consequence, supported civil society. The conditions that enabled NGOs to find openings
in particular security and disarmament bodies by which to assume new roles broadly
coincided with growing acceptance of a human security paradigm. It is therefore an
important consideration with regard to the political climate, or element of opportunity, for
NGOs to participate in the state-based system. While this policy discussion certainly
contributed to political openness to NGO activity among some states, other dynamics
were at play in each of the specific cases. These will be examined in detail, beginning
with the important example of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and
its assumption of a monitoring role for the Antipersonnel Landmine Ban Treaty.
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Chapter 3: A Political Opportunity
Considering that NGOs are external actors, with limited rights of participation in
the state-based UN system, it is useful to commence discussion of the case studies by
considering the element of opportunity. What are the openings used by NGOs to become
involved in key roles in the security and disarmament sector? The element of opportunity
has both external and internal aspects, driven by other actors or the organization's
program interests. I will consider external impacts including interaction among states
parties and between specific states and the NGO, as well as gaps in the particular regime.
Internal aspects include moral or organizational interests in pursuing the activity. For the
three case studies the element of opportunity was a pre-determinant of the NGOs
becoming engaged in the particular project that has ultimately come to play a central role
in maintaining the regime.

The Landmine Monitor: A Logical Extension of NGO Leadership
The leadership of the ICBL in achieving the Mine Ban - in cooperation with a
network of NGO partners, a core group of supportive states, and prominent international
organizations including the ICRC - was introduced in the opening chapter. The role of
the ICBL in the lead-up and Treaty negotiation phases40 has been examined in depth in
the policy literature but I will consider a lesser-studied part of the story: the origins and
development of Landmine Monitor. Landmine Monitor is the pre-eminent example of an
NGO assuming a role to implement a treaty on behalf of states party. Its annual report on
state compliance with the Treaty and progress towards its universalization has become
the de facto monitoring and verification system for the Treaty. The 'opportunity' seized
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by the ICBL to take on the monitoring function was an extension of its successful work
leading up to the Ottawa Process. In order to understand more fully why the ICBL took
on the monitoring function, it will be important first to consider the Treaty itself, namely
its compliance and verification scheme. Secondly, I will examine the important
relationship between the ICBL member organizations that founded Landmine Monitor
and the states that acted as patrons of the project. This interaction was a continuation of
the important NGO-state cooperation that reached fruition with the Ottawa Process and
was instrumental in the Landmine Monitor's creation.
The Mine Ban Treaty contains very modest compliance measures. Article 7,
entitled "Transparency Measures", establishes a reporting requirement, and Article 8,
"Facilitation and clarification of compliance", outlines the means which states can use to
resolve compliance questions.41 Article 7 requires that states submit status reports to the
UN Secretary-General on their progress to implement the Treaty, including national
implementation measures, the number of stockpiled anti-personnel mines, the location of
mined areas, mines retained for training purposes, status of destruction and decommissioning programs, total destroyed anti-personnel mines, and nature of mines
produced (See Appendix 2 for complete text). Parties are required to submit their first
report within 180 days of the Treaty's entry into force after ratification and to update the
information annually. The primary characteristic of the Treaty's compliance scheme,
therefore, is its reliance on states' self-reporting, both to establish the baseline against
which implementation is measured and to demonstrate subsequent progress.42 The Treaty
has no formal verification mechanism by way of independent monitoring or inspections
to verify the content of voluntary reports, nor a technical secretariat or standing body to
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collect and assess the contents of the reports, rather this task falls to the states parties.
Subsequent to the transparency measures in Article 7, Article 8 allows for states to seek
clarification of questions pertaining to compliance by submitting a formal Request for
Clarification through the UN Secretary General to the State Party. However, such
measures carry immense political weight and they are therefore used very infrequently.
The voluntary reporting measures of Article 7, and lack of any means for
independent verification of state compliance, are viewed by many as weaknesses in the
Treaty. Findlay (1999) has traced the negotiations to show where there was divergence
around the issue of verification, with some states such as the US and Australia favouring
robust mechanisms, while Mexico and many African states argued there was no need for
any verification mechanism. A compromise position, supported by Canada, called for
moderate measures that would allow for negotiations to proceed without becoming
bogged down over the technicalities and expense of verifying a total ban on such a
widely used weapon. In his assessment of the Treaty's compliance measures, Findlay
notes: "The Ottawa Convention is a hybrid treaty, having antecedents in both arms
control and international humanitarian law (IHL). Its verification and compliance
provisions sit indeterminably between the two traditions - more robust than some
humanitarian law but weaker than the best arms control models" (1999: 46). The hybrid
approach calls for transparency and cooperation among the member states to implement
the Treaty with self-reporting on progress.
Weakness in the Treaty's compliance and verification scheme provided the major
impetus for an independent Treaty monitoring system. The concept of NGOs monitoring
state compliance was a novel idea but had precedents from the human rights sector. The

45

Dr. Andrew Latham first proposed the concept in a 1995 paper for the Canadian
Verification Research Unit and briefly referenced it in 1996 within the context of
negotiations on landmines in the Treaty on Certain Conventional Weapons.44 In the early
negotiations of the Mine Ban, the subject of verification surfaced and the NGO
monitoring network concept was revisited as a possible option. Bob Lawson, the
Canadian official that served as the government's primary liaison with the ICBL and
driver behind Canadian leadership in the Ottawa Process, reintroduced Latham's idea in
discussions with sympathetic states and ICBL leadership.45 The Canadian government
hosted a roundtable on verification during the Ottawa Conference with government
representatives and introduced the idea of NGO verification and a subsequent 'nonpaper', authored by Lawson, acted as a proposal for the Landmine Monitor.46 There was
interest from both governments and the ICBL in retaining the cooperative relationship
that had developed through the Ottawa Process, and an NGO monitoring effort was
proposed as a possible means to do so. The leadership and credibility of one of the lead
agencies, Human Rights Watch, was an important influence on states whose support was
essential for the project in its early days.
The ICBL also had an institutional interest in pursuing the monitoring role. Mary
Wareham notes that ICBL was interested in maintaining media attention on the
landmines issue and had built considerable research capacity during the campaign that
could be built upon (2007: 22-23). The Landmine Monitor also provided a raison d'etre
for the ICBL to continue once its campaign goal had been reached.47 After six months of
preparatory discussions, and with the backing of partner states, the ICBL met in Sweden
in June 1998 to decide whether or not it would proceed with the project. The Network
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reached agreement on supporting Landmine Monitor as an ICBL initiative under a core
group of member organizations.48
From the outset, Landmine Monitor was intended to complement the reporting of
states parties required by the Treaty: "(Landmine Monitor) was created in the spirit of
Article 7 and reflects the shared view that transparency and cooperation are essential
elements to the successful elimination of antipersonnel mines. But it is also recognition
that there is a need for independent reporting and evaluation."49 The project states in the
"About Landmine Monitor" section of each Executive Summary that "the Landmine
Monitor is not a technical verification system or a formal inspection regime. It is an
attempt by civil society to hold governments accountable to the obligations they have
taken on with respect to antipersonnel mines." Operating outside of the formal
parameters of the Treaty, Landmine Monitor provides independent monitoring of states'
actions, though without robust verification. Its emphasis is on transparency through
public reporting on implementation of the Treaty that can include 'shaming' when noncompliance is seen. Unlike an official treaty reporting mechanism, the annual report
includes assessments of both member and non-member states' compliance with the
Treaty's key requirements. As such, it seeks both to hold states party accountable and
encourage broader adherence to the norm of the mine ban. Although as an informal
mechanism, Landmine Monitor has certain limitations, Steve Goose observed that
Landmine Monitor is "not official and we don't want to be official. If we're official then
we become the ISU (Implementation Support Unit) and have to 'serve' the States Parties'
(Cited in Wareham, 2007: 36).
The core group of NGOs that undertook such a large-scale and expensive project
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accepted the risk that the effort would not gain traction with governments. But evident in
Landmine Monitor's statement above is the sense of a moral imperative to monitor state
behaviour, underlined by the notion of 'holding them accountable'. The humanitarian
argument that played such an important role in achieving the mine ban by emphasizing
the indiscriminate impacts of landmines, gave the ICBL a certain moral authority once
the ban was achieved, evidenced by Jody Williams winning the Nobel Peace Prize in
1997 on behalf of the ICBL.5 The principled position that the ICBL had espoused and
promoted throughout the campaign became an impetus for it to expand its work into the
monitoring function and retain the 'high ground', holding states accountable for the
Treaty's implementation. In addition, the Landmine Monitor provided a raison d'etre for
the ICBL to continue once its campaign goal had been reached.51 Having acted as norm
entrepreneur and promoter, the ICBL through Landmine Monitor has assumed a key role
in promoting the further institutionalization of the norm against AP mines.
The opportunity to create Landmine Monitor grew out of the unique partnership
between NGOs and government that evolved through the Ottawa Process. Because the
Treaty lacked a robust verification mechanism, NGO monitoring was seen as a possible
means to support the limited compliance measures in the Treaty. At the same time, the
ICBL saw an opportunity to provide a new focus for the international network, building
on its reputation as a moral force in the landmine campaign. The result was the
establishment of an independent monitoring mechanism whereby the ICBL could
promote the institutionalization of the norm against landmines and further its goal of a
world without landmines.
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Reaching Critical Will: Necessity is the Mother of Invention
Reaching Critical Will (RCW) is a project of the Women's International League
for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) with a mandate to increase NGO engagement in
international disarmament fora, both in terms of NGO preparation for and direct
participation in multilateral proceedings. RCW facilitates NGO activities at official
disarmament events by arranging meeting space, coordinating NGO statements to plenary
meetings (when permitted) and assisting with general logistics, It has also developed a
comprehensive website with an array of disarmament related resources, freely accessible
to the public. Through this website, RCW has gradually assumed a role not being filled
by states or the UN in a comprehensive way: it has become the primary publicly
accessible repository of multilateral disarmament-related documentation.
The coordination role envisioned for RCW when WILPF was designing the
project recognized that not all NGOs could be in New York or Geneva for multilateral
disarmament meetings. Therefore, among its activities, RCW prioritized dissemination of
information to educate and inform grassroots organizations working domestically: "For
non-governmental organizations, and concerned individuals to act, they need information,
primary documents and analysis. Reaching Critical Will collects, packages and often
translates disarmament related information into terms ordinary people can understand."
Materials collected by RCW are published on its website at www.reachingcriticalwill.org
in order to educate and inform the NGO community. Staff members attend official
proceedings to collect original documents including official UN documents, government
interventions and working papers from the Conference on Disarmament, UNGA First
Committee, NPT review process, and UN Disarmament Commission. These are then
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scanned and posted online as part of RCW's centralized library of disarmament
documentation.
Unlike Landmine Monitor, the central documentation role that RCW has assumed
was never the explicit intention for the project; rather, in seeking to provide education
tools to better equip the nuclear community for its advocacy and activism, the project has
grown into a unique documentation service used widely by academics, officials and the
NGO community. Nor was the impetus for this work a response to a single shortcoming
in the multilateral disarmament regime, or the result of direct governmental support.
RCW has grown over time, in the absence of any other similar documentation service, to
become an essential resource in the disarmament regime. To better understand the origins
of the RCW project, I will discuss briefly the disarmament and arms control NGO
community and challenges to NGO accessibility at the multilateral level, which together
created the opportunity to create RCW.
In 1995, at the 5th Review Conference (RevCon) of the NPT, an indefinite
extension of the Treaty was negotiated.53 Many NGOs viewed the extension as a
continuation of the status quo, with no hard timelines for nuclear disarmament, and
protested it vigorously. Others supported the extension as a means of institutionalizing
the disarmament norm and retaining the Treaty framework for ultimate disarmament. The
division within the NGO community was seen during the Review and Extension
Conference when several organizations refused to join 60 members of the Abolition
Caucus, who opposed the extension, in signing a declaration calling for abolition of
nuclear weapons.54 Although the disarmament community is considered generally likeminded, it is characterized by range of organizational approaches from abolitionists to
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arms controllers that use different tactics including grassroots activism and high-level
advocacy.55 In the aftermath of the 1995 RevCon, there was concern within the NGO
community about a lack of coordination among the disparate grassroots peace
organizations, research institutes, and disarmament groups, and the negative impact of
this division on NGO effectiveness at international meetings.
The effectiveness of this divided and uncoordinated NGO community was further
strained because of limitations on NGO access in UN disarmament meetings, specifically
NPT events. Generally speaking, NGO access to multilateral disarmament fora is limited:
accredited NGOs are permitted to access the UN facilities where they can attend open
sessions sitting in the gallery or at the back of meeting hall as observers with no right to
intervene in the deliberations.56 Regularly, substantive debates or negotiation of text
occurs in closed session from which all members of the media and NGO observers are
barred. Standing bodies like the CD allow accredited NGO observers to sit in the gallery
with limited formal interaction with officials. The NPT rules of procedure are gradually
becoming more accommodating: since 2000, NGOs have been granted one three-hour
slot to make presentations to the plenary at all PrepComs and RevCons and in 2004, the
thematic debates, or so-called 'Cluster Debates', were open to NGO observation for the
first time.57 Because of the restrictions on access to official proceedings, NGOs rely on
informal means - through NGO-organized side events, distribution of materials and
hallway conversations - to engage diplomats.
Limitations on participation in the official disarmament proceedings make NGOs
reliant on the documentary record for a full understanding of developments. The range of
documents submitted by states for an official UN or Treaty review meeting is wide,
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including: general statements submitted as official UN documents to be translated and
given a conference document number; working papers, national reports or thematic
proposals also provided as official submissions; oral interventions distributed within the
conference hall only without translation; and printed materials handed out informally
within the conference halls and without. All official UN documents are available through
the UN's Official Document System (ODS)58 however meetings that are held in closed
session typically feature only oral interventions made with simultaneous translation. Such
statements to an NPT thematic debate, for example, are prepared by the national missions
to be distributed as hardcopies in the meeting hall by the Secretariat, and are not given
numbers as official documents to be made accessible via ODS. Both the NPT and CD
lack an institutional Secretariat or coordinating body, and rely on the Office of
Disarmament Affairs (formerly the Department of Disarmament Affairs) to provide
conference services for meetings and maintain the record of proceedings. ODA has relied
on UN document services to disseminate official documents through its regular channels,
with no formal library or website.59
The disarmament NGOs therefore faced the twin access challenges of limited
participation in multilateral meetings and an incomplete record of proceedings,
compounding concerns about internal divisions and lack of coordination. The RCW
project was designed to address these challenges, with central coordination for the large
international community of NGOs. As the project founder, the WILPF UN office was
motivated to address a remark by a South African diplomat about poor coordination
among the disarmament community and observations by other governments that the
NGOs could be more effective in the NPT context if they were better prepared.60 WILPF
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was an obvious organization to assume the coordinating role because it had a long record
of involvement on the disarmament agenda, good connections with a wide range of
NGOs, and a presence in both Geneva and New York. The initial project proposal was of
interest to a primary funder to meet the modest start-up budget.61 The project was
launched in 1999 as a six-month initiative around the 2000 NPT RevCon with a mandate
to increase the quantity and quality of NGO participation in the disarmament regime. For
the RevCon RCW prepared and disseminated orientation and briefing materials,
including a video, for the international NGO community; compiled its first website;
published a daily newsletter; held press conferences; and coordinated the joint NGO
presentations to the plenary.
Facilitation of the NGO presence at the 2000 RevCon was RCW's first activity,
however it was the website and collection of documents and background information it
prepared for the occasion that was the legacy of the conference. The Office of
Disarmament Affairs did not have the capacity to develop an online library, what was at
the time a relatively innovative project. RCW's online collection of disarmament
documentation filled this gap and enabled greater information sharing among the
concerned public in an area where access and participation continue to be hampered by
restrictive rules of procedure. The result is a continuously growing resource of
documentation related to all of the multilateral nuclear disarmament bodies, freely
available for download.
In providing the central repository for disarmament related documentation, RCW
exhibits characteristic attributes of an NGO acting as a norm promoter. Addressing the
dearth of publicly accessible information in the disarmament regime, and the limitations
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on NGO access to official proceedings, RCW's services promote the norms of
transparency and accountability. Transparency is defined by Mitchell (1998: 110) as
"information regarding the operation and impact of a regime."62 Grigorescu (2007: 627)
notes that transparency is determined by the ability to access information, not just the
offering of it, and must be understood as relational, in other words, to whom is the
institution transparent? This is a useful question in light of the documentary
transparency of the UN: the UN maintains official records of proceedings and
documentary records; but while these are in principle 'offered', RCW made them
'accessible'. In 2000, RCW circumvented official channels to further institutionalize the
norm of transparency with its new website. By providing free public access to official
and informal documents related to the various multilateral disarmament bodies, the
proceedings of the RevCon were in principle more transparent than any previous NPT
meeting of states parties.
Promoting transparency is assumed by many NGOs to be a means of ensuring
state compliance with treaty obligations by 'holding them accountable'. Chayes and
Handler Chayes (1995: 135) have described transparency's role in promoting treaty
compliance:
In the context of international regulation, we mean by transparency the availability and
accessibility of knowledge and information about (1) the meaning of norms, rules, and procedures
established by the treaty and practice of the regime, and (2) the policies and activities of parties to
the treaty and of any central organs of the regime as to matters relevant to treaty compliance and
regime efficacy.

Transparency is a normative concept: it is considered a democratic ideal to have
transparent systems of government and a principle of good governance holds that the
governed receive information from the government. The accountability of primary
concern to NGOs is what Robert Keohane (2003: 135) calls 'external accountability' or
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"accountability to people outside the acting entity, whose lives are affected by it." In the
multilateral context, NGOs widely promote accountability for state behaviour to the
citizens of the world.
These means of promoting accountability by states party to a Treaty toward the
people affected by it are closely linked with transparency through increased access to
information. Scholte (2002) notes that NGOs can facilitate increased accountability in the
global system:
"Civic groups can monitor the implementation and effects of policies regarding
global relations and press for corrective measures when the consequences are
adverse. Civil society bodies can take grievances with the performance of global
regimes to auditors, ombudspersons, parliaments, courts, and the mass
media.. .civil society associations can push authorities in global governance to
take greater public responsibility for their actions and policies."65
Casting a public eye on developments in the multilateral disarmament fora, RCW seeks
to promote state accountability for the implementation of obligations called for in the
Treaty regimes. Documentation is used as a form of monitoring, enhanced by
independent analysis and reporting, to allow NGOs and therefore the public to track
progress. States that are not meeting their obligations, whether by inaction or blatant noncompliance, may be 'shamed' with public scrutiny and negative publicity.
The opportunity for RCW to become the central documentary library for the
disarmament sector was created by a combination of situational elements: divisions
within the disarmament were exacerbated by the results of the 1995 Review and
Extension Conference; representatives of sympathetic states observed and commented on
the ineffectiveness of the NGOs, encouraging greater internal coordination; to
compensate for limited direct access to the disarmament proceeding, NGOs relied on
incomplete documentary records; there was an obvious programmatic opportunity in the
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absence of an official disarmament documentation library; and a sympathetic foundation
was willing to back the initiative. Responding to these developments, WILPF staff
developed a strategic project to assume a coordinating role, and thus address internal
NGO dynamics, with information dissemination as part of its wider mandate for
education and preparation of NGOs in advance of the 2000 RevCon. The resulting web
resource, namely the library of disarmament documentation has become a key feature in
the disarmament arena. Consequently, RCW has become an important promoter of the
norm of transparency in the disarmament sector and continues to push for increased
accountability for states party to the various Treaties.

Inside the Tent: NGO Representatives on Official Delegations
The Landmine Monitor and the RCW projects were developed in response to gaps
in the respective regimes, with input from sympathetic states, and organizational interests
in pursuing the project. Multiple factors guided project development and created the
opportunity for the NGOs to assume these roles. When NGO representatives serve on
official government delegations, however, state support is directly responsible for
creating the opening for their participation. Only by invitation and with authorization
from the government leading the delegation could a non-governmental representative
acquire the necessary accreditation to join an official delegation. In most cases the
composition of a government delegation to a UN meeting requires senior, if not
ministerial approval, and some countries have special procedures when NGO
representatives are engaged.66 While the direct opportunity for involvement in this
activity depends on state support, the motivation to involve non-governmental
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representatives, and thus the 'opportunity' is impacted by other factors. Questions of
capacity and the politics of support for NGOs will be considered in light of examples of
non-governmental participation on official delegations from the small arms, nuclear
disarmament and biological weapons regimes.
Unlike the previous cases, which were focused on an organization or network
engaged in a single project, this case features individuals participating on delegations
from several states parties to a range of multilateral events including Treaty reviews,
annual meetings of states parties, and in one unique case, on a panel of governmental
experts. Appendix 4 provides a summary table outlining the cases and listing the
individuals who were interviewed for this research, all of whom served as nongovernmental representatives on one or more official delegations. Engagement of nongovernmental representatives is observed on delegations in a variety of multilateral fora67
however the sample cases were selected from the security and disarmament sector, from
delegations covering meetings for the BTWC, NPT and UN Program of Action on small
arms and light weapons (UN PoA). While the research is not exhaustive, it includes a
cross section of major cases in the three regimes.68 From these individual cases, several
broad trends emerge, which thus shed light on the conditions that have enabled nongovernmental representatives to occupy this position on governmental delegations.
In terms of opportunity, the cases studied show a variety of avenues by which
these individuals participated on their respective country's delegation. Certainly the
majority were personally invited, many of whom have filled the role over numerous years
including John Simpson, Bill Potter and Ernie Regehr. Canada for many years requested
that its domestic nuclear disarmament community nominate its preferred representative
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and invited the recommended individual to join its NPT delegation. In some cases the
individuals were not invited, but requested of their governments the opportunity to
participate. The German NGO community used examples from other countries especially Canada - in seeking permission for members of its research community to join
delegations. Una Becker and Gotz Neuneck are colleagues at the Peace Research Institute
Frankfurt (PRIF) and participants on German BWC and NPT delegations respectively.70
PRIF lobbied officials requesting that its staff be permitted to join delegations as expert
advisors, with the expectation that they could benefit professionally from the experience
of observing the meeting 'from inside the tent'. Similarly, Angela Woodward of New
Zealand requested - and was welcomed - as a respected expert to advise her government
as a member of its BTWC delegation. Having been part of the delegation to the 2000
NPT RevCon, when he was invited to join the Canadian delegation for the first of four
NPT meetings in the 2005 Review Cycle, Ernie Regehr negotiated his participation in the
full cycle as an Expert Advisor. Florella Hazeley was nominated on behalf of the NGO
community in Sierra Leone to join its delegation to the RevCon of the UN PoA, in part
because of international lobbying by IANSA for affected countries to consider asking
NGO experts to advise them on this issue. However, even in these where the individuals
requested to serve on the delegation, the participation was endorsed by the officials
ultimately responsible for approving the delegation's composition.71
Across the individual cases examined a range of titles were given to the nongovernmental delegation member, which fall into two broad categories, described as
advisors or liaisons. The advisor role, seen where individuals were called 'expert
advisor', 'technical advisor', or 'NGO advisor', describes cases where the individual was
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engaged with a view to capitalizing on his or her technical expertise and past experience.
Individuals like Bill Potter and John Simpson have held the advisor role at multiple
international meetings. Notably, these individuals are academics with doctoral
credentials, working at institutes with dedicated non-proliferation programs, and are
considered experts in the field.72 The experts commented that their technical knowledge,
policy expertise and experience are valued by rotational foreign ministry officials who
lack the same depth of knowledge on technical issues. An important function of this
advisor role as observed by John Simpson and Bill Potter is that of providing
'institutional memory'. As that the procedures of multilateral bodies are not always
clearly stated or written down, rather are based on precedent, Simpson noted that an
historical perspective of process is important to active government delegations, and
experts who have attended several rounds of meetings maintain this procedural
knowledge.73
The liaison role, seen with titles including 'NGO liaison' and 'NGO
representative', implies a slightly different function where the representative bridges the
gap between government and non-governmental participants in the meeting. This role
should not be interpreted to mean that the individual is necessarily less knowledgeable in
the technical aspects, but it does suggest that the government has a different interest in
the person's participation. Among the tasks for which the liaison is responsible are
attendance at NGO side events and reporting to other NGOs, both organizations present
at the meeting and the national NGO community. When meetings enter closed sessions,
this liaison role can be important for the NGO community, as was evidenced at the 2001
UN Conference on SALW. NGO members of official delegations, including Ernie
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Regehr (Canada) and Stein Villumstad (Norway) regularly briefed members of the
International Action Network on Small Arms about developments inside the meeting hall,
part of what Villumstad described as his role to be a 'bridge' between the Norwegian
government and the NGOs.74 Several of the individuals interviewed mentioned that they
provided regular email updates to NGO counterparts not at the meeting.75 With an NGO
liaison on the official delegation, the state portrays itself as both in touch with and
interested in the positions of the NGO community.
The categorization of advisor or liaison suggests that states may invite a nongovernmental representative to participate on an official delegation for multiple reasons.
The direct benefits of institutional memory, technical expertise, or interaction with other
NGOs must be considered within a broader political context. What does it say about a
state when it invites a member of civil society to sit on an official delegation, with
privileged access to the policy process and closed-door, state-level negotiations? This
question is partially answered by considering which states invite NGO participation on
delegations. While my analysis is not exhaustive of every case in all the security and
disarmament fora, the sample suggests that there is a group of states that consistently
engage NGO representatives on delegations. Canada, historically a strong supporter of
NGOs and champion of NGO access rights at multilateral proceedings,76 regularly
engages NGO representatives as both experts and liaisons. Other like-minded countries
including Germany, Norway and New Zealand are supporters of NGO representatives.
The cases suggest that some states, namely the UK, engage non-governmental experts as
advisors without the liaison function.77 Others, Kyrgyzstan and Sierra Leone for example,
benefit from the extra support of an NGO expert. Perhaps even more illuminating is the
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group of states that have few if any examples of non-govemmental delegates: generally
speaking China, Russia, the US , most middle-Eastern and most Asian states rarely draw
on non-governmental experts for security and disarmament themed official delegations.
The public relations aspect of inviting close cooperation with representatives of
the non-governmental sector, or the so-called 'optics', is another consideration. This
point was raised by several of the Canadians interviewed, one observing that inviting
NGOs to be on a delegation "gives Canada a reputation of being open in its attitude to
civil society and thus perhaps forward-thinking."79 Another expert questioned whether
having an NGO representative on a delegation might suggest that a risky policy position
is supported by an informed public through the non-governmental representative.80 In the
small arms sector a number of states with acute small arms problems including
Guatemala, Kenya, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Sri Lanka have had NGO
representatives from victims groups and gun control coalitions on their official
delegations, bringing both expertise and representation of the affected population to the
UN floor. Appendix 5 lists all NGO representatives on delegations to the 2005 Biennial
Meeting of States to the UN PoA, the 2006 PoA RevCon and its PrepCom.
Underlying the emergence of non-governmental representatives being engaged as
technical experts and liaisons with civil society is the increasing 'respectability' of the
NGO sector. A series of articles in the mid-1990's traced the 'rise of the nonprofit sector'
and the explosion of NGO activity. Lester Salamon (1994) in his seminal article on the
emerging NGO sector identified several growth factors at both the micro and macro
levels including official policies that favoured nonprofit service providers over stateissued development and social welfare, endowing nonprofits with public validity in aid
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delivery. Jessica Mathews, in her paper describing growth in the NGO sector as a 'Power
Shift', noted that "NGOs deliver more official development assistance than the entire UN
System (excluding the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund)" and in many
countries are delivering services "that faltering governments can no longer manage"
(1995: 53). She argued that by NGOs bearing responsibility in the delivery of
development programs and humanitarian assistance, this conferred upon them
respectability in the international realm.81 Kim Reimann (2002: 59-61) has described a
'pro-NGO norm' seen in the 1990's with the end of the Cold War. She describes two
components of this norm: a domestic angle whereby it was important for modern states to
have a 'flourishing civil society sector", and an international element whereby the UN
system was seen as promoting 'partnership' with NGOs. The human security discourse
was a further contributor to the legitimization of NGO contributions to multilateralism in
the 1990s. The public perception of NGOs as legitimate agents of the public good has
made them acceptable partners for certain governments and thus facilitated their direct
engagement in the policy process as members of official delegations.
The element of opportunity is particularly important in the case of nongovernmental representatives on government delegations, because whether they were
invited directly, or requested to participate, these individuals have to be approved and
accredited by their government to acquire the necessary security clearances as delegation
members. All of the individuals examined had reputations as expert and experienced
individuals, and were thus considered credible partners on the official delegation. This
'respectability' was therefore essential in opening the door for their contribution to the
functioning of an official delegation, but as representatives of NGOs and academic
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institutions rather than government agencies.
Political circumstances, organizational motivation, and shortcomings in the
particular regime created the openings for these NGOs to take on particular roles in the
various regimes. However, two factors affected their further development once the initial
opportunity was available. In each case, particular organizational tools had an enormous
impact on the development of the project, providing the means whereby the NGO was
able to provide its services in the multilateral regime. These tools will be examined
carefully in the next chapter. Finally, considering the element of 'institutionalization'
introduced by the Martins model, external support and institutional ties will be examined
in the final chapter to demonstrate the sustainability of these initiatives.

63

Chapter 4 ~ NGO Tools of Engagement
The stereotype of NGO activity sees an army of volunteers writing letters and
distributing photocopied flyers to campaign for an issue on a shoestring budget. While
some grassroots organizations do operate this way, others including Amnesty
International, Oxfam and Greenpeace use sophisticated organizational and business
models to operate multi-million dollar program budgets, with permanent staff, and
extensive institutional support. The structure and composition of NGOs impact on the
scale and nature of their programming and these characteristics vary greatly among the
cases examined here. Each initiative is dependent on particular organizational tools that
enable their activity. These cover a wide spectrum, but generally fall into three categories
including financial, technical, and human resources. A key condition that must be
considered, therefore, is the financial, technical, and human resources at the disposal of
each of the NGOs. NGO programming is always dependent on external funding and often
projects are designed because they are 'fundable'. In each of the Landmine Monitor,
RCW and NGO expert cases financial resources have to some degree shaped the effort
and therefore this factor will be considered separately as the underlying enabler of NGO
activity. The availability and type of resources accessible in each case have significantly
shaped the scope of the projects and their contributions to the regimes.

Landmine Monitor: A Network Approach
The network behind the International Campaign to Ban Landmines was made up
of some 1200 organizations in over 60 countries at the time the Mine Ban Treaty was
signed. Representing a diverse array of regions and interests but united in their common
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call for a ban on antipersonnel mines, the organizations were loosely affiliated through
the campaign and able to pursue national campaign goals while drawing on the resources
of the collective to interact at the international level.83 The success of the network model
in the campaign was replicated with the Landmine Monitor to capitalize on contributions
from a network of field researchers. Landmine Monitor is run by four ICBL member
organizations that serve as its editorial board: Human Rights Watch, Handicap
International, Norwegian People's Aid, and Mines Action Canada. Both independent
researchers and NGO partners are drawn on to write national updates, working with
thematic research coordinators and the editorial board to produce the annual report. A
strong and cohesive research methodology ensures that the contributions from the various
researchers together produce a coherent annual report. These human and technical
resources enable the Landmine Monitor to maintain high standards of accuracy and
reliability, thus serving as the Treaty's primary monitoring mechanism.
The first issue of the annual report was published in 1999, a year and a half after
the Ottawa conference, and presented at the First Meeting of States in Maputo,
Mozambique. The tome weighed in at 1,100 pages and contained information on every
country in the world, including states not party to the Treaty, addressing all Treaty
obligations. Described as a 'system', the Landmine Monitor project began with a global
or

reporting network, a central online database and a published annual report. While the
annual report is its most visible product, the network of researchers around the world is
its greatest attribute. A 2005 job posting for Landmine Monitor researchers noted that its
researchers include: "lawyers, doctors, humanitarian aid workers, human rights activists,
landmine survivors, mine action practitioners, graduate students and anti-landmine
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campaigners and they are all non-governmental".

The network makes use of both

professional contract researchers and campaigners affiliated with an ICBL member NGO
such as Handicap International, Mines Action Canada, and Norwegian People's Aid, as
well as several national campaigns such as the Afghan, Cambodia and Pakistan
Campaigns to Ban Landmines and the Kenya Coalition Against Landmines.87 For the
most part, the researchers receive small consultancies for their time and can apply for
research grants for travel, translation or other related expenses. Network affiliates help to
maximize the consultancy budget. Between 2000 and 2005, Landmine Monitor engaged
over 100 researchers from some 90 countries to complete the research for every country
in the world (See Figure 5). When the project shifted its primary focus to 'mine-affected
countries' this number dropped slightly, but the network still includes approximately 70
researchers.

Year
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

2008

Figure 5: Landmine Monitor Research
Subject Countries
192
192
192
192
192
192
112 mine-affected countries
126 mine-affected countries and
regions
118 mine-affected countries, statesparties with outstanding obligations,
non states-parties
Not yet finalized

Network
Number of Researchers
80
115 from 95 countries
122 from 95 countries
115 from 90 countries
110 from 90 countries
110 from 93 countries
77 from 72 countries
71 from 62 countries
69 from 57 countries

62 from 46 countries

To consolidate the work of such a diverse group of researchers and research
coordinators into one cohesive report, the Landmine Monitor has developed a
methodology with common standards of practice to which all researchers are required to
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adhere. Yet, by its own admission, the greatest weakness of the project is the limitations
it faces in the collection of accurate data.89 The 1999 issue of the report was described as
an attempt to "establish a baseline of information from which to measure progress in
alleviating the landmine crisis" (Executive Summary, 1999: 1). Subsequent reports have
updated and refined the baseline information, and in the process, the research
methodology has been strengthened to minimize the research pitfalls of a nongovernmental monitoring network with limitations on the gathering of data. The major
characteristics of the methodology that have enabled continued improvement of the
product include: localized data collection, cooperation with states, centralized editorial
oversight and quality control. A strict publication schedule is demanded by the timeline
from distribution of the research contracts in November, through to publication in time
for the annual Meeting of States Parties, or the Review Conference as in 2004, typically
in the fall.90
The international research network has already been discussed however it bears
further reference as a central feature of the research methodology that enables localized
data collection. Researchers based in the country, or working in the region, develop
personal contacts and make use of sources in the local language, though in several
countries including Burma, China and Iran, access challenges persist.91 Landmine
Monitor relies entirely on publicly accessible information to monitor the Treaty's
implementation, using open-source information rather than investigative journalism or
war-zone reporting.92 In order to gather official field information, the researchers
cooperate with national governments and institutions, when this is feasible, including
military and health practitioners. An important information-gathering tool is Landmine
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Monitor's practice of providing governments with a draft of their national entry before
the report goes to the publisher. This provides an opportunity to gauge reaction and
gather feedback including correction of facts before final publication. Cooperation with
local UN offices and humanitarian aid agencies, particularly in affected countries, is
another important resource for researchers. Further, UN Mine Action Centre and Geneva
Centre for Mine-Affected both collect in-country data that is accessible online.93
The research is organized by both country and theme, with four Thematic
Research Coordinators responsible for Ban Policy, Non-State Armed Groups, Victim
Assistance and Mine Action respectively.94 The Thematic Research Coordinators work to
ensure consistency and common reporting methods among the international researchers.
Final editorial oversight is centralized with one lead agency, previously Human Rights
Watch and now Mines Action Canada, which bears ultimate responsibility for the
correctness and completeness of the report. Filtering the independent national reports
through the Thematic Research Coordinators and finally the editorial team brings
consistency to the disparate voices that produce the report. The research is also subject to
a process of peer review at an annual research network conference where the researchers
and editorial team gather to discuss major findings and address outstanding questions. In
the past, the conference has featured workshops and training in research methods, to
strengthen the skills of the research network.95
Quality control is consistently a concern for the project. Since its creation,
researchers have been required to find corroborating evidence for pieces of information to
verify such facts as the kind of mine used to ensure it was an AP mine, the nature of
injuries received, and whether this was a new incidence of mine usage, before including
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the incident in the annual report. The Thematic Research Coordinators perform an
additional fact-check of all draft country reports, and the editorial team has final
responsibility for ensuring the veracity of the report's contents. A "Research" page on the
Landmine Monitor website, at http://www.icbl.orig/lm/research, is maintained by the lead
agency to coordinate the research methodology for the international network. Sections
including the Production Schedule, Key Reference Documents and Links, and the
Thematic Guidelines and Questionnaires feature essential web-based content for the
researchers. For each thematic area, a document outlining information sources and key
research areas, with instructions and research requirements for each, is provided, as well
as an orientation guide.96 These documents provide tips for what information should be
reported, how to update the previous year's report, and how data can be gathered, for
example:
III) Antipersonnel Mine Use
In your first draft, cite all allegations of antipersonnel mine use from any source or actor, even if
the allegation does not seem credible. Note if nothing new has happened in the reporting period.
Describe any confirmed or suspected recent mine use by your government or within your country
in as much detail as possible with several, varied sources for this information. Use open sources
such as media reports or try interviews. Do not put yourself at risk during this research. If you
know of something, but don't wish to include it in the report communicate direct with us.97

The website acts as a quality control mechanism, providing ready access to clear
instructions, necessary online resources and contact information.
NGOs were at the forefront of the effort to ban antipersonnel landmines, and it is
therefore logical that they remain engaged to monitor implementation of the Mine Ban
Treaty. During the landmine campaign, the concern was with grafting an existing norm the taboo of certain indiscriminate means of warfare - on what was at the time an
acceptable military device - AP mines.98 With Landmine Monitor, the same NGOs who
acted as 'moral entrepreneurs' in their advocacy for a landmine ban, are institutionalizing
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the nascent norm of the mine ban. The NGO network monitors changes in state policy
and practice over successive years and publicizes developments through the annual
report, creating a record of state accountability with the Treaty. States that have
implemented the measures called for in the Treaty, or with no remaining landmines, are
removed from the report in an acknowledgement of success, while cases of noncompliance are recognized and admonished. These monitoring functions, including the
public shaming of non-compliance and the tracking of trends over time, thus strengthen
the landmines taboo. In order to fulfill this task with credibility, the Monitor employs
field-based researchers and seeks to ensure consistent and reliable reporting through its
research methodology and editorial structure. These tools have enabled Landmine
Monitor to become the de facto monitoring system for the Mine Ban Treaty.

Reaching Critical Will: Maximizing its Reach through the Internet
Unlike the Landmine Monitor, which draws on an international network of
researchers and partner organizations to monitor implementation of the Mine Ban Treaty,
Reaching Critical Will has a single full-time staff member working at WILPF's New
York office, with supplementary assistance from interns and WILPF's Geneva office.
Run on a limited budget, RCW depends enormously on electronic tools to manage and
execute its project. The vast majority of its program is implemented online through its
website at www.reachingcriticalwill.org. With minimal human and financial resources,
RCW's program has an international reach to other NGOs, the broader public, as well as
officials and diplomats through its website and thus technical resources are the major tool
supporting RCW's role as a documentary resource.

70

Reaching Critical Will was founded by one of the oldest disarmament NGOs, the
Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Although the project itself has a
small staff, the institutional support of WILPF and its international affiliates must be
acknowledged. RCW is an expansion of WILPF's historical activism on the disarmament
agenda and is supported by its international constituency. The Program Associate that
runs RCW is a dedicated staff person, specialized in the disarmament agenda with a
primary focus on nuclear disarmament. The majority of RCW's program associates over
the years have possessed academic backgrounds in peace and disarmament studies, and
several rose through the WILPF internship program." Typically quite young, there has
been regular turnover of the project associates, attributable to the demands of the job and
its modest compensation.100 In spite of their relative inexperience, however, program
associates and interns are immersed in the disarmament agenda and quickly develop issue
expertise.
Arguably, RCW is a product of the information technology revolution,
compensating for its small staff with modern electronic resources. It is only made
possible in its current manifestation by technological tools including laptop computers,
document scanners, the internet and e-mail. All of the staff members interviewed for this
research attested to the value of electronic tools for the project, noting that the work
would not be possible without modern information technology. The costs of staffing,
hard-copy publishing, postage and even office space are minimized because RCW has
built a centralized electronic nucleus. Further technological innovations even over the
past eight years have improved the ability of RCW to deliver its services in near realtime.101 Yet its website maintains a relatively simple design, is easily navigable and well
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organized and only once has it been significantly redesigned since the project's
inception.102
Craig Warkentin (2001) has described six ways in which NGOs use the internet:
"facilitating internal communication; shaping public perceptions; enhancing member
services; disseminating informational resources; encouraging political participation; and
realizing innovative ideas." While he acknowledges that the first two purposes are
common, others are emphasized variably by different NGOs consistent with their
program objectives.

RCW employs the internet for all of these purposes, with a

particular emphasis on the latter four (See Figure 6). In its capacity as coordinator for the
disarmament community, RCW's website enhances member services by providing
information about NGO registration for multilateral meetings, a calendar of events, and
general background information. The series of newsletters produced by RCW - daily
during NPT meetings, weekly during the UNGA 1st Committee and the CD, with periodic
organizational updates - for information dissemination are sent by email and linked to the
site. These newsletters and occasional action notices regularly call on the NGO
community to respond domestically to political developments and the website features a
database of diplomatic contact information. Finally, in terms of'realizing innovative
ideas', RCW's creation of a central document repository for the major multilateral
disarmament events draws a wider audience than the target NGO audience, introducing
diplomats, officials, academics and the wider public to the site. Without the internet,
clearly the RCW project would not be of the same scale or reach the audience that it is
able to currently.
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Figure 6: Reaching Critical Will's Web-based Resources
Resource
Newsletters (General ENews, CD Report, News in
Review, First Committee
Monitor)

Format
Email distribution, linked to
website

Purpose
Disseminating information,
encouraging political
participation

Government Contact
Posted on website with
Database (NY missions, UN links to government sites as
Security Council members, available
CD members)

Encouraging political
participation

NGO Contact Database

Posted on website with
email contacts

Enhancing member services

Disarmament Treaty Texts

Linked externally or posted
on website

Disseminating information

Disarmament Calendar

Posted on website with
email contacts

Encouraging political
participation; enhancing
member services

Fact sheets and
backgrounders

PDF texts on website

Disseminating information

Published Reports

PDF texts on website

Disseminating information

Disarmament
documentation

PDF texts on website

Realizing innovative ideas disarmament library to
increase transparency

In the nuclear disarmament context, the norm of transparency is regularly
referenced as a confidence-building measure with regard to Treaty implementation.10
States parties call for the nuclear-weapon states to make 'transparent' reductions of
nuclear forces or hold 'transparent' policies of no first-use, weapons test bans, and
assurances of non-use against non-nuclear weapons states. RCW has become a promoter
of this norm through its effort to bring into the public eye the documentary record of the
disarmament Treaties and negotiating bodies. While arguably a hard-copy collection of
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documents could serve the same general purpose, it is the complete and near real-time
posting of documents online that allows an international audience to monitor the
multilateral proceedings. This unofficial record is more comprehensive than any other
UN source and the only centralized repository of disarmament-related documents.
Cornelia Beyer (2007: 525) notes that "transparency through information is
understood to be central for the creation and exertion of public control and thus to be of
importance for democratization" and traces a line from increased information flow and
transparency to the public's ability to form opinion and thus participate in the political
process. RCW seeks to strengthen the norm of transparency by ensuring free, public
access to information and official documents, through which the community of advocates
and activists can pursue its objectives in an informed manner. The norm of transparency
is linked - by both states and NGOs - with the principle of state accountability for
compliance with multilateral obligations. In enhancing transparency at the multilateral
level, RCW is enabling increased public engagement in the political process around
disarmament diplomacy, and thus drawing attention to the actions of states with an
interest to promoting accountability. This pursuit of transparency, and RCW's creation of
a library for the disarmament regime, is only made possible by its extensive use of
economical and far-reaching electronic tools.

NGO Representatives: Speaking with Authority
The human and technical resources that have enabled the Landmine Monitor and
RCW projects to provide essential services to the landmines and nuclear sectors correlate
very closely with the nature of the projects. As a treaty monitoring system, Landmine
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Monitor relies on its international network of researchers, whose work is united through a
solid research strategy. With a modest staff and budget, RCW capitalizes on electronic
means to deliver its services economically to a wide audience. Similarly, the individual
non-governmental representatives who participate on official delegations have certain
resources at their disposal. Best categorized as human resources, these qualities include
an institutional affiliation as a non-governmental member of civil society and individual
expertise on the issue. These attributes establish the individual's authority to act in the
capacity of a non-governmental representative on an official delegation.
Whether the non-governmental representative fills the role as advisor or liaison,
all of the individuals interviewed for this research demonstrate a high level of issue
expertise. Some are widely published academics with expertise on the technical and
political issues in their respective fields including Una Becker, John Simpson, Bill Potter
and Gotz Neuneck. Other practitioners have a combination of academic and program
experience including Angela Woodward of VERTIC, Ernie Regehr of Project
Ploughshares and Stein Villumstad, previously with Norwegian Church Aid. All of these
individuals have been expert advisors to their governments and all felt that their personal
expertise was a major reason they were selected to perform this function.
Technical knowledge is that much more important for states that lack domestic
government expertise on technically demanding subjects. The case of Bill Potter is
perhaps the most unique among the sample cases in that he is an American academic who
serves as Technical Advisor to the government of Kyrgyzstan for NPT meetings. Dr.
Potter was invited to join the delegation early in Kyrgyzstan's post-Soviet history when it
lacked experienced diplomats to cover the NPT and needed external support.105 Since
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1994 he has served on delegations to every NPT PrepCom and RevCon and provided
direct input into the drafting of Kyrgyz national interventions. Incapacity among
government delegations may also be a result of the short-terms served by diplomats on
any one issue, an institutional memory gap John Simpson viewed to be filled by his
advisory role on the UK NPT delegation.
In contrast, the individuals who have played the role of NGO liaison are more
likely to have personal or field experience in the area, or work in a particularly affected
region. For example, Florella Hazeley of Sierra Leone is both a survivor of her country's
civil war and an educator about the dangers of small arms and light weapons through her
organization, the Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms (SLANSA). Similarly,
Ochieng Adala is a policy practitioner working on small arms issues in the Horn of
Africa and as a former member of the Kenyan government, is uniquely qualified to sit as
an NGO representative on his government's delegation to the Biennial Meeting of States
Parties and RevCon of the UN PoA on small arms and light weapons. Bev Delong is the
Chairperson of the Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons with some 25 years
of advocacy and activist experience on the nuclear agenda. Her grassroots experience has
been important in her role as NGO liaison on Canadian delegations to the NPT reporting
to the domestic NGO community. These individuals also felt that their personal
experience and professional credentials were the primary reason they were invited to
serve on a delegation. Expertise and experience lend respectability to an individual when
a government considers inviting his or her participation on a delegation.
The other common attribute among the non-governmental representatives
interviewed is their institutional affiliation. They represent a range of academic, research,
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and non-govemmental organizations but all are established civil society organizations.
Organizational affiliation qualifies the individuals as representatives of civil society and
denotes a certain authority - real or perceived - to speak on the subject. For example,
representing an organization active in public education and campaigning on the impact of
small arms on civilians in Sierra Leone, Florella Hazeley advises her government from an
NGO perspective. Similarly, as Executive Director of a major NGO involved in
verification research, Angela Woodward is a respected authority on biological weapons
serving as advisor to New Zealand. Both of these women come from small countries with
relatively few experts on a given issue and are respected because of their accomplished
careers. The academics involved primarily in the NPT context as expert advisors have
personal credentials on the issue, affiliated with distinguished academic research
institutions with specialized programs on disarmament and non-proliferation. Coupled
with an overall increase in NGO respectability, and personal expertise, the specific
credentials of the organizations represented in these cases suggest that institutional
affiliation provides certain credibility to the delegation member.106
Richard Price, in his review article on transnational civil society, examined the
concepts of civil society authority and legitimacy. His observation (cited above) that
"Transnational activists derive their authority from three principal sources: expertise,
moral influence, and a claim to political legitimacy" is worth re-visiting in consideration
of the means by which individuals assume the role of a non-governmental member of an
official delegation. In the cases studied, the individuals were qualified to participate on
delegations because of particular credentials, namely personal expertise and institutional
affiliation, attributes that embody the sources of 'authority' identified by Price. Technical
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expertise - either academic or practice-based - is critical when NGO representatives fill
an advisory role, seen most among western countries with non-governmental advisors.
Moral authority - or personal experience at the grassroots level or in an affected area - is
observed particularly in cases where the individual is an NGO representative with a
liaison function. And political legitimacy is a result of affiliation with a recognized, and
respected, NGO or institution deemed to be authoritative on the issue. Of these, political
legitimacy is most contested and will be examined further.
Non-governmental representatives serving on official delegations can be
understood as representatives of an epistemic community, consistent with Peter Haas'
definition (1992: 3) of "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue-area."107 Haas assumes that states face uncertainty
about policy decisions, which stimulates the need for information, and epistemic
communities are a possible source of information and advice, particularly on technical
and scientific questions. Non-governmental experts such as the individuals examined
here demonstrate the function of an epistemic community: as independent experts on
technical issues with shared beliefs and a principled approach, they are invited to
participate on official delegations to provide informed advice on policy questions to the
state party. While possessing a perceived authority on the issue was critical in every
incidence before the non-governmental representative was engaged as an official delegate
by a government, it can be assumed that serving in this capacity also further enhanced the
individual's reputation as an expert. The authority of the epistemic community
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representative is underlined by both the political legitimacy resulting from affiliation with
a recognized organization and personal expertise.

The Costs: Financial Resources for NGO Initiatives
Technical and human resources vary among the different cases because each has a
distinct project objective and set of activities which require unique tools. At first glance
there is very little commonality across the three cases with regard to financial resources.
Landmine Monitor operates on a $1.6 million dollar budget with extensive government
support; Reaching Critical Will has a very limited budget supplemented by voluntary
contributions from interns and partner organizations; and the individuals serving as
representatives on official delegations come from organizations and academic institutions
with various forms of financial backing. There are, however, two aspects of financial
support that are worth considering across the three cases: the scale and stability of
funding for the initiatives. Sustainable NGO programming requires both sufficient and
reliable financial resources, which is something these initiatives have in common.
Comparing the scale of a project with an international monitoring network and
thousand page published report, to one with a mostly web-based resource, or an
individual's short-term but intensive commitment on a delegation, it is concluded that
above all, funding must be commensurate with the scale of a project. NGOs design
projects to target the possible funding sources at their disposal and the scale of a project
is typically determined by the availability of resources. In spite of the variance in the kind
of funding evident in each of the three cases, all have support that meets the scale of
planned activities.

79

Inspired in part by supportive governments to capitalize on a strong NGO network
and develop the primary mechanism to verify the Mine Ban Treaty, Landmine Monitor
was designed to have a dedicated staff, extensive field research, a published annual
report, as well as a high-quality website. Its current budget of $1.6 million reflects this
and is in fact very economical considering the cost of other official treaty monitoring
schemes.108 In contrast, Reaching Critical Will was designed by an organization with
strong grassroots ties and had modest initial objectives within a $30,000 budget
constrained to a single multilateral meeting. RCW is still a very low-cost project with an
annual budget in the area of $70,000 made possible by it capitalizing on its web-based
resources and intern program.10 The funding support for NGO representatives on official
delegations is a somewhat different question, but it is only with both a regular salary and
support for additional travel expenses that these individuals can accept invitations to
participate on government delegations. Very few are paid for the time they are required to
spend away from their regular employment and therefore without institutional support,
could not attend the international meetings.110 While in some cases, the government funds
the travel expenses of its NGO representative, in others, the individual bears the cost
personally, or finds external support for travel.111 In the three cases, program expectations
and budget scale are consistent; however fundraising remains a struggle and
preoccupation, particularly for the staff of the project cases.
Acquiring start-up funding for project activities and maintaining sustainable
sources of funding are somewhat distinct challenges. These efforts to monitor treaty
implementation or maintain the documentary record of multilateral proceedings are not
one-off projects, but are efforts that could theoretically go on in perpetuity. As such,
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some funders are hesitant to commit funds for such projects, or may make start-up
funding conditional on the project finding sustainable means to continue after year one.112
The necessity of ensuring sustainable funding, particularly for the project cases, is clear.
Landmine Monitor was designed in cooperation with governments and thus had
reasonable assurances of long-term government funding from the outset (See Figure 7).
However, it is a continual straggle for staff to raise the necessary budget from year to
year, compounded in that few governments can provide multi-year funding, each state
has a different fiscal year, and the burden of reporting on government funding continues
to grow.

While the Landmine Monitor has retained a relatively stable budget since

2005, the annual report is its major cost and activities such as the international research
network conference are held when funding permits.114 RCW was designed as a short-term
project to coincide with the 2000 NPT RevCon on a pledge of one-time support from a
US foundation. Transposing the project plan into a long-term program with a parallel
funding scheme was a challenge and project managers struggled to acquire sustainable
foundation support in the early years.115 RCW shifted its focus somewhat to pursue
governmental funding, with some limited success, but is still primarily dependent on the
small number of foundations interested in multilateral disarmament work. In spite of the
challenges to secure multi-year funding, manage the changing interests of donors, and
fulfill the major reporting requirements, both projects have sustained adequate funding
for the priority activities over multiple years.
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Figure 7: Government Funders of Landmine Monitor116
Country

1999
a

Australia
Austria
X
Belgium
X
Canada
X
Cyprus
Czech
Denmark
France
Germany
Greece
Holy See
Ireland
X
Italy
Japan
Luxembourg
Netherlands
X
New Zealand
Norway
X
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
UK
X
European
Community
Other Funders:
a
Open Society Foundation
b
Merck
c
UNICEF
d
UNDP

X
X
X
X

2004
c
X
X
X
X

2005
c
X
X
X
X
X

2006
c, d
X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X

X

X

2000
a,b
X
X
X
X

2001
a
X
X
X
X

2002

2003

X
X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

X
X
X

2007
c, d
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X

X

X
X
X
X
X
X
X

X

X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X
X
X
X

X
X

X
X

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X
X

X

NGO activity of all sorts is dependent on external financial support from
individual donors, foundations and government agencies. The common tool that acts as
an enabler for the three cases studied here is financial support that is both sufficient and
sustainable to meet ongoing program needs. Beyond financial support, the projects rely
on different technical and human resources consistent with the scale and objectives of the
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initiatives. Capitalizing on the connections built during the Landmine Ban Campaign,
with a developed research methodology to establish common practice amongst its diverse
network, Landmine Monitor has developed an unparalleled monitoring system for a
fraction of the cost of an official state-run Treaty verification program. RCW has
employed information technology in innovative and far-reaching ways to become the
authoritative documentary resource for the disarmament regime with only one full-time
staff person. Individuals, with both expertise and organizational affiliation, serve as nongovernmental representatives on official delegations fulfilling both advisory and liaison
functions. The tools that enable the various initiatives reflect the structure and objectives
of the initiative.
Opportunity - a combination of timing, inclination and political circumstances as well as organizational structure and tools together enable NGOs to pursue initiatives
that have the potential to become complementary and critical to official processes. But
sustaining a project such that it essential to the particular regime requires institutional
support. In addition to the sustained funding discussed above, support from various
external actors is essential in defining these projects and distinguishing them from typical
NGO activities. Each of the case studies is characterized by some level of
institutionalization directed at state governments, the broader UN system or a
combination of the two.
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Chapter 5: Making the Connection: Institutional
Support
The level of engagement in the state-based system observed in these cases is
rarely, if ever, the result of a one-time initiative or single attempt at political
117

involvement.

Rather, in all of the initiatives a long-term programmatic commitment is

observed. To sustain their projects and acquire essential resources, NGOs develop
important institutional links with governments, funders and UN organizations. This
institutional support results when relationships with key actors are fostered over time to
assist in project implementation. In the manner of Kerstin Martens' model, a number of
variables will be examined to assess institutionalization, including the nature of
interaction with the UN system; organizational professionalism; donor relations; and
cooperation with government officials. This area is arguably that which differentiates
more typical, one-time NGO initiatives from the cases here, in that it is only with strong
institutional support that NGOs can build upon opportunity and their own capacity to
develop and sustain projects that complement official processes.
Landmine Monitor's Contacts in the Field
The scale and scope of the Landmine Monitor project require that it have strong
institutional relationships at multiple levels. Field researchers depend on close
cooperation with UN field offices and specialized agencies for data and corroboration of

information. Connections with national militaries, the media, and international
organizations, particularly the International Committee of the Red Cross, continue to be
important for the project long after the successful networking of the landmine campaign.
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Landmine Monitor has, however, established the closest institutional relationship with
those governments it is monitoring.118 It has pursued a range of avenues to engage with
governments, ensuring the support of both sympathetic and opposing states for the
Monitor's work.
Understandably, governments were somewhat skeptical of the Landmine Monitor
effort in its early iterations and were reticent to cooperate with the NGO researchers. But
because the annual report uses only publicly available information, cooperation with
officials was deemed important to enable researchers to get comprehensive and factual
information. The project therefore emphasized outreach and sought every possible
opportunity to engage with both states-party and those not party to the Treaty to both
'sell' the Monitor and acquire information. The Treaty itself provides occasions for
informal interaction with officials including at the intersessional standing committees and
meetings of states parties, which editorial staff attend in order to meet and interview
officials. Landmine Monitor has pursued other informal and indirect means to develop
government contacts and promote its work including at various multilateral and regional
meetings with presentations to ASEAN, the Francophonie, NATO and the
Commonwealth. At national mine-destruction events, researchers meet with military
officials, take photographs for the annual report, and document mine destruction. ICBL
events, including regional meetings and annual report launches, provide occasions to
invite government participation and further engage states. Landmine Monitor seeks to
engage with states on the contents of the report and posts correspondence from
governments on its website in the interest of transparency.119
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As systematic civil society monitoring of a treaty was new to the security and
disarmament sector, there was widespread expectation that Landmine Monitor would be
politically charged.12 In order to avoid this, Landmine Monitor sought to employ an
even-handed approach from the outset. Although at risk of showing a bias toward its key
supporting states, including Norway, Canada, Belgium and Austria, the editors sought to
balance each state's record against its obligations and circumstances. In adopting this
approach, most states directly implicated in the Mine Ban Treaty - as producers of
landmines or affected countries - were called to task in the early reports.121 Deliberate
outreach and interaction, coupled with Landmine Monitor's early emphasis on objective
reporting, were essential to build credibility as a reliable account of state compliance
among all states party. In time, even those states that were not in compliance with, or
have not signed the Treaty, began cooperating with researchers.122 For example, although
the US vehemently opposes the Treaty, refusing to sign and give up its right to possess
landmines, it cooperates very closely in the provision of information for the annual
report.123
Cooperating with the governments that it is monitoring has facilitated Landmine
Monitor's ability to access and verify open source information for the annual report.
Central to the Monitor's research methodology is state review of the draft national reports
before publication. Government feedback in response to these reviews has occasionally
had a significant impact on the final research. In a 2000 letter to Landmine Monitor,
Australia corrected the statement that it had never produced landmines, noting that
production had ceased in the 1980's.124 Reported in the 2003 annual report, (2003: 652)
Nepalese government officials admitted to use of landmines to Landmine Monitor for the
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first time in 2002, and an Army Official subsequently reported that Nepal had once
produced landmines, thus correcting statements in previous annual reports. While there is
a risk of real, or perceived, compromise due to close cooperation states, over time, the
Monitor is building a reputation for credibility, reliability and objectivity.
Like its interaction with states, Landmine Monitor's relationship with the UN is
not confined to the traditional avenues for NGO engagement with UN bodies, but is
interactive and essential to the research program. ECOSOC accreditation is not required
for NGO access to meetings of states party to the Landmine Convention, and the ICBL
has observer status in the Treaty regime. The ICBL has a presence in Geneva, with an
office of six staff, to coordinate participation in regular intersessional meetings and
meetings of states parties that are commonly held there.125 The lead agencies for
Landmine Monitor are based in Belgium, Canada, Norway and the United States, with
staff in affected regions. Landmine Monitor makes use of several channels to interact
with the UN, not limited to formal diplomatic meetings. In affected countries, Landmine
Monitor researchers cooperate with UN Mine Action Centres, which often have technical
expertise and provide a forum for inter-agency consultation on mine-related issues. UN
field offices provide a means to acquire and verify information that might not otherwise
be reported, including from migrants and refugees. The official data collected by the UN,
primarily through the UN Mine Action Service, is an essential tool for completion of the
annual report.
In addition to the research resources of its agencies, the UN also provides political
support for the landmine issue broadly by way of relevant agencies and the Secretary
General. In the context of the human security debate and human rights and development
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implications of the issue, landmines have provided a political focal point for several UN
agencies. UNDP identifies with the development challenges in landmine-affected
countries, advocating around the issue and supporting Landmine Monitor's work
financially. UNICEF is concerned with landmines because children are a disproportionate
percentage of their victims and is also a project funder. Both agencies fund landminesrelated field work and are politically supportive of the work of the ICBL.126 The
Department of Peacekeeping Operations has a dedicated Mine Action Service that works
in post-conflict situations doing mine-action, a key information resource. Policy guidance
for the UN's approach to landmines is provided in "The United Nations Inter-Agency
Mine Action Strategy 2006-2011", which links mine action strategy with overarching UN
policy, stressing the Millennium Development Goals.127 The annual landmine appeals of
the UN Secretary General on the occasion of the April 4th International Day for Mine
Awareness and Assistance in Mine Action, are important for maintaining public attention
on the issue.

This political support for landmines and engagement with the UN more

generally translates into valuable information resources, financial support and political
capital for Landmine Monitor.
Landmine Monitor has nurtured its connections with national governments,
international diplomats, UN field offices, and specialized UN agencies over nine years of
operation. An asset to its ability to build and maintain these relationships is the core of
long-term dedicated staff that remains involved in the project. Among these, Steve Goose
and Paul Harmon, the former and current editors, have been part of Landmine Monitor
since its creation, as has Mary Wareham formerly of the Human Rights Watch editorial
team and now a researcher. Among the research network there are several additional 'old
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hands': in a comparison of the contributors to the annual report of past years and the
contact list for 2008, nearly half of the researchers for 2008 were involved in 2005 and of
these about a dozen were also involved in 2001. Continuity in the team of researchers and
editors facilitates informal interaction with officials and other institutional sources.
In 1999, as an NGO project designed to promote the new mine ban norm through
institutionalization of the monitoring and accountability provisions of the Treaty,
Landmine Monitor was viewed by some as the new frontier for NGO engagement in
international politics. It was a continuation of the partnership between government and
NGOs built during the landmine campaign, autonomous but reliant on government
funding. Though Landmine Monitor has independently monitored implementation of the
Landmine Monitor in its nine comprehensive annual reports to date, it has relied on
cooperation with states and the UN for funding, access to information and political
endorsement.

The approach for each state differs and thus Landmine Monitor

diversifies its outreach strategy accordingly. Informal interaction with officials and
information exchange with other agencies is essential, rather than consultation through
formal diplomatic channels. In working so closely with governments and institutions,
Landmine Monitor has developed its position as the Treaty's monitoring system on
behalf of states parties in lieu of a formal verification mechanism.

RCW: Cooperating with the Bureaucrats
Reaching Critical Will is a project of WILPF - a decentralized, international
NGO whose members are international affiliates represented by a General Secretariat.
WILPF maintains a small full-time staff, of which one Project Associate is exclusively
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responsible for RCW. The small size of RCW necessitates wide use of electronic tools to
develop its resources and maximize its reach. Similarly, RCW is dependent on external
support to implement its program and exploit its resources. RCW capitalizes on its
proximity to the UN to foster relationships with government officials and UN
bureaucrats, relationships that have facilitated access to information and documents. Staff
cultivate relationships with several foundations interested in arms control and
disarmament issues, to meet funding goals. As a small project of a federative NGO, RCW
prioritizes institutional relationships, and is supported by key actors in the multilateral
system.
RCW operates from the small WILPF UN Office located directly across the street
from UN Headquarters in New York. Some activities, including the regular monitoring of
the Conference on Disarmament, which is based at the UN Office in Geneva, are
supported by WILPF's international secretariat headquarters in Geneva. From these
strategic locations RCW staff frequent the halls of the UN to attend relevant meetings of
states and cover events within their purview. Proximity to the two UN headquarters is
essential for RCW's work, enabling staff to be present at all major disarmament meetings
as well as the range of side events and conferences centered at the UN. Further, the
resources and support of the RCW offices are literally steps away from the proceedings in
the UN building, which facilitates day to day operations and prompt postings to the
website as new documents are made available.
WILPF, and thus by proxy RCW, is one of the oldest ECOSOC accredited
disarmament NGOs. As such, its staff members carry UN grounds passes, which provide
access to the conference and meeting rooms of the UN buildings in Geneva and New
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York.130 ECOSOC accreditation, and its accompanying privileges, is particularly useful
for participation in meetings of regular standing bodies such as the CD. The CD has no
special conference accommodations for NGOs that are not accredited with the UN,
although ECOSOC accredited NGOs can sit in the gallery and observe.131 With ECOSOC
accreditation, NGOs are also entitled to make use of UN press and communications tools
through the Department of Public Information and acquire hardcopies of documents. This
formal relationship with the UN through ECOSOC also imbues WILPF, and thus RCW,
with a certain degree of credibility as all accreditations are endorsed by the ECOSOC
states parties through the membership committee.
The founder of RCW, Felicity Hill, noted that WILPF has always prioritized its
relationship with officials at the Office of Disarmament Affairs, "because diplomats go,
but the bureaucrats stay". RCW has regular interaction with the ODA staff that have
coordinating responsibility for disarmament events, cooperation that is important for the
acquisition of documents and the provision of coordination services to the wider NGO
community. Because ODA did not have the capacity to build a document library in
anticipation of the 2000 NPT RevCon, the RCW staff copied official documents at the
UN library and posted them online for the first time.132 The UN now maintains websites
with complete coverage for all major conferences, but in 2000 when RCW first created
its online library of disarmament documentation the then-DD A did not have the time,
web-presence or even bandwidth to build such a resource. One former program associate
noted that "perhaps nobody is as grateful for RCW as the ODA" because RCW serves as
the liaison with the NGO community and lessens the administrative burden by taking on
certain coordination tasks. The relationship is described as a "two-way street" such that
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RCW has provided welcome services, and thus has received reciprocal assistance when it
was required.
Access to the UN also enables RCW staff to interact with diplomats and build
informal relationships with government officials. Several of the program associates noted
that this interaction facilitated their work of collecting documents, particularly hard-copy
informal interventions. As early as the 2000 RevCon, RCW's newsletters provided an
opening to interact with government officials. The "News in Review" is now distributed
in hard copy at the door of the meeting hall every morning during the NPT and is widely
read by diplomats seeking a snapshot summary on the proceedings.134 As the physical
products of RCW's work - daily newsletters and the document library - have become
recognized and appreciated by officials, so has the willingness to share statements. One
program associate recounted that even governments that disagree with RCW's positions
provide insights and information to support the reporting effort, seeking to have their
approach reflected fairly in the widely read newsletters. While initially acquiring
informal statements was difficult, now many governments provide RCW with electronic
files of their interventions immediately after they are issued, and some provide a delivery
copy of statements not distributed in the meeting room.135 Through these channels of
interaction, RCW has built relationships with diplomats and officials that aid the
collection of documents and flow of information and have become a source of funding
from a handful of governments.
In its effort to promote transparency and accountability within the multilateral
disarmament regime, RCW has established a series of resources to educate and inform.
Developing its library of documentation has required that RCW staff cooperate with UN
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officials and interact with states parties. As a small project with minimal resources, RCW
prioritizes institutional relationships that it has built through formal channels of UN-NGO
interaction. At the same time, its narrow focus, ECOSOC status, modest budget and close
proximity to multilateral activities enable RCW to provide its documentary services
while retaining its identity as an independent NGO. Only a small percentage of RCW s
budget is funded by states, and thus it is not likely to compromise its principled positions
to ensure funding. It provides an essential service as a reliable source for disarmament
documentation and reporting, but is at liberty to take critical positions. Interaction with
bureaucrats and diplomats enables staff to keep abreast of developments to provide
informed reporting, but RCW maintains its independence as part of a grassroots,
women's organization.

Speaking on their Behalf
Non-governmental members of official delegations, by definition, demonstrate
close interaction with their governments, working hand-in-hand on the particular issue. In
most of the examples, the individuals are given the opportunity to comment on draft
statements, actively participate in daily delegation briefings, attend bilateral and side
meetings with other delegations, and wear the red UN security badge of a government
official.136 While the two project cases show interaction with UN and government
officials for information, financial and political support, the fate of the projects is
dependent on the organizations responsible for their operation. In the case of individual
experts, the government may be asked to include a non-governmental representative on
an official delegation, but ultimately the decision lies with officials. In this way, the
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institutional relationship seen in the third case is overwhelmingly directed toward
government not the UN.
A high level of interaction between the non-governmental experts and the
officials working on the delegations was observed in all of the examples. The majority of
the advisors and liaisons attended daily briefings and provided input into national
positions. Una Becker and Ernie Regehr were each tasked with drafting national working
papers, which were ultimately submitted to the respective BWC and NPT meetings as
official conference documents by their governments. John Simpson occasionally attends
group and bilateral meetings on the perimeter of the NPT to represent the UK delegation.
Typically the non-governmental experts stay at the same hotel as the other delegation
members and socialize outside of official activities.137 The integration is cause for
confusion at times: Angela Woodward noted that her organizational affiliation with
VERTIC was well known and therefore her presence in closed meetings caused some
confusion at the 2006 BWC RevCon. Though rare, incidents where NGO representatives
actually speak on behalf of governments, demonstrate the highest level of institutional
interaction. Ernie Regehr's participation on the Group of Government Experts on Arms
Transfer Transparency is an interesting example of this.
UN General Assembly Resolution 43/75 of 1988 called for establishment of a
Group of Government Experts to study the Ways and Means of Promoting Transparency
in International Transfers of Conventional Arms in the interest of enhancing arms trade
transparency. Between January 1990 and July 1991 the Group of Experts met four times
to prepare its final report, which was transmitted to the General Assembly as Resolution
A/46/301 of 9 September 2001 under the title: "General and Complete Disarmament:
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International Arms Transfers".138 The group of experts included 18 individuals
representing Australia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Finland,
Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Peru, Sri Lanka, UK, US, the USSR, Yugoslavia and
Zimbabwe. Because there was not an appropriately qualified expert in Canada's
Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade at the time, an NGO
representative with respected expertise on small arms and light weapons, Ernie Regehr,
then Director of Project Ploughshares, was appointed to represent Canada. Though he
was accompanied to meetings by an official from the Permanent Mission in New York,
Regehr is listed in the report as Canada's official representative and was duly instructed
to participate actively in the negotiations, speaking freely.
The Group of Experts negotiations did not proceed smoothly on all fronts and
Regehr was in the position of maintaining Canada's pro-registry position without
blocking consensus.

Compelled to participate in the process, though not supportive of a

compulsory registry system, the US and UK in particular supported a minimalist
approach. However the aftermath of Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait, and indications that
western states had initially supplied Iraq with the arms that enabled its actions, led to a
broad call for stronger export control measures on conventional arms and greater
transparency in transfers. A like-minded group including Brazil, Colombia, Zimbabwe
and Canada emerged in the Group of Experts and considered the idea of preparing a
minority report advocating a comprehensive and compulsory registry system, but
eventually compromise was reached. The final result was a consensus report that was
recommended to the UNGA (A/46/301) for the consideration of member states, calling
for the creation of a voluntary reporting mechanism for both suppliers and recipients of
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conventional arms, called a "universal and non-discriminatory arms transfer register
under the auspices of the United Nations" (Para. 161.c).140
Regehr's role as Canada's representative on the Group of Experts over four sets
of international negotiations on the report that ultimately created the conventional arms
registry demonstrates a very high level of government endorsement for an NGO
representative. There was not, however, universal support for Regehr's participation
among the Group: at one point in the negotiations the US queried whether the position of
the Canadian representative was representative of Canadian policy.141 Regardless, Regehr
had the full confidence of DFAIT and its senior management in his participation even in
the difficult negotiations to reach the final compromise position.142 He attributed the
support for his involvement in the Group of Experts to his professional reputation and
working relationship with key officials in DFAIT at the time. Although he represented a
small national NGO, without previous experience in such a multilateral process, Regehr
was asked to represent Canada as a full-fledged member of the Group of Experts. It was
only the direct support of the Canadian government, and confidence in Regehr's
expertise, that allowed this.
In order for individual non-governmental representatives to act in the capacity of
an official delegation member, or country representative in the case of the Group of
Experts, they require institutional support from the particular government, not affiliation
with the UN or ECOSOC accreditation. In the cases of non-governmental representatives
serving on official delegations, the individuals are accredited as representatives of the
government for security clearance and participation in the official proceedings. As such,
they do not face the limitations of other accredited NGOs and have full access to the UN
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facilities and all proceedings. In the cases examined, only one individual represents an
ECOSOC accredited NGO, namely VERTIC.143 Nor is involvement with the UN or
proximity to its headquarters of particular importance in these cases. The institutions
represented are for the most part based in locations outside of the UN centers with no
regular representation or presence at the UN. For example, Bill Potter is based at the
Monterrey Institute for International Affairs in northern California; Ernie Regehr is based
in Waterloo, Ontario; and Gotz Neuneck and Una Becker work at the Peace Research
Institute Frankfurt. And unlike the other project cases studied, none of the nongovernmental experts dedicate all of their time to the particular issue: several are
professors or administrators, and most work on the full disarmament and security agenda.
Unlike either the Landmine Monitor or RCW cases, where institutionalization
with the UN is important for information gathering, political support and even funding,
this is not the case with the individual experts. And as only a minority of individual
experts required external funding for their participation on an official delegation, donor
support is not a major concern.144 Rather, the cases include individuals with respected
professional credentials, most of whom had previous connections with their government
officials. Stein Villumstad was a member of a coalition of Norwegian NGOs and research
institutions involved on the small arms issue and had cooperated with government before
being invited to join his country's delegation to the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference. As
a former diplomat and director of a research organization in Nairobi, Ochieng Adala was
well known to the Kenyan government before being engaged in the meetings of the UN
PoA. Bill Potter had worked with Kyrgyzstani diplomats earlier the 1990's through the
Monterrey Institute, offering training in arms control issues, which led to his participation
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as an advisor to that country. These professional connections are the means by which the
individuals are 'institutionalized' with their governments and thus invited to participate
as members of official delegations. However, over time this participation further
strengthens that relationship.

Building a Reputation
The institutional support exhibited here depends on maintaining a reputation for
quality work, but in some cases even this is not sufficient to maintain support from
governments in particular. Dependence on states for political support or more importantly
funds leaves a project susceptible to changes in the governing party, policy direction or
program funding priorities. Landmine Monitor was established in cooperation with
several key governments and has been able to retain its funding support for the
maintenance of the monitoring effort over nine years; however, its editor Paul Harmon
attests that this is a year to year challenge. Several key funders, including France and the
UK, recently withdrew support for the project after several years of involvement because
their funding priorities changed. Canada's Landmine Fund will run out of funding in
2008, and with the recent corresponding change in government, Canada's place as the
largest supporter of Landmine Monitor is likely to end.145 In the case of nongovernmental experts, government policy is an important determinant as to whether such
experts are invited to participate on delegations. After contributing to five previous NPT
delegations, in 2007 Ernie Regehr's name was not approved at the ministerial level for
participation on Canada's PrepCom delegation.
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Institutionalization as discussed in these cases stems from intentional effort on
behalf of the NGOs, but that is not to say that it is unidirectional. The multilateral
environment over the past decade has seen several initiatives to encourage greater
interaction with NGOs and civil society more broadly. As was discussed previously, the
human security debate was an important contributor to this climate of support for NGOs.
Members of the Human Security Network including Austria, Canada, Ireland, Norway
and Switzerland are important contributors to the Landmine Monitor (See Figure 7) and
several of these states have invited NGO participation on official delegations. In the
nuclear sector, states including Mexico, Brazil, Chile; South Africa, and
Switzerland support NGO activities at NPT meetings, although none have yet had NGO
representatives on their delegations.146 In the UN PoA process, sixteen developing states
had an NGO representative on at least one delegation (See Appendix 5).
The UN launched an initiative in the past decade to increase interaction with nonstate actors, including NGOs and other private entities. At the recommendation of
ECOSOC (1996/297), the UNGA tasked the Secretary General with assessing
arrangements for the interaction of NGOs in UN activities, outlined in his 1998 report.147
Within the context of the UN reform effort, the Secretary General prepared a subsequent
report "Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for further change" (A/57/387
and Corr.l) that called for establishment of a Panel of Eminent Persons to make
recommendations as to how the UN could enhance its cooperation with civil society.
Endorsed by UNGA in December 2002 (A/57/300), the Panel was established in 2003
and chaired by Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil. The 'Cardoso Report' that resulted
from the Panel's consultations with representatives of civil society, "We the peoples:
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civil society, the UN and global governance", contained 30 proposals to address civil
society engagement in the UN.148 Unfortunately the mandate for the Cardoso Panel
mixed constituencies, addressing both NGOs and other private sector partners under the
mantel of 'civil society', with many proposals applied to NGOs, while making implicit
reference to the business sector.149 In spite of the flaws with the Cardoso Panel's
approach and its proposals, it recommended ways to 'enhance' civil society cooperation;
highlighted the shortcomings of the existing procedures for UN-NGO engagement; and in
the process, Panelists consulted with a wide range of NGOs.

Institutional relationships are evident in each of the three cases examined however
the focus of that integration is different. RCW is narrowly focused on the formal
disarmament treaties and UN mechanisms therefore it is closely engaged with the Office
of Disarmament Affairs. It makes use of formal avenues for NGO engagement in the UN
system, including ECOSOC accreditation. Individual non-governmental experts are by
definition reliant on the support of government officials to participate on official
delegations, but have very little formal institutional dependence on the UN or donors.
Personal contacts, fostered through professional qualifications and policy expertise, are
imperative for developing the necessary relationships with officials. Because Landmine
Monitor's needs are varied, its institutional connections are dispersed at the national and
international level, across government institutions and UN agencies, and it uses a variety
of means to build relationships. Landmine Monitor has a multi-dimensional approach,
using informal and diplomatic exchanges with states party and interaction with
specialized UN agencies for research, fundraising and political support.
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This paper has explored the conditions that enable NGOs to build initiatives that
perform functions on behalf of states and officials, demonstrating how these evolve to
play important roles in the state-based system. In the three cases, NGOs made use of the
opportunity to pursue an avenue of work, and the necessary tools to implement the
project, but all show that institutional linkages are essential for the development and
sustainability of the initiative. Relationships with external actors including donors,
governments, and UN bureaucrats are important in acquiring financial resources,
technical assistance and information, as well as political endorsement and support.
Although the approach differs in each case, they all prioritize institutional relationships to
sustain their activities.
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Chapter 6 ~ Transparency, Professionalism and
Legitimacy
I began this paper with two questions: What conditions have enabled NGOs to
engage directly in the state-centric system of the United Nations? And, specifically, why
has the security and disarmament sector seen the proliferation of highly specialized
NGOs and individuals providing essential services to states? Three very different cases
provided the means by which to consider these questions. The Landmine Monitor project
of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines is the Mine Ban Treaty's de facto
monitoring system. Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women's International
League for Peace and Freedom, provides the only comprehensive, centralized and
publicly accessible repository of disarmament related documentation. And individual
non-governmental experts serve on official delegations to meetings of the NonProliferation Treaty, Biological Weapons Convention and UN Programme of Action on
small arms and light weapons as both advisors and liaisons with other NGOs. These cases
provide insights about NGO engagement in the UN system, and the means by which they
adapt to contribute as non-state actors. To conclude this paper, I will revisit some themes
that emerged in the research, consider the limitations and outcomes of this NGO activity
and propose areas for further study.

I employed two theoretical approaches to consider the three initiatives. The first

addresses the aspect of adaptation, or the conditions that have enabled the NGOs and
individuals to develop these initiatives, with particular attention to the security and
disarmament sector. My interpretation of Kerstin Martens' model, which was inspired by
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the new-transnationalist approach to NGO engagement in multilateralism, provides a
basic framework for this analysis. The model considers internal characteristics of the
NGO and institutionalization of relations with the UN to examine change or adaptation. I
added an initial element of opportunity, or the political circumstances that provided the
opening for the project's creation. An examination of opportunity, the operational tools
and structures of the initiatives, and their institutional relationships with the UN,
governments and donors provides further clarity about how NGOs adapt to the statebased security and disarmament sector.
Evolution of the ICBL from a campaign focus to the Landmine Monitor's role in
treaty monitoring required substantial political and institutional support, while the
resources of the existing network facilitated field research. But the moral voice
demonstrated during the campaign was retained in the accountability mission of
Landmine Monitor. RCW was created by WILPF as a new and distinct project using
electronic tools and professional tactics to provide tangible services to the disarmament
community. Though a new project and style of work, RCW continues WILPFs leadership
on the nuclear agenda. For individual experts, engagement on a government delegation
typically represents a shift from academic or policy work to assume advisory
responsibilities. This is only possible because of their individual qualifications and
government support.
The second theoretical approach provides a means to examine how non-state
actors engage in the state-based multilateral world, impacting the political process and
state decision-making. State-centric approaches to world politics are inadequate in their
treatment of non-state actors, and yet it must be accepted that states are the primary unit
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of analysis in the multilateral system. The question remains, then: how do NGOs engage
in multilateral processes, particularly in the security and disarmament sector where rules
of procedure are not accommodating to involvement by non-state actors? Through a
constructivist lens, the social base of world politics clarifies the roles NGOs can play in a
state-based system. Concepts of a moral 'third force', the norm promoter, and epistemic
communities provide insight into how non-state actors can participate in the political
process, in spite of limitations on their direct involvement. As norm promoters, RCW and
Landmine Monitor work to institutionalize the landmine taboo and transparency norm
respectively, acting as a third force in calling for accountability. Individual experts
serving on official delegations contribute to the policy-making process as representatives
of an epistemic community, influencing decision-making because of their expertise. More
than fringe actors, these cases demonstrate how NGOs and non-governmental experts
have adapted to provide services within the realm of state responsibility for the treaty or
arrangement.

Pursuing Transparency
NGOs in the nuclear disarmament field in the late 1990's were frustrated by
limitations on both their access to official proceedings and the documents distributed by
states in those proceedings. The call for transparency among states in the arms control
and disarmament process was echoed by the NGOs with regard to the multilateral process
and RCW responded with its initiative to coordinate NGO participation and increase
access to information in the primary disarmament bodies: the UNGA 1st Committee, CD
and NPT. While transparency was a driving force in the RCW case, it is a theme
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throughout the cases of NGO engagement in the multilateral process. In pursuit of
transparency, the cases show efforts to increase the availability of information about
Treaty compliance and implementation; promote NGO access to the multilateral system;
and foster interaction between governments and NGOs.
Increased information about state compliance - shown by Landmine Monitor,
through the annual report, and RCW, with its disarmament library - is an immediate
response to multilateral opacity. In both cases, the information gathered about Treaty
implementation is disseminated in a free, publicly accessible format so as to make it as
widely available as possible. But the cases demonstrate other steps to increase
transparency at the multilateral level. As part of its program to coordinate the
disarmament community, RCW has been a major advocate for increased NGO access to
the NPT in particular. By maintaining a presence at all of the major disarmament bodies,
RCW ensures some level of NGO engagement and has also worked for standard rules for
NGO access in the NPT context. Non-governmental experts on official delegations are
exposed to the political process in a direct way, participating in the development of
positions, delegation discussions and closed negotiations. Through their liaison role,
several of these experts report both to domestic NGOs and those present at the meeting,
including when proceedings are in closed sessions. These individuals increase the flow of
information about the official proceedings in this liaison role. In each of the cases, direct
interaction with government officials facilitates the implementation of program
objectives, but NGO-government interaction also fosters transparency. Through informal
engagement with officials in the halls of the UN, sharing of draft Landmine Monitor
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reports and direct partnership on official delegations, the work of governments in the
various Treaty regimes is made more transparent to non-state actors.
The link between transparency and compliance is an extension of the demand for
accountability seen in both the RCW and Landmine Monitor cases. The Landmine
Monitor project was designed as a civil society initiative to "hold governments
accountable to the obligations they have taken with respect to antipersonnel mines"150 by
monitoring compliance with Treaty obligations. For WILPF, restrictions on NGO access
and limited availability of disarmament-related documentation fostered concerns about a
lack of accountability to the various obligations of the disarmament treaty framework and
provided a major impetus for the RCW project. Transparency, as a measure of
accountability and thus compliance, is a recurrent theme in the three cases. In order to
pursue transparency, however, the tactics used by the NGOs show another theme: that is
'professionalization'.

Professionalization in the NGO Sector
The NGOs adopted a professional approach to their work, demonstrated in the use
of skilled staff, specialized operational tools and targeted outreach strategies to
implement the different activities. Landmine Monitor prioritizes ongoing researcher
training and strengthening of its methodology to ensure consistent and high-quality
research for its annual report. An international editorial board provides oversight and
central editorial control is held by the lead agency. Although RCW operates on a much
smaller scale, it retains a dedicated staff person in New York where informal interaction
with governments and UN bureaucrats has been essential for document collection, and
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capitalizes on its electronic resources to reach a wide audience. The individual experts all
carry certain professional qualifications - as academics or practitioners - that led to their
participation on the respective official delegations, as representatives of respected
organizations. In the highly technical security and disarmament sector,
professionalization, including specialized scientific and policy expertise, play an
important role in establishing authority and credibility.151
Employment of professional staff, tools and strategies in each of the three cases
studied suggests an interest in establishing a reputation for quality and reliability.
Reputation has an important role to play as the basis on which government, UN and
donor support is built. The initiatives depended on the credentials of respected
individuals and organizations to launch their initiatives. The success of the ICBL,
WILPF's organizational legacy in the disarmament community, and the extensive
resumes of the individual experts were important with regard to the initial opportunity.
But over time the reputations of each initiative and individual continues to grow with
demonstrated skill and professionalism. RCW has slowly built a reputation as its
resources have expanded; today an official at the Office for Disarmament Affairs
describes the RCW web resources 'indispensable' and called it 'astonishing' that this
product has been developed on so few resources.152 Having served on an official
delegation furthers an individual's reputation as an expert qualified to advise a
government delegation. Bill Potter noted that through his long-term advisory role to the
government of Kyrgyzstan on NPT delegations, he suspects he is "no longer seen
primarily as an NGO rep by most of the other delegates".153 One researcher noted that
unlike in the first years of the project, affiliation with Landmine Monitor literally opens
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doors for field researchers today. Landmine Monitor has an unparalleled reputation
among similar NGO projects and many initiatives have sought to emulate its approach.
Landmine Monitor's professional monitoring approach has made it a model for
NGOs in other arms control areas. The BioWeapons Prevention Project was founded in
November 2002 by a network of NGOs with expertise in biotechnology following the
failed negotiations over a protocol to strengthen the BTWC's weak compliance and
verification scheme. The project seeks to "reduce the threat of bioweapons by monitoring
and reporting throughout the world."154 Using a project design not unlike Landmine
Monitor, the BWPP monitors relevant developments among governments and the private
sector; reports on these through the BioWeapons Monitor, and networks global partners
in the collection and analysis of data.155 The so called "Red Book" published by the
Biting the Bullet initiative of International Alert, Saferworld and the University of
Bradford together with IANSA tracks progress towards implementation of the UN PoA.
The report was issued to coincide with biennial meetings of states on the PoA in 2003,
2005 and the Review Conference in 2006. Like Landmine Monitor, the research was
conducted by a network of researchers covering 180 countries.156 Professional and
independent NGO treaty monitoring is now seen in several disarmament and security
sectors, based on the success of Landmine Monitor.
The concept of professionalism used here describes the means by which the three
cases exhibit characteristics that emphasize quality and reliability in their work. Skill and
expertise is highlighted with polished approaches and an image of professionalism.
Fundamentally, a reputation for reliability and utility is required to ensure continued
support from institutional actors, including both political and financial support.157 To
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engage with UN staff and government officials - whether at major events or in capitals as an NGO representative, tactical decisions about approach, language and even dress
code are made, as demonstrated throughout this research.15 Professional approaches and
reliability over time support reputations that in turn, sustain the functional role of the
initiative. But even while adopting professional approaches to pursue transparency and
therefore accountability among states, there is an outstanding question about the very
political legitimacy of NGOs as non-state actors in the multilateral political process.

Legal and Political Legitimacy
The dramatic growth in the number and level of participation of NGOs at the
international level in the 1990's fed a dialogue about the UN's interaction with NGOs,
the results of which were seen in the various reports of the Secretary General discussed
previously. A parallel debate, however, questioned the legal status of NGOS and claims
that they are 'representative'. Many of the same complaints leveled by NGOs at states
about lack of transparency and accountability are echoed by critics of NGOs. It is not the
purpose of this paper to address the full debate about NGO legitimacy, but in summary, it
concerns both the legal standing and the political function of NGOs in the multilateral
system. Legally speaking, the debate questions the involvement of NGOs in international
politics given that they are not recognized as persons in international law, and thus have
only limited rights of participation pursuant to Article 71 of the UN Charter and specific
treaty instruments.159 The political debate rests on the claim that NGOs are undemocratic
in that they do not represent the 'grassroots' as is widely assumed and that they often lack
accountability to their own constituency, much less the general public.160 Concern about
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the legitimacy of NGOs as actors in international politics must be considered in light of
the highly integrated activities observed here. How is it that NGOs, as 'undemocratic'
non-state actors and non-persons in international law, can play the central roles observed
in the three case studies?
The legitimacy question is primarily a result of the imbalance between the pace at
which the role of NGOs has grown in comparison with the theoretical and legal
framework. NGOs "continued to burrow into the nooks and crannies of world politics"
(DeMars op cit) without a defined place such that it is now impossible to ignore their
contributions. States contract NGOs to deliver humanitarian aid and implement
development programs; fund NGO advocacy campaigns; and partner with them in public
education and awareness-raising. And perhaps most relevant to the cases seen here, states
rely on NGOs to provide services for them, including Treaty monitoring, documentation
and expert advice. One argument for the legitimacy of NGOs is that they are implicitly
acknowledged by states in policy and explicitly supported with resources. The body of
international law also recognizes NGOs: UN resolutions and reports have addressed the
UN-NGO relationship since the adoption of the Charter in 1945 and references to nongovernmental organizations appear in a range of treaty documents, including both the
Mine Ban Treaty and UN PoA.161 The formal procedures codified for ECOSOC's
relationship with NGOs, namely the provisions for accreditation, further legitimize NGOs
in the UN context.162
Critics expect of NGOs reflect the standards of legitimacy that are expected of
states - adherence to democratic principles is equated with political legitimacy. The
validity of this assumption is, however, contestable. Using Gordenker and Weiss'
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definition of NGOs as "private citizens' organizations, separate from government but
active on social issues, not profit making, and with transnational scope", the first
parameter is that NGOs are private entities. It therefore stands to reason that they are not
subject to the same expectations of a public institution, although they should be
encouraged to maintain transparent and democratic governance with financial
accountability.

But such expectations should not exclude small organizations, with

relevant interest or expertise on an issue but with simple governance structures or no
significant constituency, from participating in the political process as private NGOs.
Arguably in the security and disarmament sector this is even more relevant where
technical expertise is valued and the constituency is largely western. NGOs have political
motivations that subject them to criticism about accountability, but as is clear in the cases
studied here, they are often service-providers, driven by principled positions and
institutional survival.
NGOs functioning in direct service of institutional and state objectives challenge
the political legitimacy debate. The Ottawa Process that resulted in adoption of the Mine
Ban Treaty was unique in that it involved NGOs, through the ICBL, as critical actors
throughout the negotiations, an observer role that was ultimately codified in the meeting
provisions of the Treaty in Article 11.4. As a continuation of the government-NGO
partnership of the Ottawa Process, and with strong state support, Landmine Monitor
shares this recognition as a legitimate actor in the Treaty context. By contrast, RCW is
part of the wider community of disarmament NGOs that have struggled for increased
access and participation in the nuclear sector. However, ECOSOC accreditation
legitimizes its participation as an observer in standing bodies. Individual experts are
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accredited members of an official delegation, with political legitimacy established
through their affiliation with the representative government. The debate over the political
legitimacy of NGOs will undoubtedly remain unresolved until such a time as the
international system grapples with definitions and roles, however in the interim, NGOs
will continue to find ways and means to participate in international politics in
complementary ways.

The Limitations of NGOs as Service Providers
When the globalization debate was nearing its height at the end of the 1990's,
Jessica Mathews' (1997: 50) made the triumphant claim that the "steady concentration of
power in the hands of states that began in 1648 with the Peace of Westphalia is over, at
least for a while" and that the authority of states was "dissolving", giving way to civil
society and corporations. A decade later, a more restrained perspective accepts that there
are limitations on NGO contributions to international politics. While I have demonstrated
how NGOs can provide complementary, indeed necessary, services to states in the
international system, it must be acknowledged that the state-dominated multilateral
process itself is largely unchanged. In spite of the evidence that NGOs utilize multilateral
mechanisms to engage with states at a high level in the provision of technical services, it
is clear that they pose little challenge to state dominance in the official procedures of the
UN's institutions and Treaties. The provisions of the Charter that established sovereign
states as the members of the UN remain unchanged. Among the decisions for which
states are responsible are those related to the accommodation of civil society participants
in the rules of procedure for UN organs and treaties. NGOs continue to be subject to the
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authority of states with regard to their involvement in the multilateral process and while
they are now widely accepted as observers in official proceedings, there is little
expectation that they will be endowed with enhanced participation rights. The limitations
on NGO engagement in the multilateral system are therefore a notable constraint worth
consideration.
The primary enabler of NGO activity is financial: only with sufficient resources
can NGOs sustain their operations and undertake highly professional activities. This
requires that NGOs fundraise constantly and pursue new channels of funding as resources
dry up. NGO initiatives are therefore limited by the reliability of financial support, and
while the cases here have sustainable sources of funding, even these projects are
continually adapted to match available resources. NGOs are often accused of chasing
funding, or tailoring projects to the interests of donors, which is extremely difficult in the
case of long-term projects. Because of funding challenges, they also regularly make-do
with less than ideal resource levels, which has the affect of limiting activities. This was
shown in the case studies where Landmine Monitor's network meetings have been
curtailed by resource limitations and RCW has struggled to retain staff because of its
modest compensation. The pressure to find financial support for their work makes NGO
initiative inherently vulnerable.
Government funding is often seen as more dependable, but it has its own
limitations. As was discussed above, this funding is susceptible to changing government
priorities with new policies and ruling parties. Reliance on government support - political
and financial - can have negative implications for NGO independence, a threat to the
project's neutrality, whether perceived or real. Landmine Monitor has struggled with this
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throughout its existence because of its close partnership with the core group of state
supporters. Its entire budget is currently funded by government donors, and while it has
sought to widen this group, the majority includes like-minded supporters of the Ottawa
process. Early in the project's existence, Trevor Findlay observed that Landmine
Monitor's role "would be protected if funding.. .were derived from independent sources
rather than, as at present, a select group of western states parties which, although strong
supporters of the convention, may at some point not be in full compliance with the treaty
themselves" (1999: 54). The legacy of its work has been to maintain objective and
credible reporting in spite of the delicate relationship with its key funders and supporters.
Credibility is a concern even when an NGO project is not predominantly funded
by governments. Independent NGOs, driven by principled goals and policy objectives
that are not necessarily consistent with government priorities, will always face
ideological differences with states. Chayes and Handler Chayes (1995: 251) observe the
challenges of NGOs assuming central roles in regime management:
They define their own objectives, generate resources, and make commitments through their own
internal processes. They have their own vision of compliance that may or may not coincide with
that of the parties. They remain free to critique or attack the regime managers, national or
international. It is therefore not surprising that they are not always appreciated by the states and
international organizations that have official responsibility for managing the regime.

RCW is part of a grassroots peace and women's organization determined to see the
abolition of nuclear weapons and opposed to nuclear energy. Its work is used and
appreciated by a cross-section of NGO, official and government users because of its
practicality, but its policy positions are often contentious. Even among the NGO
community, not all would agree with RCW's positions. Therefore, its credibility as a
service to the community is in the value of the product to all actors, not necessarily the
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political views of the organization. NGOs tread a careful line in seeking to balance
credibility in the eyes of states with their principled positions.
A final limitation of NGO initiatives is a practical one related to access: NGOs are
very limited in their ability to access information. They must rely on open-source
information and public sources to monitor compliance or provide analysis on a policy
issue, as they are not privy to intelligence or classified information. Landmine Monitor's
research is reliant entirely on open-source material, which could be seen as a limitation to
its monitoring role. The access challenge also affects the ability of NGO representatives
to attend meetings as closed sessions at multilateral will always prohibit external
observers, regardless of the essential service an NGO might provide. This is further
evidence to the unique position held by individual experts on official delegations, where
they gain access to those closed meetings.
The limitations NGOs face in the multilateral system are not insignificant, and in
spite of these, they continue to find innovative ways to integrate their activities with
official processes at a very high level. While this study is focused on the conditions that
enable NGOs to engage in the state-based multilateral system, the obvious question is,
'To what end?' Is Landmine Monitor encouraging state compliance with obligations
under the Mine Ban Treaty? What is the impact of RCW's effort to document
disarmament proceedings? How are individual experts affecting decision-making on
government delegations? Though it is premature to suggest direct impacts of the case
studies here on performance in the various treaty regimes, some observations can be
made which suggest that NGO efforts are contributing to modest change in the security
and disarmament sector.
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A review of the Executive Summary of the 2007 Landmine Monitor Report
provides some insight into the performance of the Mine Ban Treaty since the
establishment of the NGO monitoring effort. Today 155 states are party to the Mine Ban
Treaty, four of which acceded in 2007 (Montenegro, Indonesia, Kuwait and Iraq).
Landmine Monitor has reported the continued decline in use of antipersonnel mines since
the Treaty's entry into force, reporting that only two states (Myanmar and Russia - not a
member state) laid new AP mines in 2007.164 It is estimated that states party have
destroyed approximately 41.8 million AP mines since 1997; 80 states party have
completed the destruction of their stockpiled landmines, and another sixty have declared
that they never possessed AP mines.165 At publication in 2007, Landmine Monitor
reported (Executive Summary, 2008: 15-16) ten states in the process of destroying
stockpiled mines, although unfortunately it is anticipated that of these, Afghanistan,
Belarus, and the Ukraine will not meet their deadlines for complete destruction.
Performance on mine action is not as positive, with several badly affected states
proceeding slowly on mine clearance and thus seeking extensions to the 10-year deadline
for compliance with Article 5 obligations to destroy existing mines.166 Existing landmines
continue to have their destructive effects: in 2006 there were a total of 5,751 documented
casualties caused by mines and related items in 68 states.167 The performance of state
party to the Mine Ban Treaty is encouraging on many fronts, although there are still
serious concerns about non-states party that continue to produce, stockpile and use
landmines.
Another consideration with regard to impact of these NGO initiatives is the
degree of transparency in the various bodies. At minimum, Landmine Monitor has played
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an important role in sustaining attention on the continued landmine problem, highlighting
successes and 'shaming' cases of non-compliance. Several examples cited previously
demonstrate that states read and react to the annual report and these communications are
posted on the Landmine Monitor website. States are required to submit annual reports
under Article 7 and in 2007 there were mixed results on this transparency mechanism: 96
percent of states required to do so submitted initial reports, however 70 states parties
failed to submit their required annual update in 2006. Notably, Morocco, Poland and Sri
Lanka submitted voluntary reports as non-states party (Executive Summary, 2008: 1818). In the nuclear context, the scope of RCW's reporting and documentation suggests a
clear increase in access to information about the performance of states party since the
2000 NPT RevCon. But since RCW began collecting documents on its website, the UN
has also increased the accessibility of disarmament documentation, creating designated
websites for the various NPT meetings and operating a live webcast during the 2005
RevCon.

Areas for Further Research
A complete assessment of the impact of NGO action on state behaviour is a much
larger study that carries with it great subjectivity and questions of causality. And yet, that
research is necessary for a full picture of NGO participation in the multilateral system.
While there are a wide range of studies exploring NGO activity in the environmental,
human rights and development sector, the security and disarmament sector has received
comparatively less attention.168 A decade of NGO monitoring through the Landmine
Monitor and comparative cases in the small arms and light weapons and biological
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weapons contexts could enable a more thorough analysis of the impact of NGO
monitoring on state compliance. Similarly, the range of cases of individual experts sitting
on government delegations across the disarmament and security sector warrants attention.
The cases examined here are service-based: the NGOs provide their monitoring
and documentary services or personal expertise to UN member states and the broader
public. Other cases exist where NGOs are virtually seizing the reigns from government to
negotiate Treaties, acting as norm entrepreneurs. This was seen during the Ottawa
Process, as well as the Kimberley Certification Process for Rough Diamonds and to some
degree the Arms Trade Treaty process that is in its infancy. How do these activities differ
from the service-oriented functions? What conditions are in place and how do they differ
from those seen in this study? It would also be interesting to examine other sectors to
compare how NGOs approach multilateral cooperation differently in other fora. Is the
security and disarmament context, and its history as the center of 'high polities', unique
in fostering this level of NGO engagement?
By their sheer numbers, NGOs challenge the logistical and procedural operations
of the UN system - accreditation procedures, security measures, and meeting room
accommodations are all strained by large groups of NGO observers in attendance at UN
meetings. Rules of procedure and official protocols are unlikely to change significantly to
change the status of non-state actors in the UN system, yet there are measures that could
be taken to maximize the benefits of NGO contributions to the process and minimize the
limitations. The existence, and predicted growth, of NGOs in the multilateral operations
of the security and disarmament sector points to areas where further research is required
to guide the development of mechanisms for UN-NGO cooperation.
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Conclusion
Landmine Monitor, Reaching Critical Will, and the examples of nongovernmental experts participating on official delegations demonstrate the degree to
which NGOs are integrating their activities into the state-centric UN system. When the
political opportunity was present, the NGOs had the appropriate human, technical and
financial resources, and institutional relationships were fostered to ensure the necessary
external support, the initiatives grew to play important roles in the respective regimes. By
these means, the NGOs engage directly with states in the provision of essential services,
while retaining their identity as independent non-governmental organizations. Although
the theoretical and legal foundations regarding the position of NGOs in the multilateral
system are not fully developed, they continue to find new and innovative ways to
participate in the political process without the rights of states. Motivated by the pursuit of
transparency and state accountability, NGOs are demonstrating increasingly professional
and strategic tactics to implement their activities with novel use of electronic tools,
international networks, and personal expertise. NGOs are establishing that they are
legitimate political actors through the services they provide, in spite of the ambiguity that
remains about their definition.
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The Global Civil Society Programme at the London School of Economics - founded in 1999 under the
direction of Mary Kaldor - together with the Centre for Civil Society at UCLA under Helmut Anheier has
been a major source of research on these themes. The programme produces the Global Civil Society
Yearbook and is a major source of empirical research tracing the development of global civil society.
Yearbook available online: http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/global/researchgcspub.htrn Transnational civil
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End the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Ann Florini, ed. The Third Force: The
Rise of Transnational Civil Society (Tokyo and Washington: Japan Center for International Change and
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999); and Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, and Kathryn
Sikkink, eds. Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movement, Networks, and Norms
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002).
2
Major actors in the landmine campaign all contributed to an edited volume on the problem, the
international response and the evolution of the Landmines Campaign. See Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J.
Lawson and Brian W. Tomlin, eds, To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines,
(Toronto: Oxford University Press) 1998.
3
Jody Williams (ICBL Co-ordinator) and Stephen Goose (Human Rights Watch) assessed the ICBL's
ability to "cut across disciplines to bring together a diverse array of NGOs to work towards a single goal"
one of the campaign's major attributes. Jody Williams and Stephen Goose, "The International Campaign to
Ban Landmines" in Cameron et al, op. cit., 22.
4
Efforts to address the landmines issue within the context of the UN Convention on Certain Conventional
Weapons had met with obstacles. In October 1996, at an international conference on landmines held in
Ottawa, then Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy initiated the Ottawa Process when he called on
the entire international community to negotiate a ban on anti-personnel mines by the end of 1997. A group
of like-minded states joined forces behind Canada's initiative, working with the ICBL and other
international organizations through to the second Ottawa Conference in December 1997 when the Treaty
text was finally signed. See Robert J. Lawson, et al "The Ottawa Process and the International Movement
to Ban Anti-Personnel Mines" in Cameron et al., op. cit., 160-184.
5
The internet was only in its developmental stage in the early years of the campaign, and staff argue that it
was the fax machine that was the most important tool in the years. Cameron et al., op. cit., 24.
6
See Don Hubert, The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy, Occasional Paper #42
(Providence RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, 2000).
7
My personal experience is primarily with the nuclear disarmament regime as an NGO participant at two
PrepComs (including as an NGO rep on the 2003 Canadian delegation) and at one RevCon. I was also
involved in both the project management and implementation of a monitoring project modeled after
Landmine Monitor, called the Space Security Index.
8
See Christian Reus-Smit, "Changing Patterns of Governance: From Absolutism to Global
Multilateralism" in Albert J. Paolini et al, eds, Between Sovereignty and Global Governance: The United
Nations, the State and Civil Society (London: MacMillan Press, 1998) 3-28.
9
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna on 23 May 1969. Online:
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/l_l_1969.pdf
6
See Srilatha Batliwala and L. David Brown, eds., Transnational Civil Society: An Introduction
(Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press) 2006; David Chandler, Constructing Global Civil Society: Morality and
Power in International Relations (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave MacMillan) 2004; the Global Civil Society

project at the London School of Economics, including Mary Kaldor et al, eds., Global Civil Society 2006/7
(London: SAGE publications Ltd) 2007; and John Keane, Global Civil Society? (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press) 2003.
11
The nomenclature and approach I have adopted is, according to critics, a particularly western-northern
interpretation of civil society as being internationally-focused. Mary Kaldor is critical of the 'NGOization'
of public space, arguing that "those NGOs who are northern and therefore close to the centers of power and
funding, whose emphasis is service provision, who are solidaristic rather than mutual benefit, and whose
organization tends to be more formal and hierarchical, have come to dominate the NGO scene.. .which has
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eroded traditional mutual benefit organizations as well as the kind of local community ties which help to
foster GROs and CBOs." Global Civil Society: An Answer to War (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2003) 93.
12
Resolution 1996/31 "Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental
organizations", adopted at the 49th plenary meeting of the Economic and Social Council, 25 July 1996.
13
Peter Willets notes that international federations of political parties and non-profit lobbying organizations
for industry provide indirect linkage to the UN for political parties and businesses. "The Rules of the
Game: The United Nations and Civil Society" in John W. Foster and Anita Anand, eds., Whose World is it
Anyway? Civil Society, the United Nations, and the multilateral future (1999) 252.
14
There are certainly academics that participate in the policy process of the UN as experts - seen
particularly in the case of non-governmental representatives on official delegations - in their capacity as
members of a university or research institute. These individuals will not be described as representatives of
an NGO, although they are certainly non-governmental members of civil society.
15
See Robert H. Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
16
Toni Erskine, "Assigning Responsibilities to Institutional Moral Agents" Ethics and International
Relations, 15:2 (2001) 67-85.
17
Bill Seary discusses the role of US NGO representatives and the international labour movement in the
San Francisco conference. Foster and Anand, op. cit, 25-27.
18
Information about the DPI/NGO section and NGO association with the UN through the Department of
Public Information online: http://www.un.org/dpi/ngosection/about-ngo-assoc.asp The website lists 124
NGOs associated with DPI under the Peace and Security theme.
19
Information about the UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service online: http://www.unngls.org/site/article.php3?idii-article=24
20
UN Conference on Environment and Development 1992 from UN Briefing Note Series General
Information at: http://www.un.org/geninfo/bp/enviro.html Other figures suggest that 1400 NGOs were
accredited for the conference itself and 650 attended. (Willetts, 1996: 55)
21
The annual ECOSOC report for 2007 lists 136 organizations as being in general consultative status, 1955
in special consultative status and 960 on the roster. Online:
http://esa.un.org/coordination/ngo/new/INF2007.pdf
22
This figure is drawn from Table lb of the 2007/8 report, and includes all nongovernmental organizations
listed in Clusters I-V (international bodies, dependent bodies, organizational substitutes, and national
bodies, including dead, inactive and unconfirmed bodies). The total number of this type for the four clusters
in 2007 was 53,815. The Union of International Associations has an established methodology and defines
international organizations according to a broad range of criteria. See pages 2997-3000 for more
information.
23
Since 27 February 2003, the CDs membership has included Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba,
Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Myanmar, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Noraway,
Pakistan, Peru, Poland, Republic of Korea, Romania, Russian Federation, Senegal, Slovakia, South Africa,
Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Zimbabwe. Annex
1, Rules of Procedure of the Conference on Disarmament, CD/8/Rev.9, 19 December 2003.
24
See James Paul, "NGOs and the Security Council" (New York: Global Policy Forum, 2004). Online:
http://www.globalpolicv.org/security/ngowkgrp/gpfpaper.htm
25
A statement written by WILPF on the occasion of annual International Woman's Day is read to the CD
plenary on behalf of the NGO community by a UN official or the CD delegate. In 2008, rotating CD
President Ahmet Uzumcii read the International Women's Day Disarmament statement. Online:
http://www.wilpf.int.ch/statements/IWD2008.html
26
The neo-realist strain in international relations theory is exemplified in the writings of Susan Strange,
The Retreat of the State: the Diffusion of Power in the World Economy (Cambridge, CU Press, 1997) and
John Mearscheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2001).
27
There is extensive debate between neo-realists and neo-liberals about their respective positions on the
state. See Robert O. Keohane (ed), Neorealism and Its Critics (NY: Columbia University Press, 1986).
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Neo-liberalism addresses state cooperation at the international level, including with institutionalist and
regime theories. See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony; Cooperation and Discord in the World Political
Economy (Princeton: PU Press, 1984) and Oran R. Young, "Regime dynamics: the rise and fall of
international regimes", International Organization 36:2 (1982) 277-297.
See Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change",
International Organization 52:4 (1998) 887-917.
30
Haas does not restrict this concept to natural scientists like others have, but compares it to the
sociological notion of a 'thought collective' or a group with a common style of thinking, which could be
extended to a group of like-minded NGOs. See Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: epistemic communities and
international policy coordination", International Organization 46:1 (1992) 1-35.
31
Haas acknowledges that an epistemic community may consist of professionals from a variety of
disciplines and backgrounds with: "(1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a
value-based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal beliefs, which are
derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain
and which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and
desired outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity - that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for
weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and (4) a common policy enterprise that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their professional competence
is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence." Op.
cit., 3.
32
Further development in this area led to theories about how this impact was felt, including the notion of a
'boomerang pattern' to explain how NGOs operating in networks circumvent domestic politics by working
at the international level to affect policy change, which can subsequently impact domestic policy. Further
still, the 'spiral pattern' conceived suggests a more step-by-step approach to policy change.
33
The rules of procedure, including instructions for NGO participation, are negotiated at the first
preparatory committee of each five-year review cycle for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT). Specific arrangements determining whether a meeting is held in closed session, where
NGOs are seated, and what allowance there is for oral interventions are not necessarily defined by the rules
of procedure and can vary at the behest of the Chair.
34
See Taylor Owen's analysis of "Human security defined: philosophic roots to a new definition" in his
"Challenges and opportunities for defining and measuring human security", Disarmament Forum 3 (2004)
15-24.
35
Among the theorists who have adopted this approach are Don Hubert, Robert McRae, Keith Krause, Paul
Evans, Andrew Mack and the non-Canadian, S. Neil MacFarlane.
36
P.H. Liotta has observed that the imprecision of the concept has made it "an attractive mandate in the
conduct of foreign policy for 'middle power' governments - and far less popular principle-in-practice for
so-called major powers." Liotta, "A Concept in Search of Relevance", Security Dialogue 35:3 (2004) 363.
37
"The Establishment of the Commission". Online: http://ww w.humansecuritvchs. org/about/Establishmenl .html
38
The Human Security Network now includes Austria, Canada, Chile, Costa Rica, Greece (President),
Ireland, Jordan, Mali, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa (observer), Switzerland and Thailand. Online:
http://www.huinansecuritynetwork.org/rnenu-e.php
39
Glyn Berry Program thematic priorities for 2007-8 include: democratic transitions, legal and physical
protection of civilians, human rights and minorities, children and armed conflict, responsibility to protect
(or humanitarian intervention), small arms and light weapons, war economies, business and human rights,
mediation capacity building, conflict prevention policy, security system reform and the rule of law, the
International Criminal Court and accountability campaign, women, peace and security, public safety and
emerging human security policy as outlined on the program's website for the interest of potential
applicants. Online: http://geo.international.gc.ca/cip-pip/cip-pip/gbpbythematicfocus-en.asp
40
The achievement of the Treaty is commonly referred to as the Ottawa Process, because it was at a
meeting called by Canada and held in Ottawa in December 1997 that 122 states joined to sign the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and their Destruction. The term is interpreted as a process outside the official negotiating fora that leads to
a treaty, therefore including both the pre-negotiations and final adoption.
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For a complete analysis of the Ottawa Convention's verification scheme, see "Verification of the Ottawa
Convention: Workable Hybrid or Fatal Compromise?", Disarmament Forum 4 (1999) 45-55.
42
Chayes and Handler Chayes examine the links between transparency and compliance with treaty
obligations, noting that information, through reporting and data collection, then verification and
monitoring, are required to manage regime compliance. Acknowledging the pervasive use of self-reporting,
the authors argue that this is only the beginning of the data-gathering process, which can include NGO
reporting and other informal means. Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty:
Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press: 1995)
162.
Findlay notes that this 'cooperative' approach is reminiscent of human rights agreements and even the
Kyoto Protocol. "Verification of the Ottawa Convention: Workable Hybrid or Fatal Compromise?",
Disarmament Forum 4 (1999) 51.
44
Latham referenced his policy paper and support for civil society monitoring under the heading of
"Enhanging Transparency Measures" in his paper, "The light Weapons Problem: Causes, Consequences
and Policy Opptions" in Andrew Lathem, ed. Multilateral Approaches to Non-Proliferation, Proceedings of
the 4th Canadian Non-Proliferation Workshop (Toronto: York University) 1996.
45
Mary Wareham recently published an insider account of the Landmine Monitor's first six years. She
credits Bob Lawson and Steve Goose of Human Rights Watch as the two individuals behind the
establishment of Landmine Monitor. Wareham, "Origins of the Landmine Monitor", What if No One's
Watching? Landmine Montior: 1999-2005 (Oslo: Fafo, 2006) 21.
46
Telephone interview with Bob Lawson, 20 February 2008.
47
Telephone interview with Bob Lawson, 20 February 2008.
48
There was not universal support for the Landmine Monitor idea as it had taken shape: at least one
competing proposal was submitted at the Oslo meeting and even Jody Williams expressed concern about
the capacity among the network to do research. Wareham, op. cit.. 24-26.
49
This language appears in the "About Landmine Monitor" section in each Executive Summary from 19992007.
50
Jody Williams was the founding coordinator for the ICBL from 1992-1998. See:
http://nobelprize.org/nobel prizes/peace/laureates/1997/williams-cv.htrnl
51
Telephone interview with Bob Lawson, 20 February 2008.
52
From "About Reaching Critical Will" online http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/about/aboutindex.html
53
The NPT required that states agree to extend it after 25 years of it being in force. This agreement was
reached at the 5th Review Conference in 1995 as part of a package deal that also included a decision on the
"Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", another on a "Strengthening of
the Review Process of the Treaty" and a Resolution on the Middle East. For background on the 1995
Review Conference, see Tariq Rauf and Rebecca Johnson, "After the NPT's Indefinite Extension: The
Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime", The Non-Proliferation Review, Fall/Winter (1995) 28-42
and Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider's Account, Jayantha Dhanapala with Randy Rydell,
(Geneva, UNIDIR: 2005).
54
Of the 195 NGO groups who participated in the Review and Extension Conference, 60 signed the
Abolition declaration, which became the basis for the Abolition 2000 NGO network. The Abolition Caucus
was opposed to the indefinite extension of the treaty. See Rebecca Johnson, "Indefinite Extension of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty: Risks and Reckonings", ACRONYM Report No. 7, September 1995 (London:
ACRONYM Institute). Online: http://www.acronvm.org.uk/acrorep/a07ext.htm
55
For example, Greenpeace is known for its publicity stunts at NPT meetings, while Arms Control Today
and Global Security Initiative regularly hold seminars with respected political figures and policy experts.
56
At the First Committee of the 60th General Assembly in 2006, NGOs were for the first time granted an
opportunity to present to delegates to the First Committee in a three-hour session of prepared presentations.
RCW facilitated the coordinated presentation in cooperation with the International Action Network on
Small Arms. In 2007, the presentation slot was reduced to one hour, with presentations on nuclear weapons
and the law, space security, and small arms and light weapons.
57
The NPT rules of procedure can be adapted by the Chair's interpretation for a particular meeting unless a
member state objects. At the 2004 PrepCom, South Africa raised a point of order questioning why
substantive thematic discussions were held in closed session and proposed opening them to the nongovernmental representatives present at the meeting. In the second week of the PrepCom, the chair agreed
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to allow NGOs in the hall and subsequent meetings have retained this practice. See RCW report of the
PrepCom in "A Point of Order", News in Review, 3 May 2004. Online:
http://www.reachingcriticalwiH.org/legal/npt/NI.R2004/dav6.pdf
58
The ODS pilot project began in 1992 to put all documents on a searchable online database and each UN
centre is responsible for posting all of its respective documents. The database is now extensive and
historical documents are being added. Online: http://www.im.Org/Depts/dhl/resguide/itp.htm#ods
59
A website for the Conference on Disarmament has existed since 2004, including a collection of official
documents and records of proceedings. For the first time in 2005, the Department of Disarmament Affairs
launched a website for the NPT RevCon featuring live webcasts, video streaming of government
interventions and all statements, online: http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/ However, the ODA resources
are not as comprehensive as RCW's site, lacking both the historical record and the oral, unofficial
interventions.
60
Email interview with Felicity Hill, Reaching Critical Will founder, 3 January 2008.
61
The initial project budget called for $30,000 to launch a website, produce a video, prepare introductory
materials and distribute hard copies to 500 NGOs, hire a full-time staff person on a 6 month contract and a
part time staff person for 3 months, publish a daily newsletter, and hold 4 reception and 8 press conferences
during the RevCon.
62
Mitchell develops the discussion of transparency by differentiating between different kinds of reporting
employed for compliance-oriented and effectiveness-oriented regimes. He develops a framework within
which further empirical study can be done to test the widely held assumption that transparency contributes
to regime success. Ronald B. Mitchell, "Sources of Transparency: Information Systems in International
Regimes", International Studies Quarterly 42 (1998) 109-130.
63
Grigorescu distinguishes between the flow of information to governments, the member states of
international organizations, and societal actors, including NGOs. The second flow is described as 'external'
transparency. But while acknowledging that both governments and NGOs in turn seek to inform the public,
he is careful also to consider the direct flow of information from IOs to the general public. Alexandru
Grigorescu, "Transparency of Intergovernmental Organizations: The Roles of Member States, International
Bureaucracies and Nongovernmental Organizations", International Studies Quarterly 51 (2007) 627.
64
Keohane is critical of how NGOs make normative claims for accountability in international
organizations. He argues that these institutions are subject to accountability claims from all actors, and
typically are accountable to member states, when in fact it is powerful states, multinational corporations,
religious organizations and terrorist networks that are not accountable to any actor. Robert O. Keohane,
"Global Governance and Democratic Accountability" in Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance.
David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi, eds. (Cambridge: Polity, 2003) 130-159.
65
Scholte argues that transparency and public accountability are among the key factors that enhance
democracy in global governance, and therefore legitimacy. But he is cautious that NGOs are ill-placed to
promote democracy in global governance when they lack transparency and public accountability
themselves. "Civil Society and Democracy in Global Governance", Global Governance 8 (2002) 299.
66
In 2000, New Zealand's Cabinet agreed a set of "Procedures for Including Non-Official Representatives
on Official Delegations to International Meetings", outlined in Cabinet Office Circular CO (00) 14 of 12
December 2000. The document provides standard procedures with regard to selection, approvals, and
funding for the inclusion of non-governmental representatives on delegations to international meetings. See
Appendix 3, original provided by Angela Woodward.
67
Michael Schechter notes that at least 14 non-governmental delegates participated on national delegations
to the Rio Conference on the Environment, and at the Cairo Conference on Population, NGO
representatives "constituted a large part of many official delegations - half in the case of the US
delegation." "Making meaningful UN-sponsored world conferences of the 1990s: NGOs to the rescue?" in
United Nations-sponsored World Conferences: Focus on Impact and Follow-up, Machael Schechter, ed.
(Toyko: United Nations University Press, 2001) 215, note 73 citing JoAnn Fagot Aviel, "NGOs and
International Affairs: A New Dimension of Diplomacy, " in Multilateral Diplomacy and the United
Nations Today, James P Muldoon et al, eds (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999) 160, note 27.
68
There is some evidence of NGO participation on delegations to meetings of the Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW) drawing from the landmine community. Several additional individuals were
contacted, all representatives on government delegations in the small arms process. Because of
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communication barriers, including language, I was not able to engage with all of those who filled this role
for their respective countries.
69
For the 2007 NPT PrepCom, the Canadian delegation did not request a nomination, but chose the
candidate from a pool of known experts.
70
As a government-funded research institute affiliated with the University of Frankfurt, PRIF's experts are
well respected in Germany. PRIF is not an NGO however its researchers are independent academics and
therefore non-governmental representatives.
71
In 2007, Ernie Regehr's name was proposed by officials as an NGO advisor for the Canadian NPT
PrepCom delegation; however his participation was not approved at the ministerial level.
72
While technically speaking, these academics do not represent an NGO in the direct sense, they are nongovernmental representatives and work at institutes with extensive programming on the non-proliferation
and disarmament file. In the NPT context, research institutes and non-academically affiliated NGOs have
the same credentials: non-governmental observers with no rights to intervene.
73
Interview with Prof. John Simpson, 22 February 2008. Prof. Simpson has attended every NPT meeting
since 1985 and therefore can provide the historical precedent to the UK government delegation, on which
he has been a delegate since 1998.
74
As a staff member and participant on the delegation of the World Council of Churches to the 2001 UN
Conference on SALW, I attended several NGO caucus meetings in which NGO members on government
delegations provided briefings about the closed-door proceedings.
75
Bev Delong, in her role as NGO Liaison to the Canadian delegation at the 2005 NPT RevCon and 2007
PrepCom mentioned sending regular progress reports to Canadian NGOs, as well as reports highlighting
items they might wish to act on in Canada during the conference. Email interview, 21 February 2008.
76
At the 2003 NPT PrepCom, Canada submitted a Working Paper outlining its position on NGO access,
entitled: "NGO participation in the NPT review process" NPT/CONF.2005/PC.II/WP.16. The paper was
based on research by Ernie Regehr, then Executive Director of Project Ploughshares and NGO Advisor on
the Canadian delegation. Online:
http://daccessdds.un.Org/doc/UN.DOC/GEN/G03/61.4/21/PDF/G0361421.pdf7OpenElement For the 2005
RevCon, this theme was part of a Working Paper entitled "Achieving permanence with accountability",
NPT/CONF.2005/WP.39 online: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/RevCon05/wpAVP39.pdf
77
Prof. John Simpson noted that until the 1998 NPT PrepCom, there was opposition to inviting NGO
participation on the UK delegation, however out of the need for procedural expertise and institutional
memory, he was engaged.
78
US resistance to NGO engagement in state-level processes has been observed in the nuclear arena,
although it often holds briefings with NGOs at NPT meetings. Consultation with the private sector in the
chemical weapons context and the small arms process is also common. I know of no recent cases in the
security and disarmament sector where the US has had non-governmental representatives as part of formal
delegations.
79
Email interview with Bev Delong, 21 February 2008.
80
Interview with Ernie Regehr, 20 February 2008.
81
This argument does not seek to assess whether the role of NGOs in international development has been
successful or not. Certainly there are many who would argue it has not been, see
82
The norm is not universally accepted and a number of countries have never engaged NGO experts on
official delegations. The US has had limited NGO cooperation, and there are very few examples from
Middle-Eastern, Eastern European, or Asian countries, namely China which has expressed reservation
toward NGO participation in security fora in the past.
83
Jody Williams and Steve Goose noted: "A major strength of the ICBL was its ability to cut across
disciplines to bring together a diverse array of NGOs to work towards a single goal." See "The
International Campaign to Ban Landmines" in Cameron et al, op. cit.., 22.
84
The Kenya Coalition Against Landmines was an original member of the Core Group, which in 2005 was
renamed an Editorial Board when Mines Action Canada assumed the role of lead agency, which Human
Rights Watch had held since 1999. Landmine Monitor Report 2005: Toward a Mine-Free World, Executive
Summary, 2.
85
Maintenance of the online database has subsequently stopped. Steve Goose and Mary Wareham of
Human Rights Watch (then publisher of the Landmine Monitor) provided an overview of the 1999 report,
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Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World, based on its Executive Summary, in
"Landmine Monitor: Citizens Verification in Action" in Disarmament Forum 4 (1999) 33-43.
86
"Landmine Monitor Researcher" job posting from www;ieljefwekinj Reference Code RW6HKL57-19
closed as of 14 November 2005.
87
Initially, Landmine Monitor relied almost exclusively on researchers from within the ICBL network, but
it was not always true that a good campaigner made a good researcher. In order to ensure consistent and
high-caliber research, professional researchers were engaged to work on the annual report where necessary.
The network now consists of both professional researchers, and network representatives.
88
Data from "About Landmine Monitor" and "Acknowledgements" sections of successive issues of the
Landmine Monitor Report Executive Summary (1999-2007). Online: www.icbl.org/lm. 2008 figures with
the list of current researchers online: http://www.icbl.org/lm/contacts/research network
89
Each issue of the report, in the "About Landmine Monitor" section of the front matter, includes some
version of the following caveat: "Landmine Monitor acknowledges that this ambitious report has its
shortcomings. It is to be viewed as a work in progress, a system that will be continuously updated,
corrected and improved. We welcome comments, clarifications, and corrections from governments and
others, in the spirit of dialogue and in the search for accurate and reliable information on a difficult
subject."
90
The exact timeline has varied slightly over the years, depending whether the Meeting of States Parties
was held in September or November. The first report was produced on a very compressed schedule in order
to meet the deadline of the First Meeting of States Parties, held in Maputo, Mozambique in May 1999. The
editors acknowledged that strict time constraints "did not allow for full synthesis and analysis of the wealth
of information gathered." In "About Landmine Monitor", Landmine Monitor Report 1999: Toward a MineFree World, 2.
91
Burma is, for example, a country for which a particular research methodology has been developed to
overcome the limitations on information access the result from a secretive military regime and general
incapacity in the country's institutions. Absolute measures are therefore impossible, but indicators have
been developed based on interviews with humanitarian aid staff and landmine victims at the border refugee
camps to approximate landmine-affected regions and their markings, and to track incidents. Telephone
interview with Yeshua Mosher-Puangsuwan, Burma country researcher, 21 March 2008.
92
The About Landmine Monitor section of every report reiterates this pledge stating: "Landmine Monitor
is not designed to send researchers into harm's way and does not include hot war-zone reporting."
Landmine Monitor Report 2007': Toward a Mine-Free World, Executive Summary, V.
93
The UN Mine Action Centre provides its mine action resources (a database, links, and newsletter) online:
http://www.mineaction.org/'. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, a Swissgovernment funded NGO, maintains its website onlinet: http://www.gichd.org/ Research resources include
a major database of mine-related evaluations organized by country, subject, commissioning organization,
evaluated organization and date.
94
Each of the four editorial board member organizations appoints one of the Thematic Research
Coordinators and pays their salary.
95
Different formations of the consultation process have been used in the past, including two full network
meetings, a series of regional meetings and a full network meeting, and more recently a focused
preliminary consultation with the Thematic Research Coordinators with a full network meeting near the
end of the process. Unfortunately, the costs of holding the international meeting are prohibitive and in
2008, no full network meeting will be held.
96
The Landmine Monitor 2008 Research Orientation Guide, a 48 page document for the use of all
researchers, is on the ICBL website at:
http://www.icbl.org/lm/content/download/29671/474135/file/LM08_Research_Orientation_Guide.pdf
97
"Ban Policy Guidelines" for Landmine Monitor Report 2008, 3. Online:
http://www.icbl.org/lm/content/download/28843/468697/file/2008JJan_Guide.pdf
98
See Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines",
International Organization 52:3, 1998: 613-644.
99
Emily Schroeder, Rhianna Tyson and Ray Acheson were all WILPF interns before being hired as
Program Associate. Edith Ballantyne has been engaged on disarmament themes for some 40 years and is
still active as an advisor. Suzi Snyder, current Secretary General, has worked with WILPF for five years,
previously at the UN office and now at the International Secretariat offices in Geneva.

126

100

Email from Randy Rydell, 18 March 2008.
Rhianna Tyson noted that improvements in scanning technology, and the availability of a portable
scanner and laptop, have enabled RCW to make documents available almost immediately after the staff
acquire a hard copy.
102
In 2008, RCW launched its new website which has a more sophisticated graphical style, but retains the
simple format and orderliness of the first design.
103
Warkentin is interested in the role the internet plays in enabling NGOs to contribute to international
politics as part of 'global civil society'. His analysis explores dynamism, exhibited by flexibility and
adaptability, inclusiveness, exhibited by networking and participation, and cognizance, exhibited by
informed activism in eight case studies from the environmental and development sectors, and several online
resource networks. Reshaping World Politics: NGOs, the Internet and Global Civil Society (Lanham, MD:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001).
104
Although transparency is frequently referenced in the multi-lateral context it remains ill-defined and
there is no agreed way of measuring transparency. Ann Florini examines these challenges in her article,
"Does the Invisible Hand Need a Transparent Glove? The Politics of Transparency" Paper prepared for the
Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, D.C., April 28-30, 1999.
Online: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWB.IGOVANTCQR/Resource-s/florini.pdf
105
Dr. Potter's support for the Kyrgyz delegation extends from his involvement in a Monterrey Institute for
International Studies program in the early 1990's to train young diplomats from the NIS on nonproliferation and related themes and his personal connections with a former Soviet diplomat who was in
residence at MIIS during that time. Email interview with Dr. Potter, 22 February 2008.
I know of no cases where individuals from particularly activist organizations have served as official
delegation members. Some organizations, Amnesty International for example, have policies against
aligning too closely with governments for risk of appearing compromised and would therefore likely refuse
an invitation to join a government delegation. Invited to join the New Zealand delegation to the 2000 NPT
RevCon, Alyn Ware of International Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms refused the opportunity in order to
maintain his independence as an NGO activist.
107
Haas does not limit this to scientific communities, but rather states: "what bonds members of an
epistemic community is their shared belief or faith in the verity and the applicability of particular forms of
knowledge or specific truths." "Introduction: epistemic communities and international policy
coordination", International Organization 42:1 (1992) 3, note 4.
108
Though much more technical in nature, the provisional secretariat for the Comprehensive Test Ban
Treaty and its International Monitoring Network for example, operates on an annual budget split between
$56.58 million US plus 43.57 million Euro for 2008. "The United States pays US $23.8 million to the
CTBTO" (Vienna, CTBTO Press Release: 26 February 2008). Online:
http://www.ctbto.org/press centre/press release.dhtml?item=313
109
In the early years of RCW there were in fact complaints from other NGOs that felt RCW was
undervaluing its work and therefore making it hard for other NGOs to justify their project budgets.
However, the nature and focus of its work has never made RCW a particularly 'fundable' project and its
budget remains very constrained.
110
It was observed by at least one NGO representative that bearing the upfront costs of attending a multiweek meeting in New York or Geneva is prohibitive and therefore could limit the pool of potential
participants. The same individual is an unpaid NGO worker, but whose travel expenses were paid for by the
government she represented.
111
For example, Gotz Neuneck funded his own participation on the 2005 German NPT delegation; Angela
Woodward received support from the New Zealand Peace and Disarmament Education Trust for
participation in the BWC delegation; and IANSA assisted Florella Hazeley in her attendance to the UN
PoA RevCon on the delegation of Sierra Leone.
112
This observation is based on personal experience in seeking funding for a space security monitoring
project that was initiated, and funded, by the Canadian government. The government funder planned to
decrease its funding for the project after the second year while other private foundations encouraged the
project manager to pursue 'sustainable' government funding.
113
Paul Hannon described his experience in fundraising and the perpetual struggle to ensure funds for the
Landmine Monitor from year to year.
114
In 2008 no international Landmine Monitor conference will be held because of insufficient funding.
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Rhianna Tyson, RCW Project Manager from 2003 to 2005, observed that the events of 9/11 instigated a
shift in the funding priorities of US foundations, the dominant source of RCW project funding. Even
among more sympathetic funders, interest shifted to domestic issues away from the multilateral sector, and
to the terrorism agenda away from traditional disarmament themes, affecting RCW's ability to finance its
budget.
116
Data from "Acknowledgements" sections of respective issues of the Landmine Monitor Report,
Executive Summary (1999-2007) Online: www.icbl.org/lm.
117
Theoretically, a single incident of quasi-state activity might be possible, however, the cases demonstrate
that political openness, programmatic tools including financial resources, and institutional support over the
long-term enable this level of engagement with states in the multilateral context.
118
As mentioned above, several countries including Burma, the DPRK and Iran, refuse to cooperate with
Landmine Monitor however the vast majority do.
119
A database of all government correspondence is included on the Landmine Monitor website, and can be
sorted by country or date. Online: http://www.icbl.org/lm/comments/
120
It must be acknowledged that civil society has long played an active role in monitoring human rights
around the world under the leadership of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch among others.
121
Paul Hannon noted that each of the core group of states that drove the Ottawa Process and funded the
Monitor were unhappy with how they were reflected in the first issue of the report. Mary Wareham cites
Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy's displeasure with the following reference from the
1999 Annual Report:
"Canada appended the following "understanding" to its ratification instrument:
'It is the understanding of the Government of Canada that, in the context of operations, exercises or other
military activity sanctioned by the United Nations or otherwise conducted in accordance with the
international law, the mere participation by the Canadian Forces, or individual Canadians, in operations,
exercises or other military activity conducted in combination with the armedforces of States not party to
the Convention which engage in activity prohibited under the Convention would not, by itself, be
considered to be assistance, encouragement or inducement in accordance with the meaning of those terms
in Article 1, paragraph 1(c). '1[2]
This understanding seems clearly aimed at permitting Canadian forces to fight side-by-side with the United
States in a war in which U.S. forces use antipersonnel mines. "
"Canada Country Report" Landmine Monitor 1999: Toward a Mine-Free World. Online:
http://www.icbl.org/lm/1999/canada.html
122
Paul Hannon of Mines Action Canada, the current editorial lead agency, noted that the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, Burma (Myanmar), and increasingly Iran are not cooperative with researchers
while Russia and China have never been forthcoming with information. Interview, 1 April 2008.
123
In 2002, the US discontinued its own semi-annual report on landmine production, stockpiles and use
because the Landmine Monitor was doing the same work better and at a lower cost.
124
Letter from Richard Maude, Assistant Secretary, Arms Control and Disarmament Branch, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, to Mary Wareham, Landmine Monitor, 7 September 2000. Online:
http://www.icbl.org/lrn/cornments/(,sortVcountry
125
Meetings of States Parties have been held in Maputo, Mozambique (1999) Managua, Nicaragua (2001)
Bangkok, Thailand (2003) Nairobi, Kenya (RevCon - 2004), Zagreb, Croatia (2005) and The Dead Sea,
Jordan (2007) and in Geneva during alternating years. Four Intersessional Standing Committees meet
annually in Geneva as well.
126
An account of field-based mine action projects supported by UNDO, UNICEF and UN Mine Action
Service (DPKO) is published annually. Portfolio of Mine Action Projects 2007, tenth edition by Mine
Action Service (DPKO), UNDP, UNICEF (New York 2007: UN)
127
United Nations Inter-Agency Mine-Action Strategy: 2006-2011. Online:
httElZ/wwvymdjxorg^
128
April 4, 2008 Message from the UN Secretary General on the International Day for Mine Awareness
and Assistance in Mine Action online: http://www.mineaction.org/overview.asp?o=2166&
129
Some in the wider NGO community are concerned about possible compromise when an initiative is so
closely connected with states.
130
Of course this access must conform to the rules of procedure for the respective bodies, dependent on
whether a session is open or closed, or other restrictions of the chairperson.
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For major conferences such as meetings of the NPT Review Cycle, all NGOs are required to be
accredited specifically for that event, so the grounds pass is less important.
Stephanie Fraser was tasked with developing the first RCW website and collected key NPT documents
including treaty texts, agenda, and official conference documents from the UN library, copied them to disk,
and posted them online for NGOs to use in preparation for the RevCon. She noted that the US State
Department linked its website to the RCW site for access to the documents for the 2000 RevCon. During
the conference, the British American Security and Information Council (BASIC) scanned and posted key
conference statements and interventions, which RCW linked to. After 2000, RCW took on this role
entirely.
133
One former staff person (2003-4) recalled occasional difficulty in tracking down documents from thenDDA, but overall the relationship was described as productive and reciprocal.
134
There is of course regularly opposition to the more contentious content of the newletter. Some
diplomats, however, have told RCW staff that they use the newsletter to report back to their capital during a
busy conference and others from smaller delegations rely on the newsletter to follow the proceedings when
they cannot attend all meetings.
135
For example, the 2008 Norwegian statement on Negative Security Assurances was shared with RCW
and is posted online, but it was not disseminated in the meeting hall. Online:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom08/statements/May02Norway ND&NSA.pdf
136
UN security badges are colour-coded depending on the kind of accreditation the individual carries. NGO
badges are generally brown, while government badges are red, and the heads of delegations wear a yellow
badge.
137
In cases where the non-governmental expert's costs are not covered by the government this is less
common.
138
Online: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/lJNDOC/GEN/N91/289/95/PDF/N9128995.pdf?OpenBlerneni
139
Describing his instructions from DFAIT, Regehr noted he was told to push as far as possible for a strong
mechanism without breaking consensus among the Group. Interview 20 February 2008.
140
See the Conventional Arms Register online: http://disarmament.un.org/cab/register.html
141
Regehr recounted that on one occasion in the negotiations a US delegate questioned whether a comment
he made "was the position of the Canadian government". Interview 20 February 2008.
142
There was reportedly some apprehension to Regehr's participation among the officials in International
Trade who implement export control policy, although Foreign Affairs had the lead on the portfolio and
were responsible for appointing the representative.
143
The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC) is accredited with ECOSOC as a
member of the Roster pursuant to Council Resolution 1996/302. E/2007/INF/4"List of non-governmental
organizations in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council as of October 17, 2007". Online:
http://esa.iin.org/coordiiiation/iigo/new/INF2007.pdf
144
Of course that is not to say these individuals to do not cultivate relationships with donors: the NGO
representatives have programmatic funding needs unrelated to participation on delegations and most of the
academics are also engaged in seeking funds for research. Those that did require funds to participate in the
delegation made use of existing academic and foundation contacts. For example, Angela Woodward's
travel was funded by a scholarship program for peace and disarmament research and IANSA supported
travel for small arms representatives from developing countries.
145
Since 1007, the Canadian Landmine Fund has funded landmine-related programming in affected
countries totaling $172 million however the funding runs out in 2008. Online:
http://www.international.gc.ca/foreign_policy/mines/iv/menu-en.asp
146
This is an observation partly from personal experience of attending events with diplomats from these
states parties. Further, Ambassadors from several of these have been interviewed for the News in Review,
and Mexico has repeatedly welcomed NGO involvement in the NPT in its official statements. Notably, at
the 2007 PrepCom, Costa Rica submitted a working paper on a Model Nuclear Weapons Convention, based
on the work of several NGOs. Online:
http://www.reachingcriticalwill.Org/legal/ii:pt/prepcom07/workingpapers/17.pdf
147
UN A/53/150 - "Arrangements and practices for the interaction of non-governmental organizations in
all activities of the United Nations system", Report of the Secretary-General. 10 July 1998. Online:
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/53/plenary/a53-170.htm
148
Online: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/376/41/PDF/N0437641.pdf7OpenElement
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Peter Willetts gave a scathing review of the Cardoso Report, criticizing the unqualified panel
membership; incoherent theoretical assumptions; and impractical recommendations. He observed that "The
Cardoso Report was poorly received by all significant political actors: by governments from both the North
and the South, by most NGOs, and by the UN Secretary-General." "The Cardoso Report on the UN and
Civl Society: Functionalism, Global Corporatism, or Global Democracy?", Global Governance 12:3 (2006)
308. Among the NGO community, the Global Policy Forum - a New York-based NGO with expertise in
UN-NGO relations - responded to the report with criticism of the 'multistakeholder approach', which it
views as a sub-text for increasing business partnerships. Among its greatest criticisms was the proposal to
merge the NGO Liaison Service with several other bodies serving non-state constituencies. Jens Martens
and James Paul, "Comments on the Report of the Cardoso Panel (New York: Global Policy Forum) August
2004. Online: http://wwvv.globalpolicv.org/reform/initiatives/panels/cardoso/08gpf.pdf. The Secretary
General responded to the report in: UN A/59/354 - Report of the Secretary-General in response to the
report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations. 13 September 2004.
Online: http://www.un-iigls.org/edited%20advance%20report0/o20of)/o20SG%20on%20Cardoso.pdf
150
This statement is repeated annually in the "About Landmine Monitor" section of Toward a Mine-Free
World.
151
While professionalism may be perceived as an attribute when it increases effectiveness, the disarmament
community has experienced division between organizations perceived to be professional and others with a
grassroots base. In other sectors, including human rights and development, professionalism is equated with
elitism, particularly in the developing world. See Rana Lehr-Lehnardt, "NGO Legitimacy: Reassessing
Democracy, Accountability and Transparency", Cornell Law School LL.M. Papers Series 6 (2005) 22.
152
Quoted form email correspondence with Randy Rydell, Senior Political Advisor, Office of Disarmament
Affairs, 18 March 2008.
153
Quoted from email correspondence with Dr. Bill Potter, 22 February 2008.
154
See "About the Bio Weapons Prevention Project" online: http://wwvv.bwpp.org/about.html
155
While BWPP planned to publish an annual analysis of developments with regard to the BTWC, it only
published one copy of the BioWeapons Report, in 2004, online:
http://www.bwpp.org/documents/2004BWRFinal 000.pdf
156
The Bite the Bullet project maintained final editorial responsibility for the content of the report and
acknowledges limitations because of lack of transparency in some countries, the wide scope of the PoA and
the gap between publication (May 2006) and the July 2006 Review Conference. See, Mike Bourne et al,
Reviewing Action on Small Arms 2006: Assessing the First Five Years of the UN Programme of Action.
Arms (Biting the Bullet, 2006). Online: http://www.international-alert.org/pdfs/red_book_2006.pdf
157
1 have, however, stated above that this support is never guaranteed, as policy developments and new
government priorities will always affect the ability to raise funds in particular.
158
The unwritten diplomatic dress code calls for business attire at all official meetings. NGOs attending
multilateral meetings regularly adapt their dress accordingly, which is essentially a requirement for nongovernmental experts.
159
Bosire Maragia states: "NGOs are not international legal persons, and by extrapolation, are not therefore
subjects of international law with rights and duties thereunder. Adhering to the letter of the law, NGOs do
not generally have official rights of participation save those narrowly defined under specific international
instruments such as Article 71 of the United Nations." "Almost there: Another way of conceptualizing and
explaining NGOs quest for legitimacy in global politics", Non-State Actors and International Law 2 (2002)
304.
160
There is a large body of literature, particularly in the development sector, that expands upon these
arguments. See Claire Mercer, op. cit., for a review of the literature.
161
The Mine Ban Treaty has provisions for NGO observers at meetings of State Party, identified in Article
11.4. The UN PoA references civil society contributions to the small arms issue in Preambular Paragraph
16 and in Section IV, Paragraph 2 (c). Maragia notes that NGOs are given prominent place in the UN
human rights framework and environmental law, including the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance, and the Convention on the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage. Maragia, Op. cit., 329-330.
162
Rana Lehr-Lehnardt notes that ECOSOC encourages accountability and democratic process in the NGO
statute, with international NGOs only considered for accreditation if they are "of a representative character
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and of recognized international standing". "NGO Legitimacy: Reassessing Democracy, Accountability and
Transparency", Cornell Law School LL.MPapers Series 6 (2005) 36.
163
For various reasons, including compliance with charitable laws or the ECOSOC statute, many NGOs are
required to maintain such standards.
164
Use by non-state armed groups was reported in at least eight states in 2007. See Landmine Monitor
Report 2007: Toward a Mine-Free World, Executive Summary, 11.
165
A further five states parties have not formally declared whether or not they have AP mines but are not
believed to. Executive Summary, 15.
166
Among those unlikely to meet the deadline are Cambodia, Chad, Croatia, Mozambique, Niger, Peru,
Senegal, Tajikistan, Thailand, Venezuela, Yemen, Zimbabwe and Falkland Islands, for which Argentina
and the UK are responsible for mine clearance. Executive Summary, 25-6.
167
This total includes victims - death and injury - of mines, explosive remnants of war and victimactivated improvised explosive devices. The actual total of mine casualties is likely much higher due to the
inadequacy of casualty reporting in many affected countries: the report notes that "data collection is
inadequate or non-existent in 64 of 68 countries with recorded casualties." Executive Summary, 39.
168
The UN Institute for Disarmament Research did some useful work on NGO engagement in the security
and disarmament section, but there is room to build on this. See "NGOs as Partners: Assessing the Impact,
Recognizing the Potential" Issue, Disarmament Forum 1 (2002). The Verification Research, Training and
Information Centre (VERTIC) focused particularly on NGO monitoring. Online:
http://www.vertic.org/publications.asp
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Appendix 1 - Interviewees
Landmine Monitor
Robin Collins, Board Member, Mines Action Canada
Paul Harmon, Executive Director, Mines Action Canada
Jacqueline Hansen, Managing Editor, Landmine Monitor
Robert (Bob) Lawson, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (Canada)
Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan, Mine Ban Policy Research Coordinator, Landmine Monitor

Reaching Critical Will
Ray Acheson, Project Associate
Stephanie Fraser, Contractor, 1999-2000
Dimity Hawkins, Contractor, 2000-2001
Felicity Hill, Project Founder, former Manager, WILPF UN Office
Jennifer Nordstrom, Project Associate 2005-2007
Randy Rydell, Senior Political Affairs Office, Office of the High Representative, UN
Office for Disarmament Affairs
Emily Schroeder, Project Associate 2002-3
Susi Snyder, Secretary General, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom,
former Manager, WILPF UN Office
Rhianna Tyson, Project Associate 2003-5

Non-Governmental Experts
Ochieng Adala, Africa Peace Forum
Una Becker, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
Bev Delong, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
Florella Hazeley, Sierra Leone Action Network on Small Arms
Gotz Neuneck, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
William Potter, Monterrey Institute for International Affairs
Ernie Regehr, Senior Advisor, Project Ploughshares

John Simpson, University of Southampton
Stein Villumstad, World Conference on Religions for Peace (formerly with Norwegian
Church Aid)
Angela Woodward, VERTIC
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Appendix 2 - Article 7 of the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction
Article 7
Transparency Measures
1.
Each State Party shall report to the Secretary-General of the United Nations as
soon as practicable, and in any event not later than 180 days after the entry into force of
this Convention for that State Party on:
a) The national implementation measures referred to in Article 9;
b) The total of all stockpiled anti-personnel mines owned or possessed by it, or under
its jurisdiction or control, to include a breakdown of the type, quantity and, if
possible, lot numbers of each type of anti-personnel mine stockpiled;
c) To the extent possible, the location of all mined areas that contain, or are
suspected to contain, anti-personnel mines under its jurisdiction or control, to
include as much detail as possible regarding the type and quantity of each type of
anti-personnel mine in each mined area and when they were emplaced;
d) The types, quantities, and if possible, lot numbers of all anti-personnel mines
retained or transferred for the development of and training in mine detection,
mine clearance or mine destruction techniques, or transferred for the purpose of
destruction, as well as the institutions authorized by a State Party to retain or
transfer anti-personnel mines, in accordance with Article 3;
e) The status of programs for the conversion or de-commissioning of anti-personnel
mines production facilities;
f) The status of programs for the destruction of anti-personnel mines in accordance
with Articles 4 and 5, including details of the methods which will be used in
destruction, the location of all destruction sites and the applicable safety and
environmental standards to be observed;
g) The types and quantities of all anti-personnel mines destroyed after the entry into
force of this Convention for that State Party, to include a breakdown of the
quantity of each type of anti-personnel mine destroyed, in accordance with
Articles 4 and 5, respectively, along with, if possible, the lot numbers of each type
of anti-personnel mine in the case of destruction in accordance with Article 4;
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h) The technical characteristics of each type of anti-personnel mine produced, to the
extent known, and those currently owned or possessed by a State Party, giving,
where reasonably possible, such categories of information as may facilitate
identification and clearance of anti-personnel mines; at a minimum, this
information shall include the dimensions, fusing, explosive content, metallic
content, colour photographs and other information which may facilitate mine
clearance; and
i) The measures taken to provide an immediate and effective warning to the
population in relation to all areas identified under paragraph 2 of Article 5.
2.
The information provided in accordance with this Article shall be updated by the
States Parties annually, covering the last calendar year, and reported to the SecretaryGeneral of the United Nations not later than 30 April of each year.
3.
The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall transmit all such reports
received to the States Parties.
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Appendix 3 - New Zealand Policy on NGO Experts
CABINET OFFICE

CO (00) 14

CIRCULAR

12 December 2000
Officers for Enquiries:
Director, UN and Commonwealth
Division,

All Ministers
Parliamentary Under-Secretary
All Chief Executives
All Senior Private Secretaries

Procedures for Including Non-Official Representatives On Official
Delegations to International Meetings
Key Points
• Cabinet has agreed to standardise procedures for including non-official representatives on
official New Zealand delegations to international meetings.
• Decisions about including non-official representatives in official delegations should be
made in accordance with the guidelines attached to this circular and must be cleared in
writing with the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
• Ministers should seek approval from Cabinet to include Members of Parliament in official
delegations and should advise Cabinet about the inclusion of any non-official representatives
in official delegations at the same time as recommendations on Ministerial and official
participation are put to Cabinet.
Introduction
1

From time to time the government receives requests to include non-official

representatives in official New Zealand delegations to international meetings, or invites
non-official representatives (e.g. scientific or business experts) to join delegations
because of the special expertise they can offer. Among non-official representatives who
have joined New Zealand delegations in the past have been Members of Parliament,
members of Crown entities and state-owned enterprises, representatives of nongovernmental organisations (NGOs), industry groups, and representatives of Maori
interests.
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2

The inclusion of non-official representatives in official delegations contributes breadth
and specialist knowledge to the delegation, and can generate a better understanding of the
government's objectives in the parent organisations of non-official representatives.
Departments should consider the value that can be added to a New Zealand delegation by
the inclusion of appropriate non-official representatives.

3

Cabinet has agreed to a standard set of guidelines and procedures for including nonofficial representatives in official New Zealand delegations to international meetings.
This circular sets out those guidelines and outlines how departments should implement
them.

Guidelines Governing Inclusion of Non-Official Representatives in Official
Delegations
4

The guidelines have been developed from existing practice and guidelines in relation to
the inclusion of NGO officials in official delegations. Cabinet has amended these
guidelines and agreed to extend them to all non-official representatives being considered
for inclusion in official delegations. A copy of the guidelines is attached as Annex I.

5

A key to ensuring the effective operation of official delegations is to examine the balance
of the delegation in determining whether, or what proportion of, non-official
representatives should be included. To avoid claims of official bias when there are
competing requests for representation from similar NGOs, and where the size of the
delegation is limited, the bodies may be asked to agree on one or more representative
acceptable to them all.

6

It is generally expected that travel and accommodation costs of non-official members of
official delegations will be met by the members or their sponsoring organisations. Where
their inclusion is at the request of the government because of the special expertise they
may bring to the delegation, however, the government may consider meeting costs
officially.

7

Non-official representatives included in official New Zealand delegations to international
meetings must be either New Zealand permanent residents or New Zealand citizens.

Conditions Applying to Participation
8

For non-official representatives to be effective, it is desirable that they be able to
participate fully in the delegation's activities and be treated as full members of the team.
All members of official delegations are bound by conditions of confidentiality and take
their instructions from the head of the delegation, and these conditions must apply

equally to non-official representatives.
9

Representatives of NGOs, other non-official bodies, and civil society groups are required
to sign a standard undertaking governing members of official delegations. A copy of the
undertaking is attached as Annex II. A different procedure applies to Members of
Parliament (see paragraphs 15-16 below).
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Procedures
10 Proposals to include non-official representatives in official delegations to international
meetings must be cleared in advance in writing by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and
Trade.
11 The lead agency managing New Zealand's participation in an international meeting
should seek approval for the inclusion of non-official representatives under the terms of
the agreed guidelines. The lead agency is also responsible for ensuring that non-official
representatives sign the required undertaking in respect of conditions for participation in
official delegations.
12 Where an agency other than the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade has the lead, that
approval should be sought in a submission to the Minister concerned, which should be
referred to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade for agreement.
13 In cases where there is a well established and agreed practice of including non-official
representatives in delegations to regular meetings, such as for example the annual ILO
Conference, it is not necessary to seek approval on every occasion.
14 Cabinet should be advised of any non-official representatives in official delegations at the
same time as recommendations are made to Cabinet on Ministerial and official
participation.
Participation by Members of Parliament
15 The Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade will generally formalise the inclusion of any
Members of Parliament joining official delegations through the signature of a credentials
document. It is not appropriate to request Members of Parliament to sign the same
undertaking as other non-official representatives. Instead the Minister of Foreign Affairs
and Trade or, where appropriate, the Minister leading the delegation, will write to
Members of Parliament prior to the meeting drawing their attention to the conditions
governing members of official delegations.
16 The Minister leading the delegation and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, in
consultation with the Prime Minister and other interested Ministers, should seek approval
from Cabinet to include Members of Parliament in official delegations. This should, if
appropriate, occur at the same time as recommendations are made to Cabinet on
Ministerial and official participation.
Further Information
17 Further information is available from the United Nations and Commonwealth Division of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, telephone 494 8324.
Marie Shroff
Secretary of the Cabinet
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Annex I

Guidelines Governing Inclusion Of Non-Official Representatives
On Official Delegations
Decisions about the inclusion of non-official representatives on official delegations should be
taken by the Ministers concerned, who should be provided, where possible, with information
on the following points:
•

Whether the representative can obtain observer status at the conference in his or her own
right, through their parent body or through an NGO association. If this is possible, that
should be the preferred option.

•

The general objectives of the representative and their sponsoring organisation and their
particular objectives for the conference under consideration.

•

Points of similarity and difference between the government's policy and objectives and
those of the representative and their sponsoring organisation.

•

Advantages to the government in including the representative on the delegation, for
example because of specialised knowledge and expertise.

•

The general balance of the delegation, taking into account its overall size. The smaller the
delegation, the less appropriate it is to include non-official representation.

•

Whether the meeting is one where non-official representatives are perceived as
acceptable to other governments, especially the host government.

•

Assurance that the particular person nominated has the support of the sponsoring
organisation in question, is a New Zealand citizen or permanent resident and - on the
basis of known information - is a person acceptable to the government.

Should a selection have to be made amongst more than one qualified non-official
representative, the organisations concerned should reach agreement on one nomination for
the government to consider.
Participation by non-official representatives will be subject to acceptance in writing by the
person nominated of the conditions as set out in Annex II.
In principle, non-official representatives on official delegations should meet their own costs.
However, financial assistance may be considered when non-official attendance directly
advances the government's objectives.
Requests for assistance with travel costs for other than participation in official delegations
should be considered on a case by case basis. Such assistance will only be recommended if it
directly advances the government's objectives.
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Annex II
Conditions Applying To Participants In
New Zealand Delegations To International Meetings

Participation on official New Zealand delegations will be subject to the following conditions:
•

The participant will at all times be under the authority of the leader of the delegation or,
in his/her absence, that of the deputy leader, and will comply with their instructions or
with any instructions received from the New Zealand authorities.

•

As a participant in an official delegation the participant will act consistently with the
government's interests as identified in the brief or by the delegation leader. If required
he/she will also assist in compilation of the delegation report.

•

The confidentiality of information received through participation in the official
delegation is to be maintained. This information includes government documents,
restricted conference documents, delegation discussions and such international
negotiations as are conducted in camera.

•

This confidentiality shall particularly apply to any communications with the press.

•

The participant may brief sponsoring organisations on developments and results in the
negotiation but only on the basis that any information of a sensitive nature provided to
sponsoring organisations will not be revealed publicly by them.

•

Any articles written by the participant about the negotiations are subject to the clearance
of the leader of the delegation or the appropriate government authorities.

•

It is understood that inclusion in the delegation does not imply any obligation on behalf
of the New Zealand government to meet costs of non-governmental participants.

/ agree to abide by the above conditions in respect of my inclusion on the New Zealand
delegation to the
Signature:
Name:
Date:
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Appendix 4 - Table of Non-Governmental Experts
Name
Organizational
Affiliation
Title on Delegation
Country
Event
Tasks
Input into policy
positions
Compensation

Name
Organizational
Affiliation
Title on Delegation
Country
Event
Tasks
Input into policy
positions
Compensation

Name
Organizational
Affiliation
Title on Delegation
Country
Event
Tasks
Input into policy
positions
Compensation

Professor John Simpson
Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of
Southampton
Advisor
United Kingdom
Non-Proliferation Treaty- 1998, 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004
PrepComs; 2000 and 2005 RevCons
Expert advisor, institutional memory
Not into written statements; participation in daily briefings and
regular consultation with other delegation members
Travel and expenses for attendance at meetings

Ernie Regehr
Senior Advisor, Project Ploughshares
Various: NGO Advisor and Expert Advisor
Canada
2001 UN Conference on SALW; 1999, 2002, 2003, 2004 NPT
PrepComs; 2000 and 2005 NPT Rev Cons
Expert advice on policy positions, reporting to NGOs, specific
research tasks at some NPT meetings
Commented on draft interventions, responded to discussion of
positions at daily briefings, drafted working papers
Travel and expenses for attendance at meetings

Dr. Gotz Neuneck
Senior Fellow, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy,
University of Hamburg
Technical Advisor
Germany
NPT
Learning about the process, reporting and building contacts with
NGOs
No
None
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Name
Organizational
Affiliation
Title on Delegation
Country
Event
Tasks

Input into policy
positions
Compensation

Name
Organizational
Affiliation
Title on Delegation
Country
Event
Tasks
Input into policy
positions
Compensation

Name
Organizational
Affiliation
Title on Delegation
Country
Event

Tasks
Input into policy
positions
Compensation

Bev Delong
Chairperson, Canadian Network to Abolish Nuclear Weapons
NPT Liaison
Canada
2005 NPT RevCon, 2007, 2008 PrepComs
Attend NGO events and report to delegation; report to Canadian
NGOs on conference developments; participate in delegation
meetings and discussions
Opportunity to comment on statements and provide input in
delegation meetings - confidentiality statement required
Expenses and travel for participation in meetings

Angela Woodward
Executive Director, VERTIC
Non-official representative
New Zealand
BWC Review Conference, December 2006
Observe proceedings and side meetings, offer advice and
comment on positions
Reviewed and commented on draft statements
None, external support for travel expenses

Stein Villumstad
Norwegian Church Aid and Norwegian Initiative on Small
Arms Transfers (NISAT) Coalition
Advisor
Norway
2001 UN Conference on SALW and its PrepComs (3); two
other regional SALW meetings; bilateral human security
consultations with Canada
Input into drafting of statements, bridge between delegation and
NGO community
Directly involved in statement drafting
Travel and expenses for attendance at meetings
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Name
Organizational
Affiliation
Title on Delegation
Country
Event
Tasks
Input into policy
positions
Compensation

Name
Organizational
Affiliation
Title on Delegation
Country
Event
Tasks

Input into policy
positions
Compensation

Name
Organizational
Affiliation
Title on Delegation
Country
Event
Tasks

Input into policy
positions
Compensation

Dr. William (Bill) Potter
Monterey Institute for International Studies
Technical Advisor
Kyrgyzstan
NPT: 1995, 2000, 2005 RevCons and 1997, 1998, 1999, 2002,
2003,2004 and 2007 PrepComs
To provide technical counsel as needed, institutional memory
Regular input into statements
None

Una Becker
Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
Scientific Advisor
Germany
BWC RevCon 2002, 2005; PrepCom 2006; Meeting of States
Parties 2004, 2005, 2007
To report on side events and discussions to other delegation
members; provide background information on states' positions;
analyse draft documents and comment on general policy
questions
Not involved in preparation of draft interventions, but did codraft a Working Paper for the 2006 RevCon
Expenses covered by institute in early years, since 2006 paid for
by foreign ministry

Florella Hazeley
Council of Churches in Sierra Leone
Civil Society member
Sierra Leone
2006 RevCon for the UN PoA (unable to attend 2005 PrepCom,
but participated in preparation)
Reporting to other NGOs on closed sessions, cooperation with
Ambassador leading delegation, contributed to country
statement and national report
Yes, direct input into government statements
No support from government, some funding from IANSA for
expenses
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Name
Organizational
Affiliation
Title on Delegation
Country
Event
Tasks

Input into policy
positions
Compensation

Ochieng Adala
Executive Director, Africa Peace Forum
Advisor
Kenya
UN PoA BMS (2005) and RevCon (2006)
Consultation on national positions, assistance in drafting
interventions and position papers, participation in daily
briefings
Yes, direct input into government statements
No support from government, some funding from another NGO
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Appendix 5 - List of Non-Governmental Experts in
the Small Arms and Light Weapons Process
Civil society organisations accredited to government delegations for the UN small
arms process since 2005

BMS 2005:
Argentina (Dario Kosovsky, INECIP)
Australia (Stephanie Koorey, Australian National University)
Burundi (Ilhan Berkol, GRIP)
Canada (David Jackman, QUNO)
Costa Rica (Luis Alberto Cordero, Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress)
Cote d'lvoire (Claudio Gramizzi, GRIP)
Finland (Anne Palm, Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network, Sanna Rummakko,
Peace Union of Finland)
Germany (Simone Wisotzki, Peace Research Institute, Robert Lindner, Oxfam
Deutschland)
Guatemala (Carmen Rosa de Leon, and Mayda de Leon Wantland, IEPADES)
Ireland (Tony d'Costa, Pax Christi)
Kenya (Ochieng Adala, African Peace Forum, Peter Gunja, Jan Kamenju, Johnstone
Kibor, Kenya Coalition Against Landmines, Roselyn Mungai, Oxfam GB)
Mali (Mohammed Coulibaly, Oxfam GB, Abba Toure, WAANSA)
Mexico (Mariana Fernandez, CAENI)
Netherlands (Undule Mwakasungara, CHRR)
Norway (Nic Marsh, PRIO)
New Zealand (Philip Alpers, IANSA Pacific, Damien Rogers, Australian National
University)
Nigeria (Dickson Orji, NANSA, but he couldn't come)
Sierra Leone (Florella Hazeley, CCSL, but she couldn't come)
Sri Lanka (Kingsley Rodrigo, SASA-Net Sri Lanka)
Trinidad & Tobago (Folade Mutota, WINAD)
UK (Paul Eavis, Saferworld)
*In addition, the delegation of Switzerland included Keith Krause and Eric Berman of the
Small Arms Survey.

PrepCom 2006:
Canada (Peggy Mason, Group of 78; Lynn Griffiths-Fulton, Ploughshares)
Chile (Luis Alvarado, SerPaJ)
Cote d'lvoire (Claudio Gramizzi, GRIP)
Finland (Anne Palm, Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network; Sanna Rummakko,
Peace Union of Finland)
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Germany (Robert Lindner, Oxfam Deutschland)
Guatemala (Carmen Rosa de Leon, and Mayda de Leon Wantland, IEPADES)
Ireland (Tony D'Costa, Pax Christi Ireland)
Kenya (Ochieng Adala, African Peace Forum; Roselyn Mungai, Oxfam GB)
Mexico (Roberto Dondisch, CAENI)
Netherlands (Johnstone Kibor, Kenya Coalition Against Landmines; Holger Anders,
GRIP)
Norway (Nic Marsh, PRIO)
Senegal (Christiane Agboton Johnson, MALAO)
Uganda (Canon Joyce Nima, UJCC)
UK (Paul Eavis, Saferworld)
*In addition, the delegation of Switzerland included Keith Krause and Eric Berman of the
Small Arms Survey.

RevCon 2006:
Australia (Cate Buchanan, HD Centre, and Sam Lee Coalition for Gun Control)
Canada (Ken Epps, Project Ploughshares)
Cote d'lvoire (Claudio Gramizzi, GRIP)
Finland (Anne Palm, Civil Society Conflict Prevention Network, and Laura Lodenius,
Peace Union of Finland)
Germany (Robert Lindner, Oxfam Deutschland; Simone Wisotzki, Peace Research
Institute Frankfurt)
Guatemala (Carmen Rosa de Leon, and Mayda de Leon Wantland, IEPADES)
Ireland (Tony D'Costa, Pax Christi Ireland)
Kenya (Ochieng Adala, African Peace Forum; Roselyn Mungai, Oxfam GB)
Lesotho (Kathleho Pefole, Transformation Resource Centre)
Mali (Mohammed Coulibaly, Oxfam GB)
Mexico (Roberto Dondisch, CAENI; Wendy Cukier, CGC)
New Zealand (Mary Wareham, Oxfam NZ, and Philip Alpers, IANSA Pacific)
Niger (Ilhan Berkol, GRIP)
Norway (Nic Marsh, PRIO)
Panama (Vicente Blake, ALUDEC)
Senegal (Christiane Agboton Johnson, MALAO)
Sierra Leone (Florella Hazeley, SLANSA)
Spain (Richard Magan, Oxfam Intermom)
Sri Lanka (Kingsley Rodrigo, PAFFREL)
Uganda (Canon Joyce Nima, UJCC; Richard Mugisha, People With Disabilities Uganda)
UK (Paul Eavis, Saferworld)
*In addition, the delegation of Switzerland included Keith Krause and Eric Berman of the
Small Arms Survey.
(List Provided by Alun Howard of the International Action Network on Small Arms)
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